Major Concepts in Tourism Research - Memory

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INTRODUCTION

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The German online magazine *Spiegel Online* recently started an online project for which people can upload the pictures and stories they deem important for contemporary German history. One of the topics that members started concerns InterRail, which in 1972 was offered for the first time and allowed people to travel for four weeks to anywhere in Europe they wanted. The author of this chapter uploaded a picture of himself and his friends in 1972; the young people are at a train station and prepared with guitar and backpacks to embark on their journey to Greece. He added a text of his personal memories of the long train ride. Another photo, dated 2007, shows three girls with their backpacks who are likewise at a train station on an InterRail holiday (Boom, 2007).

The personal material of the author such as his picture and the narrative of the train ride represent his personal memory of the time. Furthermore, the comments by other members of the online portal who added their own memories and the pictures of the three girls in 2007 suggest that there is something like a collective memory that people share about this way of travelling. Both, the personal as well as the collective memories can be interesting for tourism researches because they are indications for the experiences of InterRail in specific and travel cultures in general in the Germany of 1972 until today. Furthermore, the pictures and texts can be seen as an example for the material that is available for tourism research.

Such material and peoples’ memories of their holidays play an important role, not only concerning the history of tourism but also concerning more recent memories, when people are asked to talk about their experiences after the holiday or to fill in a questionnaire. Moreover, not only in tourism research but also within the tourism process memory plays an important role. Experiences from the holidays can be recalled again and again in different forms of memory and are represented by different materials. In order to gain a better understanding of the role of memory in tourism and, more importantly, the concept(s) of memory we included this topic in the series *Major Concepts in Tourism Research* of the Centre for Tourism and Cultural Change.

The workshop took place in April 2008 at Leeds Metropolitan University, and we were able to welcome Prof. Sharon MacDonald from Manchester University as the keynote speaker. In her keynote Sharon gave an overview over the use of the concept of memory in the different disciplines, especially the humanities. By doing so she showed the wide use and importance of the concept, although she also mentioned that this wide use holds the danger of it becoming just a label. Nonetheless, it can be fruitful in tourism research to employ the concept of memory in many different ways. Especially so, because tourism is often seen as something to be remembered, and therefore certain expectations are connected with it. On the one hand, the material dimension of tourism is connected to memory. Relating to material culture, the questions to be asked would be how important it is to bring souvenirs back from a trip and in how far things “carry” memory. On the other hand, the corporal presence of tourists at certain sights might be important for memory and the sensory dimension of tourism might bring back memories.

The ensuing discussion mirrored the dilemma of everyone having an idea of what memory is, but of the whole group missing a common idea to rely on. Accordingly, the discussion covered a wide range of topics without going into detail for any one of them. Therefore, the points that were discussed after the keynote can rather be taken as questions that were partly answered over the course of the workshop. Other questions and further details remain to be answered.
One aspect that was discussed was the process of recall. The question was posed whether it is the memory that changes over time or just the way of expressing it. As the further discussion in the workshop has shown, memory and recall need to be seen as very closely connected because through the process of recall, for example in narrative, memories are created and changed. Accordingly, the second aspect of the discussion, which concerned the connections between memory and forgetting, is closely related to the first part. Especially in relation to material culture it was mentioned that there is a certain panic of forgetting in that people are afraid to throw things away or lose their souvenirs because they are afraid that they might lose the memories that are attached to certain objects. Concerning the physiological part of forgetting, Alzheimer’s was discussed as not only showing that memory and forgetting cannot be divided but that memory and learning are also closely connected. It seems that people with Alzheimer’s rather lose the ability to learn than the ability to remember.

While the discussion about memory and forgetting was rather concerned with individual aspects of memory, we also discussed different kind of individual and collective memory. Sharon pointed to the importance of “outer memory” because this is the kind of memory that is passed on to other people. She differentiated between this memory and the more intimate family memory. In the context of memory, the family could be conceptualised as a mediator between the individual and the social. Especially in the tourism context the consideration of family memory might be important because tourism often takes place in a family context.

