Contagious Underdetermination. In Search of an Interesting Example from True Science

Contagious Underdetermination. In Search of an Interesting Example from True Science

ABSTRACT. Quine's famous underdetermination thesis says: Each complete theory of the world has at least one alternative, which fits all observations (past, present, and future) equally well. As Quine restricts his thesis to complete theories, which nobody has ever seen, it is not surprising that we lack convincing examples. This is why other proponents of underdetermination have spelled out a notion of transient underdetermination: The observations available at a given moment from the history of the sciences do not always uniquely determine theory choice. Given this, true examples of underdetermination can be provided. But at the same time, underdetermination looses much of its original appeal, because adherents of objectivity of the sciences may well point out that future progress in observation is likely to determine theory choice after all.

This difficulty can be overcome once a stronger version of underdetermination is put on the table. It begins with an actual example from history and claims that the underdetermination of past theory choice is like a contagious disease, transferring its germs to future choices of theory. This idea limits the range of historical examples from which we should start; an appropriate example of past underdetermination ought to concern theoretical claims which survive (in some form or other) until now. (My own example will concern Newtonian optics and an alternative to it proposed by Goethe). In light of such an example we have to ask: What would have happened, and what would we believe now, if early scientists had opted in favour of an alternative to the one which was, back then, actually opted for? If, as I claim, scientific objectivity hinges on counterfactual speculation of that sort, it is itself much less of an objective notion than one might think.

Biography:

Olaf L. Mueller studied philosophy, mathematics, computer science, and economics in Goettingen (Germany) and Los Angeles (UCLA). He teaches analytic philosophy at the Humboldt University (Berlin). In his books, he argues against Quine's philosophy of language (1998), against skepticism (2003), in favour of metaphysics (2003), in favour of moral observation (2008), and in favour of Goethe's attack on Newton's optics (March 2005). In his papers, he defends freedom against the neurosciences, pacifism against adherents of just war, and dualism against materialism. 

For more information about Professor Muller's work and research see:

https://www.philosophie.hu-berlin.de/institut/lehrbereiche/natur/mitarbeiter/mueller