Elite Women as Strangers: A Phenomenology for Interdisciplinary Studies

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The goal of phenomenology is to describe the universal structures of subjective orientation in the world, not to explain the general features of the objective world.

(Thomas Luckmann 1978: 9)

In this article, we will outline why we want to take part in the development of a phenomenology for interdisciplinary studies on gender and migration and what we will use for such a development. Then we provide a brief historical account of phenomenologists who have contributed to the phenomenological movement that started at the beginning of the 20th century. We will focus on critical phenomenology as an approach and methodology rather than on its different research methods and will draw especially on what Hannah Arendt and Dorothy E Smith may contribute to methodological considerations. Such an approach seems to have a renaissance today. Qualitative research methods, especially as they have developed historically within the social sciences, are often understood to be interpretative and post-phenomenological. The qualitative research methods that are explicitly called ‘phenomenological’ today resemble unstructured depth interviews, ethnography, participant observations, ethnomethodological and post-structural discourse analyses etc which are discussed more thoroughly in other contributions to this project. Therefore the article moves from a phenomenological framework via methodological reflections to a couple of textually based examples, one from the humanities and the other from the social sciences.

A phenomenology for interdisciplinary studies on gender and migration

A phenomenology can be a paradigmatic framework in a Kuhnian (Kuhn 1962) sense, a certain approach, i.e. a specific way of attending to the phenomena of consciousnesses; a

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methodology for studying such phenomena and a set of research methods, i.e. certain ways of accessing, interpreting and presenting phenomenological descriptions.

At least three crucial points of departure are common among feminist phenomenological scholars: 1) an emphasis on attentiveness to concrete, lived experience in an intersubjectively constituted, social world, 2) the rejection of mind/body dualism, and acknowledgment of embodied knowing, feeling, thinking etc., and 3) the rejection of the epistemic opposition between subject and object, while stressing a two-way relation, often called a ‘lived relationship’.

To inform our framework and methodological reflections we bring together two (pro)feminist researchers trained in or influenced by phenomenology, i.e. Hannah Arendt from the humanities and Dorothy Smith from the social sciences. We emphasize especially Dorothy Smith’s concepts of ruling relations and outsiders/within and Hannah Arendt’s conceptualisations of the pariah and of inter esse, i.e. in what appears in between us in the only world we humans share, (re)create and (re)negotiate.

Qualitative research methods given a phenomenological approach may be productive for critical studies on gender and migration as a certain set of phenomena, as e.g. lived experiences of being a woman and a foreigner. Foreignness may be experienced in a variety of ways – e.g. under labels such as ‘stranger’, ‘refugee’, ‘immigrant’, ‘outsider’, ‘pariah’, etc.

The last two words will be especially important in the two examples we choose for how to critically study gender and migration, given a phenomenological approach. The examples focus on relatively privileged women and foreigners who can be said to be strangers, pariahs or outsiders/within even if they in other senses may belong to more or less privileged social groups. The first example draws on Hannah Arendt’s implicit methods for a phenomenological description of the eighteen-century Jewish salonniere Rahel Varnhagen. The other example applies Dorothy Smith’s explicit methods, given a phenomenologically influenced framework, to material already collected and analysed by two social scientists on foreign academic elite women.

A brief history of phenomenologists

The waves of the phenomenological movement from Germany via France to the USA were intensified with the migration of intellectuals during the Second World War. Although the
phenomenological movement is interdisciplinary, it is striking how much weight its impact on philosophy is given in historical presentations (Luckmann 1978: 7ff). This movement became the predecessor of significant schools of thought and research in humanities, social, caring and natural sciences during the 20th century, such as existentialism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, social constructionism etc. (Morris 1977, Spiegelberg 1982, Orleans 2001, van Manen 1997).

The origins — of phenomenology — and on phenomena

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a mathematician and philosopher, is often acknowledged as the founder of phenomenology. In Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations, 1900-1901), he describes his search for a rigorous scientific method able to start from a perspective free from preconceptions or hypotheses. He distinguishes between perceived phenomena on the one hand, and physical things or concrete events in the world on the other hand (Husserl 2002: 136-7). In order grasp the structure of what actually is given in my perception with as few preconceptions as possible, I need to “bracket” the existence of the “actual” thing or event in the world, i.e. perform a phenomenological reduction, and then concentrate on describing the phenomenon as it appears to me — to my consciousness.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) saw phenomenology as a methodological, hermeneutic approach, not engaged with the what or essences of phenomena, but rather with how they appear to the beings who perceive them, and with the origins of meanings of anthropologically important Greek terms hidden under layers of (mis)interpretations in the history of philosophy. He saw philosophising without presuppositions as impossible.

Alfred Schütz (1889-1959) and his students brought phenomenology to the social sciences, especially to sociology in Europe and USA during and after World War II. Schütz saw the

