I'm a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of York. Before coming to York, I was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre for Philosophy of Time, based at the University of Milan (2016-17). Before that, I taught philosophy at the University of Nottingham (2014-16). I completed my PhD in Nottingham in 2014.
My research mostly concerns metaphysics and the philosophy of time. Recently, I've been thinking about the relationship between my preferred theory of time, presentism, and theories about what truth is and what propositions are. I'm sympathetic to the view that what's true substantively depends upon the world, and I think that propositions are a certain kind of structured entity. But that gets me into all sorts of trouble when defending presentism. In general, I'm interested in the metaphysics of x for all values of x.
Time and Change: I'm working on defending presentism from a variety of metaphysical objections. I recently published a monograph on this topic: Thisness Presentism (2019, Routledge).