Wednesday 24 February 2021, 1.00PM to 2.00 pm
Speaker(s): Michele Lombardi (University of Glasgow)
Host: Anindya Bhattacharya
Absract: Agents are farsighted when they consider the ultimate consequences of their actions. We re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting with transfers, where farsighted coalitions are considered fundamental behavioral units, and the equilibrium outcomes of their interactions are predicted via the stability notion of the largest consistent set. The designerís exercise consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. The designerís challenge lies in forming a rights structure in which the equilibrium behavior of agents always coincides with the recommendation given by a social choice rule. We show that (Maskin) monotonicity fully identiÖes the class of implementable single-valued social choice rules. Even though, monotonicity is not necessary for implementation in general, we show that every monotonic social choice rule can be implemented. These Öndings imply that the class of implementable social choice rules in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning.
Location: ZOOM (details to follow)
Admission: All welcome