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3 Husserl was inspired by Franz Brentano, his philosophy teacher in Vienna 1884-1886. (Moran 2002: 11).
4 Intentionality, the directedness of consciousness to ‘intentional objects’ should not be confused with intentions, i.e. purposeful actions. “The term intentionality indicates the inseparable connectedness of the human being to the world. /…/. Husserl [among others] argued that the fundamental structure of consciousness is intentional /…/. This means that all thinking (imagining, perceiving, remembering etc.) is always thinking about something.” (van Maanen 2000).
5 In his late writings Husserl developed an idea of the lifeworld as “the world of immediate experience /…/ original and naïve, prior to critical or theoretical reflection”. There are several lifeworlds, each of them expose certain pervading structures or styles. (van Maanen 2000).
6 A colleague and student of Husserl. In his major work Being and Time, Heidegger linked phenomenology with the hermeneutical tradition (Moran 2002: 245 ff). In 1934 Heidegger was for a while a university rector under the Nazi government.
7 Husserl never had any success in Great Britain, but Schütz had some impact. He was a student of Max Weber and Husserl. Another student of Husserl at the same time was Rudolf Carnarp, one of the founders of the logical positivism of the Vienna school in the early 20th century. Intellectually, however, they developed in different
phenomenological investigation as profoundly reflective, which could begin only in retrospect, when the situation of interest already belongs to the past. He developed further the Husserlian concept of life worlds as one of his most important concepts. To Schütz, the ordinary life world is understood as a field of praxis and a shared social reality. This reality is accessible for us through the reservoir of experiences, which is built from our own experiences – and from others, developed by parents and teachers for example (Bengtsson 1999: 15). When Schütz (1964) characterizes the stranger, he refers especially to immigrants, but suggests that his analysis structurally can be applied to other forms of social outsidership.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), inspired by especially the late, life-world Husserl, by Schutz and by Heidegger, developed a phenomenology of embodied beings in the world. We are our bodies and we share and (re)create a common world. Thus, Merleau-Ponty rejected mind-body dualism and solipsism. The body is the starting point for all our projects (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 193, 194). Merleau-Ponty in his turn influenced several scholars interested in a mundane form of phenomenology, among them several feminists.

Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986) who is one of them was also inspired by Jean Paul Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl and George W. Hegel. But she develops her very own brand of phenomenology as an inquiry with the Husserlian ambition to return to origins, to the “things themselves”, i.e. to phenomena. Beauvoir describes her phenomenological investigations not as a reconstruction of the world, but as an attempt to understand the relations we have to the world. Most striking is Beauvoir’s phenomenological method of inquiry, which she uses in a consistent manner in The Second Sex (Beauvoir 1949). Her method is to give a set of descriptive accounts of historically situated phenomena affecting women of the time as these show themselves.

Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) studied with Heidegger before she wrote a doctoral thesis with Karl Jaspers in 1929, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. The phenomenology Hannah Arendt directions. The thought of Schütz influenced Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to develop social constructivism and Harold Garfinkel to develop the phenomenological approach ‘ethnomethodology’. In the U.S. Schütz became the instructor of Maurice Natanson, who also contributed to the phenomenology of the social sciences (Schutz 2002: 18). Natanson was in his turn the advisor of Judith Butler when she wrote her thesis Recovery and Invention: The Projects of Desire in Hegel, Kojève, Hyppolite, and Sartre (1984). Butler CV.05.rtf accessed from internet in 2005.


9 Heinämaa 2003: 5.

10 Simone de Beauvoir and the early phenomenologists inspired a generation of feminist philosophers, such as Sandra Lee Bartky, Iris Marion Young, Elizbeth Grosz, Judith Butler, Eva Gothlin, Sara Heinämaa, Silvia Stoller, Veronica Vasterling, Sonia Kruks, to mention just a few.
learnt during Heidegger’s lessons was to pay attention to appearances and original meanings of terms. From Jaspers she learnt to pay attention to appearances in the world, especially in the political realm. But as Beauvoir, she used what she learnt in her very own style of thinking “without banisters” when “diving for pearls” in the historical sediment of thought and in “telling stories” about crucial events, great deeds and words of men and women who in dark times may give us a glimpse of hope (Cf. Taminiaux, 1998). History turned Arendt into a migrant in 1933 and the “denial of the right of citizenship led Arendt on an exploration of the origins of totalitarianism that would dominate her intellectual life.”

… contemporary scholars tend to separate Hannah Arendt the brilliant and original political theorist from Hannah Arendt the Jewish woman, the refugee from the Holocaust … Being a Jew constitutes a part of how she looks at the political world… [Arendt] was a Jewish woman, a classical scholar, a German refugee, and ultimately an American academic. But the developments of her life that contributed to her identity as a scholar do not completely replace its foundation in gender and Jewish identity… She never denied either aspect of herself, but … In Arendt's own terms, Arendt the philosopher was not affected by Arendt the Jew or Arendt the woman. (Ring 1998: 39-41)

Dorothy E. Smith (1926—) a sociologist and migrant from Great Britain to Canada accounts on a web page for three big moments in her intellectual life:

One was going to the London School of Economics when I was twenty-six and becoming fascinated with sociology; the second was a course given by Tamotsu Shibutani at Berkeley on George Herbert Mead which laid the groundwork for a later deep involvement with the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (I encountered his work accidentally by picking up one of his books in a bookstore and knowing instantly that that’s where I belonged); and finally and perhaps biggest of all, the women’s movement which was for me a total transformation of consciousness at multiple levels.\footnote{http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/mdevault/dorothy_smith.htm, accessed 2006-10-23.}

Alfred Schütz, his followers and Mikhail Bakhtin, also influenced Smith. She utilizes diverse phenomenological notions, such as the focus on concrete, everyday experiences, the refusal of

\footnote{Arendt fled her homeland, moved from Prague to Geneva then to Paris, and finally to the United States in 1941. \url{http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm174.html}, accessed 06-12-15.}
the mind/body-dichotomy through her emphasis on the bodily being and a rejection of the opposition between subject and object, in terms of ethnographic work as a dialogue (Smith 2002: 19, 20, 26).

