Anke Gerber - On the Endogenous Order of Play in Sequential Games

Seminar
  • Date and time: Wednesday 19 February 2025, 1pm to 2pm
  • Location: In-person only
    A/EW105
  • Audience: Open to staff, students
  • Admission: Free admission, booking not required

Event details

Author: Anke Gerber (Hamburg)

Abstract:  Cases abound in political or industrial competition where it is not reasonable to assume that agents will passively wait for their turn to act. We formalize, under the name of games of addition, the strategic interaction between agents who sequentially take actions, but may also agree unanimously to stop taking further actions and collect the payoffs associated with the given sequence of moves. Our formalization differs from that of extensive form games in that the order of the agents' moves is not predetermined but emerges endogenously when applying an adapted version of a solution concept proposed by Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2004). We provide results regarding the properties of solutions to games of addition, and we also demonstrate that the predicted outcomes may significantly differ from those obtained if using extensive form games and subgame perfection as alternative tools of analysis.

Host:  Yuan Ju (York)