Social norms, self-starvation and the anorexic frame of mind

On its face, anorexia nervosa is an unassailable case of pathology. Its bodily effects are
visible for all to see and physically dangerous, and it seems to transgress the self-
preservative social norms of this or any imaginable culture. Yet little about this condition
can be taken at face value. Corresponding to two-part “harmful dysfunction” definitions
of mental disorder, there are two ways apparently voluntary behavior is considered apt
for diagnosis, one according to which it is judged the causal outcome of underlying
organic dysfunction, disorder, or risk; the second where the motivation and rationale by
which it is guided contravene societal norms. These criteria fall short of establishing the
pathological status of anorexia, it is argued here, because, in addition to other
particularities of social and cultural context, unsupportable epistemic weight rests on the
anorexic frame of mind. And despite all the evidence at our disposal about it, that frame
of mind remains opaque. The epistemic reliance on it resulting from our social norms
around self-starvation, it is concluded, indicates that general ascriptions of pathology to
all cases of anorexia will remain unwarranted when judged by “harmful dysfunction”
criteria.