In her early works Smith problematised women’s experiences of “every day and night” as falling outside of what mainstream sociology dealt with when she herself entered Academia, being a woman, a single mother and a migrant. The fact that women entered Academia in the West on broad scale from the 1950ies onwards urged Smith to constitute a sociology for women (Smith 1987, 1996), an enterprise she has since developed into *Institutional Ethnography — A Sociology for People* (Smith 2005, 2006). From the start her approach included the notion of *ruling relations*. This conception of ruling relations and how it enters Smith’s methods of research will inform our reflections on the example with foreign women in Academia.¹³

**Methodological reflections for a critical, (post-) phenomenological approach**

Phenomenology is generally characterised as a way of seeing, rather than as a set of doctrines (Moran 2002: 1). The phenomenological perspective basically intends to *illuminate the human world*. The approach and starting point is to provide a variety of possible descriptions of phenomena as they appear to the consciousness of the perceiver in order to identify invariants, also called ‘essences’ in the language of Edmund Husserl. The objects of our investigations – material things, texts, speech, emotions etc. – should be studied as carefully as possible. The descriptive account is motivated by an urge to rid the perceiver of presuppositions, be they theoretical, practical, common sensical or historically sedimented meanings in order to discover hidden, veiled, new, unforeseen aspects or original meanings¹⁴ of the phenomena in question. This effort is made through the so-called phenomenological ’reduction’, which basically is an ambition to put one’s presuppositions in brackets, to try to set the perception free from what we already know (Gothlin, 1991: 193, Luckmann 1978: 8 ff).

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¹³ For a fuller account of Smith’s work and method, see Karen Widerberg’s contribution to this project. Other feminist scholars within the social sciences inspired by Dorothy Smith, phenomenological or ethnomethodological approaches and methods are Marjorie De Vault (1999), Sarah Fenstemaker and Candace West (2002), Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna (1976), Johanna Esseveld (1982, 1988).

¹⁴ “Because Heidegger shares the opinion of Husserl that the history of philosophy has created more confusion and misinformation than anything else, he expresses a desire to return to the question of Being, an emphasis on origins by re-examining the original meanings of key Greek terms” (Hull 2002: 82).
This may be just a regulatory phenomenological ideal, impossible to ever achieve, as feminist and other critics, with good reasons, have argued. Feminists have emphasized at least two derivations from the Husserlian phenomenology. On the one hand the way interpretations and meanings are attributed to findings (i.e. how objects are 'posited', using Husserl’s terminology), and on the other hand, the significance of making the researcher visible as an interested and subjective actor, rather than as a detached and impartial observer (Lester 1999).

We agree with Johanna Oksala who accepts the general phenomenological method as productive for accounts of gender, but who offers a critique of first-person perspectives and transcendental egos. She has argued for “four different understandings of phenomenology and … their respective potential in terms of understanding gender….a classical reading, a corporeal reading and an intersubjective reading” and a fourth “post-phenomenological reading” (Oksala 2006: 230). Oksala concludes her discussion with critical demands that the first three readings do not or cannot meet, but which she suggests a critical post-phenomenology can:

Post-phenomenology would …start with knowledge and experiences that are foreign to us, but this does not mean that the question of gender is relegated to the domain of empirical study. The method of reduction is necessary to effectuate the reflective step that opens up the realm of transcendental investigation. We must break away from the natural attitude understood as an attitude where our ontological pre-understanding of the world is not visible to us at all, to an attitude that is capable of problematising it. At the same time, we have to accept that ontology can never be totally suspended, because it is irrevocably tied up with our language, methods of reflection and ways of seeing the world. This means accepting the always partial and preliminary character of any philosophical investigation concerning ourselves. An analysis of experience that aims to be radical and transcendental can only ever be fragmentary and incomplete. (Oksala 2006: 241)

A critical, feminist (post-)phenomenological method can be said to share the methodological urge of phenomenology in general to disregard the testing of hypotheses, of confirming theories or of explaining human phenomena in the way causal relationships between natural events in the world are explained within positivist frameworks. The phenomenological approach wants to get access to the perceived, remembered, desired etc. phenomena as the meanings and structures of them are constituted as lived human experiences. Such an
approach may be suitable to phenomena in the lives of women as migrants or strangers. As an approach within sociology phenomenology seeks to reveal how human awareness is implicated in the production of social action, social situations and social worlds (Natanson 1970). A (post-)phenomenological approach strives, in intersubjective or dialogic settings, to attend to how concrete phenomena are lived and perceived by the researched, perceived and described by the researcher, in as many of its aspects and from as many perspectives as possible. Through its emphasis on careful descriptions phenomenology insists on the importance of discovering, unveiling or problematising hitherto taken for granted, hidden, unseen, forgotten or repressed aspects of the concrete everyday world.

Phenomenological methods are thus purely descriptive. They find their data in the researcher’s experiences or in the experiences of those researched and phenomenological studies find their way via studies of the historical, biographical, social and cultural expressions of the phenomenon in question (Luckmann 1978: 8).

Phenomenological, sociological techniques, tools or methods which may be made compatible with Oksala’s feminist demands are summarized by Myron Orleans in her article on ‘Phenomenology’ in the *Encyclopaedia of Sociology* as qualitative methods: “analyses of small groups, social situations, and organizations using face-to-face techniques of participant observation”, as “intensive interviewing to uncover the subject’s orientations or his or her ”life world””. “Qualitative tools are used … either to yield insight into the microdynamics of particular spheres of human life for its own sake or to exhibit the constitutive activity of human consciousness”. The “ethnomethodological branch of phenomenology” has according to Orleans developed techniques to “unveil the practices used by people to produce a sense of social order and thereby accomplish everyday life” such as video- and audiotaping social situations “to permit the painstaking demonstration of the means by which participants produce themselves, their interpretations of the meanings of acts, and their sense of the structure of the situation” or using conversational analysis “to describe how people make sense of each other through talk and how they make sense of their talk through their common background knowledge”. Also “interrelations between mundane reasoning and abstract reasoning are … examined in great depth as researchers expose, for example, the socially constituted bases of scientific and mathematical practice in common-sense thinking”.

