Profile
Biography
After studying in Cambridge and University College London, I started at York in 2007. My primary research interests include philosophy of perception, colour, early modern philosophy, phenomenology, and x-phi (experimental philosophy).
In a Naïve Realist Theory of Colour (Oxford University Press, 2016) I defend a naïve realist (or ‘primitivist’) theory of colour, according to which colours are mind-independent properties of objects that are distinct from those described by science. My work on colour is part of a wider interest in the philosophy of perception, where I defend a naive realist (or ‘relationalist') theory of perception.
I am interested in related questions in the history of philosophy, particularly in early modern philosophy and phenomenology, and I collaborate on work that uses empirical methods to investigate both the psychological mechanisms of perception and ordinary beliefs about it.
Research
Overview
I work primarily on the philosophy of perception (especially colour), early modern philosophy, phenomenology, and the philosophy of philosophy. I welcome enquiries from potential research students wanting to work in these areas.
Projects
I am currently working on the relationship between naïve realist theories of perception and science, with a particular interest in a position that I call transcendental naïve realism.
Teaching
Other teaching
I mostly teach courses relating to philosophy of mind and the history of philosophy.