Wednesday 13 February 2013, 4.15PM to 5.45pm
Speaker(s): Alexandru Nichifor, University of St Andrews (joint work with John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp)
Abstract: In models of matching in networks, when transfers are not allowed or are only allowed to be discrete, both substitutability of preferences and supply chain structure of the contractual set are required for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes. We show that when continuous transfers are allowed and utility is quasilinear, the substitutability of preferences is on its own both sufficient and necessary for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes. Furthermore, when preferences are substitutable, the set of stable outcomes is equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria, and all stable allocations are efficient.
Location: Economics Staff Room (EC/202)
Admission: Economics Department Seminar. All welcome to attend