To sum up, abstract reasoning may, already following Husserl, risk passing over the duality of our body-ness. In order to see the other subject at all, it is important that you perceive her as an inquiring person. As Oksala, however, argues with Anthony Steinbock, “a
phenomenological analysis of the social world cannot begin with individual consciousness to reach a universal We, because intersubjectivity cannot be reduced to a universal, collective singularity without the patronizing assumption that we are the entire structure.” (Oksala 2006: 239) Her understanding of a post-phenomenological method would give up a complete phenomenological reduction to transcendental subjectivity, but it would, nevertheless, attempt to accomplish a partial bracketing in order to reveal something about the ontological schemas underlying our ways of thinking, perceiving and acting. It would begin with considerations that are in some sense ‘foreign’ and therefore distanced from the subject, such as anthropological, historiographical and medical studies, for example. This knowledge would then be appropriated in an attempt to make visible the presumptions and implicit ontological commitments in one’s homeworld. Unlike the classical readings of phenomenology, it would hold that these constitutive, ontological schemas are always tied to cultural normativity – to language, history and culture. While they are thus necessarily and irrevocably intertwined with our forms of reflection, they are, nevertheless, ultimately contingent and therefore changeable. (Oksala 2006: 240)

Arendt and Smith on methodology

In this sub-section we reflect on Hannah Arendt’s implicit and Dorothy Smith’s explicit views on phenomenological methods, especially as they can be applied to the examples we chose. Hannah Arendt’s concept of the pariah and its internal varieties (parvenu, unconscious and conscious pariah) are crucial for her mundane form of phenomenology with the help of which she tried to understand forced migration, statelessness, Jewishness, refugees, blacks, the freedom of the thinker and her own experiences of being “Das Mädchen aus der Fremde” (Arendt 1998: 76, 79-80). They are related to her methods of “looking at things in themselves”, which “meant looking at the human individual in its existence among others” (Hull 2002: 82), storytelling and the political notion of achieved ’common sense’ (sensus communis).

Arendt explicitly expressed dislike for methods and methodology and mentioned only rarely the framework she in fact works within.15 Her phenomenology differs from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s. She “distinguished her aim as, superficially, to discuss political action and, more

deeply, to promote human plurality” and interaction. But like them she stresses “the importance of ‘origins’.” Especially with Heidegger she saw the “immense value in grasping what certain ideas originally meant in their Greek usage.” (Hull 2002: 84) Arendt’s phenomenology deals with *res publica*, the public, where everything that is manifest to people is understood as belonging to the world of appearances. For something to be public is to be seen, to appear. “The presence of something in front of others ensures the reality of it” (1958, p. 50). Political activity turns us into something other than labouring animals. wanted to shed light on the realm of the public, trying to catch the intrinsic meanings of human conditions of sharing a world, and the experience of what lies between us in this world “…which is neither you nor me, but something to which we both belong.” (Moran, 2000: 288)

Arendt emphasizes the *love of the world* (*amor mundi*) and *being of the world* – rather than just *in* the world. Her phenomenological attempt to return to the things themselves is understood as the approach to investigate the nature of our belonging as humans to a human world. For her “the phenomenal also implies an interactive dimension… [that] is… interaction with another as perceiver” (Hull 2002: 84).

It is … as though everything alive … has an urge to appear, to fit itself into the world of appearances and show “not its ‘inner self’ but itself as an individual” (Arendt 1971a: 29).

When Arendt returns to look at “things in themselves” she stresses the everyday world without bracketing experiences of it and interactions with others in it. Her phenomenology distances itself from the classical reading (Cf. Oksala 2006) of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies.

Heidegger’s phenomenology does attempt to avoid extreme solipsism, yet it is still guilty of bracketing certain fundamental aspects of everyday life that results in a distorted picture in Arendt’s eyes. … As Bernstein says, “I do not think Heidegger had a deep sense of what Arendt meant by plurality - the most basic concept of her political thought” (1996:191)... Arendt’s phenomenology of plurality and interaction are inherently intersubjective…. Arendt took what was primarily valuable about the phenomenological method, the idea of looking at things as they appear and how they are meant, without risking the same pitfalls into which both Husserl and Heidegger fall. … she alone of the three avoided the charges often made against phenomenology in general as being overly solipsistic. (Hull 2002: 85)
There is no metaphysical hand behind our backs that determines the historical outcome of our actions. We are accountable for the chains of events our actions set in motion, but we cannot predict their outcome. Arendt characterizes our shared, human, earthly conditions through a set of existentials.\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Plurality}, at first, is such an existential, important for understanding Arendt’s views on agency. Through ‘plurality’, she investigates the situation of being linked together in a net of relations and public actions (Arendt 1998: 8). ‘\textit{Natality}’ is our bornness, which symbolizes our capacity to act.\textsuperscript{17} To be born is to come as a new member into a world with given human relations and given social structures. Every new member of the world brings \textit{possibilities for new actions}. To learn a language is to be initiated into the community, where I also can make use of my capacity for agency (Arendt 1998: 8). ‘\textit{Narrativity}’, finally, describes \textit{actions and constitutes identities}. An action is thus identified in a narrative of how it started, how it was developed and how it came to be a part in the net of relations that is constructed by one’s own and other people’s activities and narratives (Holm 1998). Arendt’s political phenomenology thus takes into consideration the relation between the individual, known and unknown people around her, as well as activities and actions that bring us together. Arendt’s thought is of interest for research in action.

