Consciousness and its Limits

Consciousness and its Limits

Abstract:

According to Moore, seeing is a way of being conscious, as being red is a way of being coloured. Contemporary orthodoxy demurs. Philosophers with widely differing attitudes towards consciousness (e.g., Prinz, Rosenthal, Burge and Block) argue or assume that perception -- of the very same kind as occurs in ordinary conscious perception -- can occur without consciousness. According to these philosophers, this is a lesson which science has taught us. It is also a lesson which underpins a shared project of articulating a 'theory of consciousness'. I survey the various evidence cited in their advocacy of unconscious perception (including work on priming under masking and inattention, on 'integrated perception' in neglect, and preserved discrimination in blindsight) and argue that their case is unproven. I close by exploring some of the epistemological issues we ultimately face in pressing the case further.

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