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Family doctor responses to changes in target stringency under financial incentives

Monday 4 May 2020, 2.00PM to 3.00pm

Speaker(s): Luke Munford, Health Organisation, Policy and Economics, School of Health Sciences, University of Manchester

Abstract: There is a risk that providers will engage in gaming if they self-report the targets on which they are monitored, regulated or rewarded. There is relatively little evidence on whether this occurs amongst health care providers. We examine how family doctors responded to a temporary but substantial increase in the stringency of the targets that governed their payments for ensuring patients diagnosed with hypertension had controlled blood pressure. We use patient-level data from 129 family practices over a seven-year period (2010 to 2016) to examine whether family doctors changed their diagnostic behaviour, increased treatment intensity, exempted patients, increased rates of testing and/or gamed the recording of the blood pressure measurements. There was some evidence of more intense treatment but also clear evidence of increased exemption of patients and bunching of recorded measurements just under the target level. These results suggest that doctors will game in response to changing performance targets under financial incentives.

Location: The Seminar will be via Zoom

Who to contact

For more information on these seminars, contact:

Adrian Villasenor
Adrian Villasenor-Lopez
Dacheng Huo
Dacheng Huo

If you are not a member of University of York staff and are interested in attending the seminar, please contact Adrian Villasenor-Lopez or Dacheng Huo so that we can ensure we have sufficient space

CHE Seminar Programme

  • Friday 2 December
    Sean D. Sullivan, University of Washington

Map showing Location Details (PDF , 297kb)