Dorothy Smith has explicit activist ambitions with her institutional ethnography (Smith 2005, 2006). We will use her understanding of how ‘ruling relations’, the instruments of power, are incorporated and negotiated in the relations and activities of everyday lives and concrete lived experiences. Generally speaking, an inquiry conducted within this approach does not start from preconceived hypotheses, but in an attitude of welcoming discoveries and in a striving to develop a deeper understanding of how we take part in (re)creating our shared everyday world. The ordinary life is the starting point for research. Smith unveils how our individual lives are ruled by the activities of other individuals in companies, organizations and social relations that both produce us and are produced by us:

In general, instead of being ruled directly by individuals whom we’ve known (and perhaps hated) for years and who were known before us by our parents, we are ruled by people who are at work in corporations, government, professional settings and organiza-

\textsuperscript{16} The day we can emigrate to the moon, our human conditions have radically changed (Arendt 1958: 10).
\textsuperscript{17} With ‘natality’ Arendt did not just introduce a new term. She introduced a new category in philosophical anthropology. The fact that we all have been born, that we step into this world as newcomers makes everyone of us a potential “beginner”. This condition is double-edged, though. Human institutions and laws are fragile, since they depend on the condition of human natality. There is always a potential that a newcomer may demolish what exists (Arendt 1958: 177-8).
tions, universities, public schools, hospitals and clinics, and so on and so on. Though they are, of course, individuals, their capacities to act derive from the organizations and social relations that they both produce and are produced by. (Smith 2005; 18)

From the locality of people’s everyday and night experiences Smith moves to examine the ‘ruling relations’ that both

…rely on and determine people’s work knowledge of what they do, as these are collaboratively produced in the research process as well as with the texts that are essential to the production of the generalizability, generalization, and objectivity of institutional regimes. (Smith 2005: 44)

Following Smith, power is developed in interactions between ourselves and others, although often established far away from us, “constituted externally to particular people and places”, where the functions of “knowledge, judgment, and will”, have become built into a specialized complex of objectified forms of organization and consciousness that organize and co-ordinate people’s everyday lives”, yet constantly present in our own lives (Smith 2005: 13, 18). The important question, though, is how we carry out our activities with this instrument of power constantly incorporated in the activities of our everyday lives. For the researcher, furthermore, the difficulties are to connect these different levels of local and institutionalized power.

Examples

We will exemplify our reflections on Hannah Arendt’s and Dorothy Smith’s phenomenological methods by showing how on the one hand, Arendt herself initiated, to develop later, the concept of pariah in different analyses with political impact. Drawing on the inquiry The Thin End of the Wedge (Czarniewska and Sevón 2005), we will on the other hand suggest a reading of this text within the framework of a critical phenomenology for gender studies.

In the first example we show how Arendt’s implicit phenomenological methods accounting for the life of a Jewess and “the elements which crystallized into totalitarianism” (Arendt, quoted in Bernstein 1997: 51) provided her with a concept of pariahdom, which she developed throughout her oeuvre in order to understand the political implications of social marginalisation and outsidership.

The second example of attending to experiences of being an outsider within the academe as a woman may structurally show similarities, but also differences in relation to experiences of
being an outsider in other senses, e. g. as a migrant. Outsider/within experiences may render the outsider a certain attention to and awareness of her/his surrounding social and political world, and a sensitivity to and reflection on her/his perceptions. The sensitivities may however differ between different forms of outsership.

Hannah Arendt’s notions of the unconscious and conscious pariah and the parvenu are concepts feminists used long before other aspects of her thinking were discovered as useful for feminist thinking. The conscious pariah became associated with the outsider-within discussions. The notion ‘outsider/within’ usually ascribed to Patricia Hill Collins’ variety of black feminist standpoint epistemology (Hills Collins 1998) is in feminist context said to have its origin in the early works of Dorothy Smith.

Privileged Jewish women and other pariahs

Arendt’s phenomenological method applied to an interest in gender and migration can be condensed in her conceptualization of the pariah extrapolated from her study on Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess (1997), her writing on refugees in The Jew as Pariah (1978c) and from the unpublished The Life of the Mind (1971). The first nine chapters of the Varnhagen study had been written by 1933. But it was not until her migration to Paris that Arendt managed to complete it in 1938 and long after her migration to the USA that it was published in “1957 in English translation, and two years later in German.“ (Moran 1999: 297)

Here we will focus only on her method in the Rahel Varnhagen study.

Rahel Levin (1771-1833), born in Berlin in an “orthodox but uncultured” Jewish-German merchant family, ran her first salon around 1790-1806 “in the attic room on Jägerstrasse, to which almost all the important intellectuals of Berlin come.” (Arendt 1997: 261) After a series of short love affairs, restricted financial circumstances of her family, the death of her mother and a severe illness she finally in 1814 married the younger Karl August Varnhagen von Ense. She also underwent baptism and changed her name to Antonie Friedrike Varnhagen, but she never stopped calling herself ‘Rahel’. With her husband she moved to Karlsruhe where he became a Prussian chargé d’affairs in 1816 but when he was recalled...
from his post three years later they returned to Berlin and to Salon Varnhagen (Arendt 1997: 262-3). As a woman and a Jew, Rahel Varnhagen was a member of a group that was both marginalized and deprived of legal rights. Indeed, Jews were often likened to women in the eighteenth century. As a Jewish woman, Rahel was even denied the authority of citizenship… Rahel viewed herself as an outsider to a cultural tradition that might have guided her pen to form perfect German words in the Latin alphabet, and in accepted literary forms. (Weissberg 1997: 10)

Rahel Varnhagen wrote about her life and “matters of the heart” in letters to more or less famous friends. Unable to publish an autobiography in her own right, she still claimed the autobiographical tradition of J. J. Rousseau by describing her letters as the *Confessions de J.J. Rahel* (Weissberg 1997: 10)

Hannah Arendt, who had written a doctoral dissertation on Saint Augustine’s *Confessions* and often referred to Rousseau, chose to write what was meant to be her habilitation dissertation as a biography of sorts, utilizing Rahel Varnhagen’s autobiographical letters and diaries.\(^{21}\)

According to Weissberg “Arendt’s writing seems to obliterate the difference between the author and her subject”(Weissberg 1997: 6) and according to Moran it is “a difficult, abstract book, essentially a phenomenological treatise rather than a biography”. (Moran 1999, p. 297) Arendt herself gives us few hints about her phenomenological, (auto)biographical, and storytelling method. In the preface written in 1956 she writes that her “book was conceived and written from an angle unusual in biographical literature”, and that it was never

