Time consistency and impure benevolent planner

Seminar
  • Date and time: Wednesday 15 February 2023, 1pm to 2pm
  • Location: In-person only
    A/D71 (above Alcuin porters), Alcuin College, Campus West, University of York (Map)
  • Booking:

Event details

This seminar is hosted by Zaifu Yang.

The only way to make the Pareto condition compatible with a social planner with exponential discounting is the dictatorship. Unlike the previous studies, we investigate the compatibility of the Pareto condition with an impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer and Noor. We require that a social planner is tempted to adopt the majority’s opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals. Under the Pareto condition and the temptation condition described above, we show the following two ways of avoiding the dictatorship result:
  1. We accept a social planner with temptation from immediate consumption and avoid dictatorship by allowing the temptation utility to reflect the static tastes of multiple individuals.
  2. Instead of adopting a more far-sighted social planner with temptation from consumption streams, we allow the preferences of at most two individuals, including their time preferences, to be reflected into the social planners.

About the speakers

Takashi Hayashi (University of Glasgow), Noriaki Kiguchi and Norio Takeoka