SEMINAR: Shapley value-based rules for distributing duration costs in stochastic projects
Seminar
Seminar
This event has now finished.
Event date
Thursday 6 June 2024, 1pm to 2pm
Location
In-person only
A/D271 (above Alcuin Porters)
A/D271 (above Alcuin Porters)
Audience
Open to staff, students
Admission
Free admission, booking not required
Event details
Speaker: Ignacio Miguel García Jurado (Coruña)
Abstract: In this seminar we present two procedures, based on the Shapley value of cooperative games, for allocating project duration costs (due to delays, for example) among the various agents responsible for their realisation. To compare the two procedures we illustrate them with several examples and characterise them mathematically using parallel properties. We also study other desirable properties of the procedures and make some remarks on how to calculate them in practice.
The content of this seminar expands on the results we published in: Goncalves-Dosantos, Garcia-Jurado and Costa (2020) “Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays” 4OR 18, 457-476.
Host: Yuan Ju (York)