...my intention to write a book about Rahel; about her personality, which might lend itself to various interpretations according to the psychological standards and categories that the author introduces from outside; nor about her position in Romanticism and the effect of the Goethe culture in Berlin, of which she was actually the originator; nor about the significance of her salon for the social history of the period; nor about her ideas and her "Weltanschauung," in so far as these can be constructed from her letters. What interests me solely was to narrate the story of Rahel's life as she herself might have told it. ...My portrait therefore follows as closely as possible the course of Rahel’s

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\(^{21}\) She could read these in the Berliner Staasbibliothek before the war, and check “the numerous corrections and additions to the letters and diary entries which Varnhagen published in her three-volume *Buch des Andenkens, 1934*” (Arendt 1997: 80) Rahel Varnhagen’s archives disappeared during the war, which contributed to the late publication of Arendt’s study of her. For archival methods and problems regarding gender and migration, see the contribution by Isabel Carrera Suarez and Laura Vinuela Suarez to this project.
own reflection upon herself…It does not venture beyond this frame even when Rahel is apparently being examined critically. The criticism corresponds to Rahel’s self-criticism … I have deliberately avoided that modern form of indiscretion in which the writer attempts to penetrate his subject’s tricks and aspires to know more than the subject knew about himself or was willing to reveal; what I call pseudoscientific apparatus of depth-psychology, psychoanalysis, graphology, etc., fall into this category of curiosity-seeking (Arendt 1997, pp. 81-83)

As an epigraph to the book Arendt chose a poem by Edwin Arlington Robinson, where the first stanza quoted runs:

We tell you, tapping on your brows,
    The story as it should be, —
As if the story of a house
    Were told or ever could be;—
We’ll have no kindly veil between
    Her vision and those we have seen.—
As if we guessed what hers have been
    Or what they are or would be.
(Arendt 1997, p. 73)

Liliane Weissberg, who wrote an introduction to the 1997 edition of the Rahel Varnhagen study, comments that “Arendt’s negation of the veil is no modern” penetration (Weissberg 1997: 6). One could say that Arendt starts from the standpoint of Rahel, that she “situates herself into Rahel’s salon as a vantage point from which to view the world” (6).

Arendt stages a text as a mimesis, as acting as if. It is performance that constitutes both Arendt’s subject and her specific biographic discourse. …Like an actor, the author Arendt is able to assume another person’s voice and render it for a wider audience, …The theatrical nature of this performance is confirmed on every page of her book. (6)

Performance, appearances, showing who one is to others who tell stories about one’s appearance and performance are notions Arendt develops in her later political thought.

Her biography of Rahel was intended as an autobiography, an auto-revelation on paper of Rahel's own life. Storytelling allows the activity of writing to become political without constituting action. Storytelling is the disclosure of all disclosures and, as such, it also forms part of these disclosures. Homer emphasized the political nature of stories
when he told stories about heroes who were true ‘politicians.’ According to Arendt, all stories are political in nature. (Herzog 2001: 169)

Arendt does not want to explain Rahel Varnhagen, but she applies concepts she herself did not, but could have used according to Arendt who draws on Rahel’s own insights regarding her wish to escape a Jewishness she never in the end could escape (Arendt 1997: 237-59) Arendt’s standpoint analysis of Rahel’s development from involuntary or unconscious pariah over parvenu to conscious pariah, or in Rahel’s terminology, rebel, was to account for a historically situated structure of

… a certain possibility of existence which arises from being Jewish, a characteristic she termed “fatefulness”, arising out of the foundationlessness of the Jewish condition. Arendt goes on to describe Varnhagen in terms of categories of Jewishness as “pariah” or “parvenu”, categories she had borrowed from the French writer and Dreyfus defender, Bernard Lazare. (Moran 1999: 297)

Against exclusion and marginalisation the Jews responded with at least four different strategies according to Arendt. 1) The unconscious pariahs, who care about their social and political conditions and who follow Jewish traditions. 2) The pariahs who claim Jewish separatism. 3) The parvenus who do not acknowledge their outsidership and try to escape it through silence or through assimilation into non-Jewish society. 4) The conscious pariahs who acknowledge the misery of the ghetto existence, but who instead of assimilation claim recognition for Jews as Jews among other humans.22

In Origins of Totalitarianism, which Arendt published before the Rahel Varnhagen study, but which in reality is a sequel, she uses Rahel’s story as an example, “she makes her person publicly important, completing in a way Rahel’s emancipation as a woman and as a Jew” and emphasizes thereby “the already political nature of the earlier work” (Weissberg 1997: 20).

Arendt continued to develop the pariah concept and its varieties until her very last, unpublished book, where even the thinker could be seen as a conscious, rebellic pariah – the

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22 This paragraph builds on Larsson Berit (2003) Parians ansvar, unpublished seminar paper. Larsson also influenced our interest in the Rahel Varnhagen study.
only freedom left for the marginalized.\textsuperscript{23} In the article ‘We Refugees’ from 1943 republished in The Jew as Pariah Arendt describes the situation for the holocaust migrants in US

Once we could buy our food and ride in the subway without being told we were undesirable. We have become a little hysterical since newspapermen started detecting us and telling us publicly to stop being disagreeable when shopping for milk and bread. We wonder how it can be done; we already are so damnably careful in every moment of our daily lives to avoid anybody guessing who we are, what kind of passport we have, where our birth certificates were filled out -- and that Hitler didn't like us. We try the best we can to fit into a world where you have to be sort of politically minded when you buy your food. (Arendt 1987)

**Privileged foreign women in Academia**

For the purposes of this article, we draw here on second-hand material to exemplify our framework. It is thus important to mention that the material and the interpretations we account for in this section are already selected and interpreted by other scholars. Here, we draw our example from the text *The Thin Edge of the Wedge*, by Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón (2005).\textsuperscript{24} In their inquiry, Czarniawska and Sevón focus on the intersections of ethnicity and sex in the construction of foreign women in the academe in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Europe.\textsuperscript{25}

