All or Nothing, but if not All, Next Best or Nothing

Abstract:

Consider the following case: Armsgiving: 'Two children face a deadly threat. You can either do nothing, save one child by sacrificing your arms, or save both children by sacrificing your arms.' It seems plausible that: (1) It is permissible for you to do nothing. (2) It is wrong for you to save only one child. But suppose you are not going to save both children. (1) and (2) seem to imply: (3) You ought to save neither child rather than save only one. And (3) may in turn seem implausible. This is one instance of what Joe Horton (2017) calls the All or Nothing Problem. In this paper I very briefly outline Horton’s solution to the All or Nothing Problem, noting two difficulties it faces. I then argue that in order for (3) to seem implausible in the way Horton claims it does, (3) must be interpreted so as to entail a conditional ought claim that would discourage you from saving a child if you are not going to save both children but are willing to save one. I argue we should reject the principle Horton proposes to bridge (1) and (2) to (3). Instead, we should accept what I call conditional permissions.

Information about the work and research of Dr Pummer can be found at:

https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/philosophy/dept/staffprofiles/?staffid=255