Visual Evanescence

Talk Abstract:

Visual Evanescence

It seems permissible in English to say that something ‘looks invisible’. But how should we understand such statements as statements of looks? For how can anything look invisible? In this talk, I advance a solution. I suggest that ‘looks invisible’ can be read as an epistemic or comparative looks claim: either something can be said to be invisible on the basis of some visual evidence, or, once suitably understood, it can be said to look the way that invisible things look. Accordingly, in the main part of the talk, I spell out the nature of the relevant visual evidence and I explain how to make sense of the peculiar comparative reading. Finally, time permitting, I consider whether there is, after all, such a thing as an invisible ‘look’ and what properties might be supposed suitable candidates for grounding visual evanescence.

For further information about the work of Dr Claire MacCumhaill please visit the web pages at:

• https://www.dur.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/?id=11902