In a phenomenological inquiry, humans are seen as the constructors of the social world. This implies that social products are conceptualized as “humanly meaningful acts, whether these products are termed attitudes, behaviours, families, aging, ethnic groups, classes, societies, or otherwise” (Orleans 2001). The purpose of the phenomenological inquiry is to gain insight into how a phenomenon is filled with meaning in a specific context. One of the bottom lines in a framework of phenomenology for gender studies is the notion that the scholar shall describe concrete events, things or experiences of individuals, rather than explain general features. The aim of a phenomenological inquiry is to identify some kind of invariants,

\textsuperscript{23} See Arendt 1987c; cf Bernstein’s (1996: 14-45) for an interesting discussion of the thinker as pariah which shows how central the pariah concept was to Arendt as a political concept. Cf. also Parvikko 1992.
\textsuperscript{24} Barbara Czarniewska calls herself ‘post-phenomenological’ and Czarniewska and Sevón present their study in a borderland between a phenomenological and ethnomethodological framework.
\textsuperscript{25} As they are often interrelated, it is important to stress that we do not intend to focus on experiences of double oppression. We rather focus on the paradoxical effects of the construction of women as “double strangers” in the academy, i.e. on the combination of being a woman entering a masculine field, and a foreigner entering another country and culture.
To be able to do this, the scholar needs to start with locating a position in the concrete world that provides the perspective of exploration, the point from where it will be explored. The focus on how a phenomenon is constructed is the starting point for the inquiry by Czarniawska and Sevón, expressed by references to disrupted plans of conducting a quantitative analysis. While working with statistics, they found a lot of difficulties with the topic of researching elites, such as predefined and narrowing concepts for instance. Their decision to conduct an inquiry focusing on the mundane, everyday experience of four foreign woman professors in Europe, is expressed as follows:

The impetus for this study was an observation that many of the women who obtained the first chairs at European universities were foreigners. Our initial attempt to provide a statistical picture proved impossible, because there were numerous problems deciding the contents of such concepts as “first”, “university professor” and “foreigner”. We have therefore focused on four life stories.

Czarniawska & Sevón dissociate their inquiry from the number of biographical texts written about these four women professors, hailing them “as pioneers, female heroes and martyrs” (4). Instead, they inquire the construction of being “a double stranger”, with an interest not in these women’s personal success, but in the opportunities for women entering the academy (4, 63). In their inquiry, Czarniawska & Sevón draw on concrete phenomena, in a description not focusing on ‘true’ or ‘false’ constructions, but on how the phenomena, i.e. intersections of sex and ethnicity, are constructed within a given context.

As mentioned earlier, the description is the starting point for a phenomenological investigation. In their inquiry, Czarniawska and Sevón describe important dates, events, people and incidents in the lives of these four foreign women, drawing on biographical material. The descriptions of the life stories of the foreign women professors are detailed and thorough, albeit focusing on one trace in their life stories, i.e. the academic possibilities, in an emphasis on the mundane, everyday experiences.

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26 Called ‘essences’ in the language of Edmund Husserl.

27 Czarniawska and Sevón 2005: 2. Life stories are unique stories told out of diverse everyday life experiences. The everyday life world is a practical and social world, available to us through a reserve of experiences, in turn constituted by our own experiences as well as those taken over by others – teachers and parents, for instance. The everyday life world is an ambiguous reality, built through the various lives of individuals (Bengtsson: 1999: 17).
At the beginning of the life story of Sofia Kovalevskaya,\textsuperscript{28} the very first woman professor in a European university, Czarniawska & Sevón highlight certain moments in her biography of importance for the training of her extreme talent for mathematics: “Her father believed that an exaggerated interest in mathematics made her neglect other topics, and he stopped the lessons” (12). The conventional structures, here personified by Sofia’s father, were confronted with the open-minded attitude from scientists with a fascination for a genuine talent: “He [Nikolai Tyrov, professor in physics and Sofia’s first tutor] pleaded with her father to permit her to study further, calling her “a new Pascal”. Krukovsky [the father] relented, and in 1865 Sofia went to school in Petersburg, returning home in 1867 after having completed the school’s program. Women could not enter Russian universities, and Krukovsky would not permit his daughters to travel abroad” (Ibid.).

Subsequently, though, Sofia travelled to Europe. Due to her double strangeness as a women and a foreigner, Sofia’s life in the academy during the following years developed in a constant wave motion, between being stuck in structures of discrimination on the one hand, and being released from the discrimination on the other. Her double strangeness caused paradoxical effects: Sofia was not allowed matriculate to the university in Europe. Therefore, she was privately tutored also in Germany. In four years she was tutored by the most noted mathematician of the time, Karl Weiserstrass. In 1874, she had completed three works (of which everyone should pass as a doctoral thesis). To get a doctor’s degree however, Sofia was in need for a university that would grant her. Seeing that no university did allow women to matriculate, it was difficult finding a university to give an exam to a woman. Nevertheless, one university in Germany “had a reputation for occasionally granting such a favour to foreigners”. And finally Sofia got her PhD, through one unforeseen advantage of being a foreigner (15,16).

In their analysis, Czarniawska & Sevón, mean that the role of a transgressor was a result from the very double strangeness, postulated as a possibility where “these two types of transgression – a women entering a male field and a foreigner entering another culture – may cancel one another in some cases and double their effect in others.” (Czarniawska & Sevón 2005: 62). When Sofia Kovalevskaya in 1889 was appointed to a final chair at Stockholm University, Czarniawska & Sevón links the impact from the two themes: “We do not claim

\textsuperscript{28}Sofia Kovalevskaya used the male version of her last name in her scientific production, i.e. ‘Kovalevskaya’. Furthermore, she might be known by her nickname ‘Sonia’. In Slavic languages, however, nicknames are used in private contexts or for younger people.
that these four women whose careers we describe became professors because they were women and foreigners. They clearly merited their professorships and the time was ripe to begin nominating women to university positions. But their double strangeness, we claim, often helped them to reach this position before native women, who had to pay the costs of transgression” (53). And further: “This may mean that, if stranger is a woman, her “womanness” may be overlooked in that it does not correspond to the local standard of femininity” (57).

