'Experiencing the Present and the Time-Lag Argument'

'Experiencing the Present and the Time-Lag Argument'

Abstract:

In Theory of Knowledge, Russell distinguishes between two senses of ‘present’ – one of which he calls the ‘temporal’ sense of ‘present’:

"Whatever I experience is, in one sense, ‘present’ to me at the time when I experience it, but in the temporal sense it need not be present – for example – if it is something remembered, or something abstract which is not in time at all." (Russell 1992, p.38)

Dr Rashbrook argues that we should understand ‘Temporal Presence’ as reducible to a feature of perceptual experience identified by Izchak Miller - the 'Principle of Presentational Concurrence’:

“The time interval occupied by a content which is before the mind is the very same time interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very content before the mind." (Miller 1984, p.107)

He then uses the Principle of Presentational Concurrence to develop a contrast between the way items feature in episodic recollection, and in abstract thought. The perception/episodic recollection distinction is drawn by appealing to the idea that episodic recollection is representation of past experience. The perception/abstract thought distinction is drawn by appealing to differences in the way thoughts and perceptual experiences fill time.

• Dr Oliver Rashbrook is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Christ Church College.  Further information about Dr Oliver Rashbrook.