Considering “outer memory” it is important to ask who has the power to preserve ones own memories and who has power to define what is remembered collectively. There seems to be the feeling at the moment that people do not count if they and their memories are not archived somewhere. Furthermore, people keep mental collections of important events of their lives.

The following presentations and discussions of the workshop showed that the concept of memory is indeed widely used in tourism research and related disciplines. All these presentations in addition to the texts that have been discussed show the wide range of research in which memory plays a vital role. Therefore, this workshop has set the stage for further discussions in opening new questions such as how the current research might be critiqued and furthered in relation to a more general conceptualisation of memory as well as in relation to tourism research in specific.

The presentations have been put together in this publication outline the different understandings and uses of memory in current tourism research. First, we are happy to publish Prof. Sharon MacDonald’s keynote. Second, Birgit Braasch, Leeds Met, undertakes the task to give an overview over the current interdisciplinary research that is being done in relation to memory. Third, Allison Hui, Lancaster, shows that memory can be conceptualised as an immaterial “absent presence”. She considers the interactions of tourists with time and space and claims that it is important to consider immaterial aspects in order to get a better idea of how tourists experience spaces differently, since memory has a profound influence on the performance of tourism spaces. Fourth, Robbert-Jan Adriaansen, Rotterdam, takes a broader look at the development of modern tourism in the 19th century to analyse how the pedagogy of travel in the different periods considers the connections between travel, the past and memory.

The papers are followed by shorter discussions that concern further papers that were given at the workshop. Birgit Braasch discusses a presentation by Simone Abram, Leeds Met, in which Simone followed the very physical manifestations of and connections to memory in Norwegian practices related to the use of the hytta. Claudia Müller, Leeds Met, discusses the very practical personal approach to memory by Marina de Stacpole, who was showing the art she has created using her own memories and photos from a trip to South East Asia.
MEMORY, MATERIALITY AND TOURISM

Sharon MacDonald (University of Manchester)

Introduction

Memory is one of those concepts that is beguiling and attractive – partly because it seems like a key to so many areas and because it travels across disciplines with such apparent ease. But it is also frustrating and perhaps even dangerous, partly for the same reasons – we think that we may be talking about the same thing, but we are not; or we think that it is the key to what we are looking at, when perhaps it is just a superficial account that seems to be providing answers but which should be used as the prompt for more questions. A lot of my own work might be characterised as work on memory – public memory, social memory, cultural memory, collective memory. But I have often been reluctant to talk about it in these ways. It has sometimes felt too slippery, implying things that I did not quite intend. Yet, at the same time, there is a tremendous body of fascinating theorising and commentary which I would certainly like my work to be able to be in dialogue with.

Partly what I want to do in this essay, then, is to unpack some of my own ambivalence about ‘memory’ as an analytical focus for research. This also provides a way of setting out some of the concepts and approaches involved in thinking about memory. In particular, as my title indicates, I want to pick up especially on considerations of materiality in relation to memory – and especially how this is entangled with tourism. Tourism can be seen, I suggest, as (in part at least) a particular kind of memory practice or set of memory practices. How this works and some of its implications are also of concern to me here. I begin, however, with some general comments about the efflorescence of memory research and interest.

Memory boom

As numerous commentators have observed, we are in the midst of a ‘memory boom’. Some call it a ‘memory epidemic’ (Bodeman 2002: 24), a ‘hypertrophy’ and ‘obsession’ with memory (Huyssen 2003: 3) or ‘commemorative fever’ (Mistzal 2003: 2), their medicalised terminology indicative of a fear that the emphasis on memory may not be entirely healthy. This ‘boom’ or ‘epidemic’ is thoroughly evident in the academy – with vast numbers of books, articles, research projects, conferences and journals, such as the new *Memory Studies*; and the selection of the concept as one of the ‘key concepts’ in this series. A characteristic of this – and distinguishing it from many other concepts – is that it is being used in numerous disciplines: history, sociology, anthropology, archaeology, cultural studies; psychology and philosophy; and also in neuroscience, computer science and areas of engineering and physics. Topics studied range from brain chemistry and the function of the hippocampus; to technicalities of digitised storage and retrieval mechanisms; the ‘memory’ of certain alloys or plants; speeds of different kinds of individual memory retrieval; the politics of public...

