We are interested in the philosophy of mind and perception as well as metaphysics more broadly, including the topics of causation, the philosophy of time and the philosophy of mathematics.
Research into the philosophy of mind and perception is a significant strength for our Department. We have a large group working in this area covering a range of issues concerning the proper characterisation of phenomenological states such as perception, imagination, episodic memory, the emotions and self-consciousness.
Our interests include the classification of mental phenomena - such as the senses - and areas of psychology and psychiatry. We also have work that draws from more straightforwardly metaphysical issues such as the nature of colour or causation.
We particularly enjoy applying insights from the history of philosophy, including the phenomenological tradition, to contemporary philosophical questions. This close interaction between historical and contemporary approaches is a distinctive feature of our research.
- Dr Keith Allen Colour, the philosophy of perception and meta-philosophy.
- Professor Greg Currie Imagination and its place in the architecture of mind and philosophy of literature.
- Dr Stephen Everson Philosophy of mind, metaphysics and the philosophy of language.
- Dr Johan Gustafsson Decision theory, free will and personal identity.
- Dr David Ingram Metaphysics and philosophy of time.
- Dr Christopher Jay Fictionalism.
- Philosophy of mathematics and science, meta-metaphysics.
- Dr Daniel Morgan Philosophy of mind and moral psychology.
- Professor Paul Noordhof Consciousness, representation, imagination, self-deception and belief and mental causation.
- Professor Tom Stoneham The phenomenal characters of perceiving and pseudo-perceiving; self-knowledge and temporal externalism.
- Professor Matthew Ratcliffe Phenomenology, philosophy of psychiatry, social cognition, emotions and feelings, empathy and perception.
- Dr Louise Richardson The philosophy of perception and the senses.
- Dr Fiora Salis Nature and varieties of imagination.
- Dr Rob Trueman Philosophical logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics.
- Andrew Ward (Honorary Life Fellow) Personal identity.
- Professor Dorothea Debus (University of Konstanz) Memory, imagination, attention, perception and the emotions.
- Professor Michael Devitt (City University of New York Graduate Centre) Philosophy of language, philosophy of linguistics, naturalised metaphysics.
- Professor James Ladyman (University of Bristol) Philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of information and computation, philosophy of mathematics.
- Professor Jennifer Radden (University of Massachusetts Amherst, Boston) Philosophy of psychiatry; emotions.
- Chelsea Demanche (supervisor: Professor Tom Stoneham)
- Sam Dickson (firstname.lastname@example.org)
An Investigation Into the Nature of Mathematical Objects (supervisors: Professor Mary Leng and Professor Paul Noordhof
- Jake Dorothy (email@example.com)
A Phenomenological Analysis of Self in Complex Trauma (supervisor: Professor Matthew Ratcliffe)
- James Dyer (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Understanding Gender Identity (supervisor: Professor Mary Leng)
- Declan Hartness (email@example.com) Introspective Ignorance & The Problem of Consciousness (supervisor: Professor Tom Stoneham)
- Nasir Khan (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Deflationary Neutral Monism: one order of existence and power (supervisor: Professor Paul Noordhof)
- Bridger Landle (email@example.com) Counterpart Theory (supervisor: Professor Mary Leng)
- Jacob O'Sullivan (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Should we accept the existence of mathematical objects? An evaluation of mathematical fictionalist attempts to remove ontological commitment to mathematical entities. (supervisor: Professor Mary Leng)
- Daryl Tyrer (email@example.com)
Can the evolutionary naturalist account for realism in metaphysics and science? My research will focus on reformulations of Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. Specifically, I aim to show how Plantinga’s argument can be recast as an argument for scientific anti-realism and anti-realism regarding claims about metaphysics. I propose to do this by showing how Plantinga’s argument is structurally similar to other arguments for scientific anti-realism. Then I intend to demonstrate how Plantinga’s narrower form of his argument, that the reliability of our metaphysical belief-forming mechanisms is questionable given evolutionary naturalism, can also be used to support anti-realism in metaphysics. This approach differs from Plantinga’s in that it rejects global scepticism; I am instead arguing for local scepticism regarding metaphysical claims. The result is that if we are sceptics about certain metaphysical claims underpinning the sciences, then this scepticism also affects science more generally. (supervisors: Professor Mary Leng and Professor Tom Stoneham)
- Ed Willems (firstname.lastname@example.org)
- Does Easy Ontology require Global Expressivism? (supervisors: Dr Keith Allen and Dr Rob Trueman)
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