Belief and Implicit Bias

Recently, a fair amount of philosophical attention has been paid to the phenomenon of implicit bias. One debate has concerned whether or not the unconscious state involved in implicit bias (assuming there is one) is a belief. On the whole, pro-believers have been concerned to establish that the unconscious state is capable of responding directly to epistemic reasons. I will argue that even if it is capable of responding directly to epistemic reasons, this is not sufficient for its being a belief. If it is also capable of being directly formed and/or revised on the basis of conditioning, it is not a belief. In arguing that this is the case, I will develop a conception of belief according to which it can only be directly formed and revised on the basis of epistemic reasons.

 

 

Information about the work and research of Dr Sophie Archer can be found at: https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/people/view/1270025-archer-sophie