Accessibility statement

Truth and the World - PHI00137H

« Back to module search

  • Department: Philosophy
  • Module co-ordinator: Dr. David Austin
  • Credit value: 20 credits
  • Credit level: H
  • Academic year of delivery: 2022-23

Module summary

This module considers philosophical issues about the nature of truth and truth-value bearers, focusing on theories of truth that accept a correspondence between truth and the world or that what is true depends upon what exists (e.g., truth-maker theory). The module explores some of the areas in which such theories have ramifications, including negative truths, modal truths, and tensed truths.

Module will run

Occurrence Teaching cycle
A Spring Term 2022-23

Module aims

To explore ongoing debates about the nature of truth and truth-value bearers (propositions) and the relationship between truth and the world.

To provide a research-led approach to understanding and participating in contemporary debates on the metaphysics of truth and propositions.

To develop some key skills and abilities, such as: understanding challenging philosophical puzzles, views, and arguments; discussing complex and difficult conceptual problems with others; evaluating views and arguments; arriving at your own view on a question, based on and informed by an understanding of contributions to the debate, and then assembling a reasoned case for that view; undertaking independent research; and, finding your way through a range of connected debates, grasping connections between them.

Module learning outcomes

Upon successful completion of the module, students should be able to:

Understand some key puzzles, problems, and theories concerning truth, truth-making, and truth-value bearers, and explain those in clear and precise terms, showing critical awareness and an ability to synthesise information and ideas from a variety of academic sources.

Develop and articulate detailed arguments for and against theories of truth that accept some sort of correspondence between truth and the world.

Be able to read and critically engage with contemporary work on (i) the metaphysics of truth and truth-making, and (ii) the metaphysics of propositions, in an independent and autonomous way.

Have further developed their skills in philosophical discussion and writing.

Assessment

Task Length % of module mark
Essay/coursework
Summative Essay		 N/A 100

Special assessment rules

None

Additional assessment information

The formative essay plan is due on Friday, Week 8 of Spring Term.

The summative essay is due by 12 noon on Monday, Week 2 of Summer Term.

Reassessment

Task Length % of module mark
Essay/coursework
Summative Essay		 N/A 100

Module feedback

Students will receive feedback on formative assessment 2 weeks after the submission deadline.

Students will receive feedback on summative assessment (and any reassessment) 4 weeks after the submission deadline.

Indicative reading

Armstrong, David M. (2004) Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge University Press

Barker, Stephen & Jago, Mark (2012) ‘Being positive about negative facts’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 117–138

Bennett, Karen (2011) ‘Truthmaking and case-making’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 187–195

Cameron, Ross (2008) ‘How to be a truthmaker maximalist’ Noûs 42: 410–421

Hawley, Katherine (2011) ‘Trivial truthmaking matters’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83: 196–202

Hornsby, Jennifer (2005) ‘Truth without truthmaking entities’ in Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd, Oxford University Press

Keller, Lorraine (2013) ‘The metaphysics of propositional constituency’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43: 655–678

Melia, Joseph (2005) ‘Truthmaking without truthmakers’ in Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd, Oxford University Press

Merricks, Trenton (2007) Truth and Ontology, Oxford University Press

Merricks, Trenton (2015) Propositions, Oxford University Press

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (2005) ‘Why truthmakers’ in Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd, Oxford University Press

Tallant, Jonathan (2009) ‘Ontological cheats might just prosper’ Analysis 69: 422–430

Tallant, Jonathan & Ingram, David (2017) ‘Truth and dependence’ Ergo 4: 955–980

Wang, Jennifer (2016) ‘Representation and explanation’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93: 462–468


The information on this page is indicative of the module that is currently on offer. The University is constantly exploring ways to enhance and improve its degree programmes and therefore reserves the right to make variations to the content and method of delivery of modules, and to discontinue modules, if such action is reasonably considered to be necessary by the University. Where appropriate, the University will notify and consult with affected students in advance about any changes that are required in line with the University's policy on the Approval of Modifications to Existing Taught Programmes of Study.