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1 This paper was originally presented at a key concepts workshop of the Centre for Tourism and Cultural Change, Leeds Metropolitan University, April 2008. I thank all of the participants and organisers, especially Josef Ploner who gave an insightful discussion of my work. The Nuremberg research mentioned here received support from the Alexander von Humboldt organisation and the AHRC.

memorising and sensory differentials of recollection. This raises the question, of course, of whether we are really all talking about the same thing. But whether or not this turns out to be the case – and often, I suspect, we are not – the fact that so much work is couched in these terms, and the promise that it holds for interdisciplinary collaboration, is a significant feature of the flourishing of memory work. It is part of a self-feeding spiral, in which projects produce more projects, and interest more interest.

Another feature of this boom, however, and another reason for the way it has taken hold and taken off, is its public life. Discussion of memory is widespread, from debates about false memory syndrome and Alzheimers; through numerous kinds of popular memorising practices, such as photography and collecting. Aspects of this memory boom are connected with tourism in direct and indirect ways – popular photography and popular collecting, both grew massively in the second half of the twentieth century and have been given further boosts in recent years by cheap digital photographic technologies, the internet and e-bay. Also symptomatic of the expansion of memory in the public domain is the spread in the 1980s of industrial and working-class heritage – of heritage sites within the living memory of large tracts of the population. Part of a wider shift towards social history – and often socialist-inflected history – many of these heritage representations tapped into oral rather than documented accounts; and they were often discussed – as by Raphael Samuel in his Theatres of Memory (1994) – not so much as opportunities for people to learn history as for them to activate memories and to engage in reflexive identification. And the place of things – of stuff and preferably lots of it – in this is at least implicit in some of the accounts, Samuel himself waxing lyrical at the materiality of bricks even as he historicises the fall and rise of appreciation of them. Implicitly more often than explicitly, there is here an idea that material culture can offer some kind of direct route to memory activation.

**Individualisation of memory in public culture**

On the shift to memory in public culture, German theorist Rosmarie Beier (who is also chief curator at the German historical museum) has likewise pointed out that many museums, especially history museums, now present what they are doing in terms of memory rather than history (2005, 2006). She draws on Ulrich Beck’s arguments about a ‘second modernity’ to conceptualise this in terms of ‘individualisation’ – a shift from larger social categories to more individualised ones. So the social history movements of the 1970s and 1980s, that saw museum displays presented through categories such as gender and class, have now been superseded, she argues, by ones that are oriented towards a performed approach that seeks to elicit individual responses, memories and experiences. Examples might include the use of identity-cards in exhibitions, as in the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and exhibitions using multimedia to incorporate individual interplay, such as the A Pockets full of Memories project – in which people were asked to talk about items that they had in their pockets. It might also include a project in which I have been involved at the Royal Armouries in Leeds, which entailed designing and trialling ‘personalisation’ exhibition technologies in part of an exhibition about the Chronicles of Froissart. The idea involved here is that an exhibition is designed using technologies that allow visitors to actively contribute to creating their own individual exhibition – different visitors will not simply perceive or interpret an exhibition differently but will, through the choices they make as they navigate the displays, receive an exhibition crafted in part by them. Some of these visiting opportunities are set up to elicit existing memories but equally as often they are to provide opportunities for the creation of

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4 The project is described at: http://www3.shu.ac.uk/c3ri/Details.cfm?Action=DetailsOfProject&ProjectID=41 (accessed August 2008).
individualised memories, of a unique experience. To some extent, of course, exhibitions always allow for this – but they do not build in the visitor input into what is displayed.