Furthermore, as the very first woman professor and as a foreigner, Sofia Kovalevskaya’s experiences as a ‘double stranger’ in the academy during the late 19th century gave her a significant position, from where she had the possibility to have a critical attitude and try to change the structures in the academy: “The stranger”, writes Czarniawska and Sevón, “like the poor and like sundry ‘inner enemies’ is an element of the group itself. His [sic] position as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it”. In addition, Czarniawska & Sevón dissociates from using the metaphor “women as the Other” because “the Other, different as it might be (a women, a dog), can be nevertheless familiar; might provoke distaste, but only occasionally fear. The Others can also be exotic, as in the case of “the otherness of the Orient” /…/ but are still different from the stranger in that they remain far away “ (5).

The inquiry on being a double stranger could consequently also be problematised with Hannah Arendt’s conception of the ‘conscious pariah’, as elaborated earlier in this chapter. The conscious pariah is outside the community. It is a person who is aware of herself as an outsider and of the way history has shaped her life. The experiences of being a pariah informs her life in two ways: the experiences on the one hand makes her aware of the fact that the personal is political and on the other hand they establish her marginalized position in the culture and society as a position with a critical potential (Parvikko 1992: 87) To Hannah Arendt, the pariah is a rebel (Arendt 1978: 67).

Czarniawska & Sevón do not follow the personal traits from the life stories to the translocal levels of domination. That is to say: to the relations of ruling, using Dorothy Smith’s term. By following the personal traits to the level of translocal relations, the investigation would have potentiality to grasp how the instruments of power was produced in the organizations,
corporations and universities, located at a translocal level, and related to the concrete individuals in the inquiry.

The idea of ruling relations illustrated

Figure 1: Ruling relations

Smith’s notion of ruling relations could for instance be informative for reflections over the fact that Sofia Kovalevskaya did benefit from academic mentorship – i.e. male professors in the possession of expert knowledge and power to be able to help her. Strict laws and practices regulate positions at the university. It would have been interesting to further develop if – and in that case, how – practises of intellectual mentorship was apprehended as a way to successfully incorporate women and other Others into the university.

Czarniawska & Sevón started off their investigation in a description of the individual, concrete experiences of the individual scholar. Towards the end of their inquiry they comment their findings in a concluding remark:

As we tried to show, these four women foreigners suffered from all kinds of repressions and attacks. Nevertheless, they succeeded in making their place in the men’s world, and may have served as wedges, opening the closed doors of academy to other women.

They suffered a double pressure, but it must be compared to the price that /…/ a (native) woman had to pay for entering male domains: madness, a civil death (63).

The phenomenological inquiry aims to interpret the aspects of meaning or meaningfulness associated with the phenomenon in question. The example we used to exemplify the phenomenological inquiry focused on foreign women in the academy of the late 19th and early 20th century. Drawing on concrete descriptions of everyday experiences, Czarniawska &
Sevón refrains from falling into preconceived notions of “university professor”, “foreigner” and “first”. In order to make a less prejudiced inquiry on how the double strangeness influenced the careers of these four women professors, they write life stories. By doing this, they arrive at the interesting conclusion that these two sorts of foreignness – of being a woman entering a male world, and of being a foreigner entering a new culture – was not a cumulative disadvantage. Rather the opposite: “it seems that these two types of strangeness might cancel one another, permitting these women a greater degree of success than was allowed their “native” sisters” (3).

**Summary**

In this chapter, we have described phenomenology as a paradigmatic framework. By using the expression ‘paradigmatic framework’ we want to stress its holistic and composite character, especially three dimensions of what has been called ‘phenomenology’, i.e. as a) a certain approach, b) a methodology and c) a set of research methods. Phenomenologists can use a range of research methods, such as archival work, interviewing, participant observations and discourse analyses, just to mention some of the methods compatible with a phenomenological approach that are introduced in other chapters in this book.

As an interdisciplinary methodology, however, phenomenology focuses on how a phenomenon is constructed – a phenomenon may be a material thing, a text, speech, an emotion, etc. The descriptive account is, consequently, the mere starting-point of a phenomenological inquiry. It is in, our adaptation, motivated by an urge to discover, unveil or problematise aspects of the concrete, everyday world that has been “habitualised”, taken for granted. Such discovering of new, or unforeseen, aspects of the phenomenon is accomplished through the phenomenological reduction. One’s presuppositions are put into brackets, our practises and beliefs temporarily lifted out from the habits and norms they have become intertwined with. In addition, our looking at the world is intimately tied up with our language and our orientation towards the world. This implies that the character of the inquiry always demands a situated consciousness, i.e. a reflection in which the scholar situates the subject and object of inquiry, as well as the surrounding context. In contrast to abstract reasoning, a phenomenology for interdisciplinary studies strives to focus on the mundane, concrete everyday.

By drawing on the phenomenological dimensions in Hannah Arendt’s and Dorothy E Smith’s thought, the chapter finally highlights a few crucial components in a phenomenology for
interdisciplinary gender studies focussing migration, i.e. Arendt’s conceptualizations of pariahdom and Smith’s concept of ruling relations. Albeit very different, these concepts offer a critical perspective on hegemonic regulations of power in concrete everyday lives, uniting waves of phenomenological thought that have developed in different directions in the humanities and the social sciences.

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Affidavit of identity in lieu of a passport.

They wouldn't use them long words if they had to clean up after themselves!