Setting reserve prices in English auctions with limited commitment: an empirical assessment

Friday 16 November 2018, 1.00PM to - 2.00pm

Speaker(s): Ricardo Gonçalves (Catolica Porto Business School)

Abstract: This paper is an empirical assessment of reserve price setting in a limited commitment environment, where the seller is unable to commit not to re-auction a good at a later date if the reserve price is not met. We find that the dynamics of reserve price setting over time (a declining reserve price path) are consistent with the theoretical predictions. However, several other predictions have little or no empirical support. We present and discuss some possible explanations for our results, especially the (possible) failure of sellers to incorporate the limited commitment environment in their decision making process.

Location: ERC (Economics Resource Centre), Seminar Room A/D/271 (above Alcuin Porters Lodge)

Admission: All welcome