If tourism has always offered possibilities or prompts for individual and individualised memory-making, then, Beier’s arguments and these examples suggest that these are now being elicited, and also publicly performed, in more active ways. The role of research and researchers in this also deserves mention: a massive new field has opened up of collaborative work as researchers seek out and record memories that then are played back into exhibition-making; or as they develop tools and design strategies to enable individualisation and personalisation. Rather than going further down these lines, however, let me turn back to the concept of memory and tack a route through a tiny part of the mass of research upon it, outlining some of the developments that I think have been significant and approaches that I think are promising, as well as some of my reservations.

**Out of the head and distributed: perspectives on memory**

One of the main contributions of social and cultural perspectives on memory has been to take memory ‘out of the head’ as it were. That is, these have emphasised the ‘out there-ness’ of memory – the ways in which it is co- or inter-subjectively rather than purely individually produced. This is not to say that there may not be individual memory (and in many ways the intersection between individual and social or collective is especially fascinating) but it is to recognise that remembering is something that does not only take place inside the heads of individuals but also in all kinds of social situations and collective practices. This includes, for example, talk at the family dinner table or with the photograph album, including recalling those holidays; participating in commemorative events or even watching those endless shows about ‘best comedies from the 1970s’ etc. Just as there has been much talk of the ‘distributed person’ in recent years, we might talk about this as ‘distributed memory’.

This taking of memory out of the head or distributing it has some significant corollaries. One is a shift away from considering memory primarily as a cognitive or mental store or process. This paves the way for considering memory as embodied. Here Paul Connerton’s work, in *How Societies Remember* (1989), has been influential. He emphasizes the importance of bodily practice for what he calls *performative memory*. Memory he suggests is ‘sedimented, or amassed, in the body’ (p.72). This takes place through *incorporating practices* – actions that are appropriate to particular contexts, and that we repeat, often without thinking about it, within them. These range from ceremony and ritual, which he sees as particularly important for social memory, through to more everyday bodily practices, such as handshakes and other interpersonal actions or the ‘memorisation of culturally specific postures’. (Bourdieu is an influence here.) And it takes place through *inscribing practices* – through, as he puts it, ‘devices of storing and retrieving information… [devices that] do something that traps and holds information, long after the human organism has stopped informing’ (p.73).

We can extend this emphasis on inscribing practices to materiality more generally, as Connerton does when he writes about the importance of objects in social remembering. This has been taken up by a wide range of scholars in recent years in particular, often as part of a wider turn to material culture. Liz Hallam and Jenny Hockey, for example, write that ‘Mementoes, memorials, words and artefacts can be understood as external forms functioning to sustain thoughts and images that are conceived of as part of the internal states

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5 The notion of the ‘distributed person’, used in this way, can be found in Gell 1998. The term ‘distributed memory’ is in use in computer science and psychology but not, as far as I am aware, in social and cultural studies of memory.
of living persons’ (2001:4); and they highlight a wide range of ways in which material culture is used mnemonically – including as a kind of bulwark against forgetting (ibid.) Marius Kwint, in his introduction to Material Memories (1999), usefully sets out three ways in which, he says, ‘objects serve memory’ in ‘Western traditions’: (1) ‘they furnish memory; they constitute our picture of the past’; (2) ‘objects stimulate remembering’; and (3) ‘objects form records’ (p.2). Some of the research in this vein has also been part of ways of thinking about the agency of objects, sometimes derived from versions of actor network theory (e.g. Edwards, Gosden and Phillips 2006). This entails seeing these not just as things to be acted upon – or, in this context, as things to be remembered, or the furniture of memory – but as themselves playing some kind of more constitutive role in remembering, as Kwint’s attention to the stimulating or recording potentials of objects suggests.

Social, cultural, public, collective: perspectives on memory

If embodiment and materiality are two emphases that follow from taking memory outside the head, the more general, of course, is the move towards what is variously called social, cultural, public, or collective memory. A few comments on these terms are probably worth making here.

