Epicurus on Pleasure, a Complete Life, and Death: A Defence

Epicurus on Pleasure, a Complete Life, and Death: A Defence

Epicurus famously argued that: "death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lie in sensation, whereas death is the absence of sensation." Many leading philosophers, including Cicero, Nagel, Williams and Feldman, have interpreted this argument in a way that renders it invalid. All that Epicurus' argument establishes, these interpreters claim, is that death is not *intrinsically* bad. But, they continue, death can also be *comparatively* bad for us, by depriving us of more pleasurable time alive. I offer an interpretation of Epicurus' views of pleasure and the complete life which renders Epicurus' argument valid. On this view, one tastes the greatest pleasures when, as a consequence of philosophical reflection, adjusting one's desires, and choosing the right social and natural environment, one has made oneself sufficiently invulnerable to great evils. A necessary condition of such invulnerability is that one's central projects are such that they cannot be thwarted by death. From the perspective of an Epicurean sage who has achieved this state of invulnerability, more pleasurable time alive is welcome, but does not make one's life more complete. For such a sage, death is therefore neither an intrinsic nor a comparative evil.

Further information about Professor Alex Voorhoeve can be found at:

http://personal.lse.ac.uk/voorhoev/