Wednesday 1 May 2013, 4.15PM to 5.45pm
Speaker(s): Kai Konrad, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Abstract: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the hold-up problem.
Location: Economics Staff Room (A/EC/202)
Admission: Economics Department Seminar. All welcome to attend