Social – emphasising the social means looking at the social relations involved in the maintenance of certain events or accounts over time; and in its classic formulations, in the work of Halbwachs, it is bound up with questions about how memories also help to shore up or sustain social groupings. Work on social memory has drawn us to look, for example, at questions of the transmission of memory over generations, or at the way in which collective versions of the past can be a means by which groups identify; and in more recent work has also pushed into questions of who is involved in the making of shared memories.6

Cultural – while this is sometimes blurred with social, and more generally all of these terms typically get used rather loosely, it is, I think, useful to make the distinction. When we are talking of cultural memory, we are dealing with accounts that are maintained or promulgated in cultural form – e.g. through memorials or television programmes – but which are not necessarily part of wider social practice or relations, or mapped onto social identities in a direct way. They might, for example, cut across existing groups, as has been argued for ‘cosmopolitan memory’ by Levy and Sznaider (2001, 2002). Part of their argument is also that certain events may become the ‘memories’ of particular social groups that do not have any direct connection with them. The Holocaust is the case that they take, arguing that it has become part of a widely shared memory – sustained by film and other inscribing practices – not only of those who did not experience it but also of places, e.g. the US, in which it did not take place. Alison Landsberg’s concept of ‘prosthetic memory’ works similarly at a more individual level (2004). She is interested in the ways in which, though cultural technologies, people might experience memories through which they did not actually live. Among other things, she talks about the immersive experiences of some kinds of museums; and her arguments have, I think, broader resonance for tourism. Cultural memory, which puts particular emphasis upon the technologies of remembering or of suggesting memory, is central to this; and thus of particular importance in tourism research.

Public – this is a way of talking about aspects of both of the above, but with a particular emphasis on institutional or state processes in the making of shared memory accounts. Its emphasis is particularly upon the making and reworking of memory in the public sphere; and its language derives on the one hand from the kinds of concerns represented by the journal

6 The classic reference is Halbwachs 1950, though note that the title of his book is in fact ‘collective memory’. For useful commentary on social memory and the following terms see also Fentress and Wickham 1992; Hautaniemi, Jarman and Macdonald 2006; Kansteiner 2002; Misztal 2003; Olick 2003.
Public Culture, with politics and transnational flows; and, on the other, is much used within American ‘applied history’ programmes, that are concerned with the practicalities of producing historical representations in the public domain (see Jordanova 2000).

Collective – in some ways this is a nice loose term that can be used to cover social memory but allowing more readily for any kinds of groupings. A potential disadvantage, partially shared with social and cultural memory, however, is that ‘collective’ may be seen to depict memory as wholly shared and identical.

Another significant move in memory research has, however, been towards appreciating memory as potentially fragmented rather than as strongly shared and coherent. Certainly, memories may well be shared and some institutions, especially those of nation-states, are geared towards trying to produce certain collective memories. Our school days are in part an occasion for producing such collective memories; and in relation to tourism we might reflect here upon the place of the school trip (now so often sadly at risk of risk assessments). But rather than looking at these as necessarily ‘collective’ – or shared in quite tightly patterned ways – there has been a move towards thinking about them more in terms of sets of overlapping and partial connections. Winter and Sivan retain the term ‘collective memory’ but draw on ideas from Roger Bastide to think of it as ‘a matrix of interwoven individual memories’ (2000: 28) – or, as they put it, a sort of group sing-along. In some ways this is attractive but it runs the danger of implying that the collective is just an agglomeration of the individual; whereas taking seriously the notion of cultural memory highlights ways in which this can ‘come before’ the individual. It is nevertheless different from Halbwach’s conception in which collective memory was the intersection of individual memories – what was shared – rather than their potentially disharmonious bunching together. But it also risks collapsing the sorts of social differentiations that notions of social memory take an interest in, into a mass ‘collective’.

Nevertheless, the mediation between individual and collective a key problematic for memory research. Here, James Young’s notion of ‘collected memory’ seems to me to offer an attractive approach. His focus is on memorials but can readily be extended. He is interested in how certain material forms (though we might equally talk, say, of events or even cultural icons) become a focus for memory-making, for their gathering and accumulating, and production of memories, but not necessarily in strongly overlapping ways (1993; see also 2000).

Memory concepts in practice

All of these concepts should, in theory, also de-individualise memory, or make us aware of how collective memory does not necessarily work in the same ways as individual memory. In recent critiques of memory research, however, by Kansteiner (2002) and others, there has often been criticism of the way in which social or other forms of collective memory are mapped onto assumptions about individual memory, and borrow theorizing across the two. So just as individuals are typically thought of as autonomous units, with their own memories somehow locked inside their own heads, societies too get understood as each having their own body of memories that are somehow just ‘there’, awaiting only the right techniques to bring them forth. Psychoanalytic theory has been particularly influential in such theorising – and is widespread in popular ways of thinking about memory; and this too has been applied in relation to collective memory. Thus, notions of repression or trauma are invoked at

7 The idea seems to me to have resonance with some of Victor Turner’s approach to symbols (especially 1967) – seeing these as having this very capacity for allowing different takes to some extent at least, something possible precisely because of their non-discursive form.
collective levels to explain, for example, when certain episodes of the past are not talked about in the public domain. A pervasive cultural emphasis on memory as hidden, and in need of being ‘brought out’ or revealed, is linked to this too.

Part of my own criticism of this in my book about post-War public memory in Nuremberg is that such accounts typically don’t tell us very much. They apply a label and assume a universal process at work. As I write there:

- rather than trying to infer transcendent psychological mechanisms – which risks blurring differentiations and ignoring historically located social processes
- I am concerned to try to identify the particular cultural assumptions and understandings, and the players and tensions, involved in negotiations and particular courses of action.\(^8\)

When, in this research, I looked at times of supposed ‘repression’, it seemed to me that there were often very good social accounts for what was going on. Furthermore, the empirical evidence that we might expect to find for ‘repression’ (though it doesn’t especially offer itself to empirical investigation – another problem with it) often did not fit. So, for example, the 1950s has widely come to be seen as a time of repressed memory in Germany – of not being able to face up to the terrible crimes committed under Nazism. Certainly, there was material that could fit such an account – including in the tourism domain. For example, tourist maps of Nuremberg almost always framed the city with a focus on the Old Town, missing out the Nazi buildings – the Nuremberg rally grounds – lying just outside. And yet, while on the one hand this was a conspicuous cutting off and ignoring, and matched by other things going on in the City, it was probably more conscious than ‘repression’ implied. Local government contained influential individuals thinking quite clearly about how the local populace should not be pushed to think too much about that past, partly because of concerns about remaining Nazi affinities. At the same time, however, they set up other arenas for discussing related matters. So the picture was not uniform; and the was scene shaped by numerous players and interests – none of which is well captured by a label such as repression; and none of which could be easily depicted as a singular collective memory-culture. This is not to say, however, that I do not think that such concepts are irrelevant, neither that they should be ignored. I don’t rule out the idea that a more subtle and extensive development of psychological and psychoanalytic terms might help us to make more useful distinctions if sensitively deployed.

One of the things in which I have been particularly interested in my own work is how certain ideas about memory and related matters themselves get utilised and incorporated into public discourse and action. In the case of Germany, we see from the late 1960s an argument about having repressed the past really taking off in a generational critique; and actions from the 1950s and since have been cast within its frame. In other words, what we see is that particular formulations and understandings of memory and how it works themselves are part of the context that we are trying to understand. This kind of perspective is one that informs my own work and that I see as integral to anthropological research.

This also accounts for some of my own wariness of the term ‘memory’. Rather than take it as an analytical focus or even as a substantive known field of investigation, my preference has been to look to see what gets counted as memory and how people involved are doing what they count as ‘memory’. For this reason, I have sometimes preferred to use the term ‘historical consciousness’ for the more analytical project (e.g. Macdonald 2000; also 2008). This is a term derived from German theorising, there being a large literature on Geschichtsbewusstsein:

\(^8\) This and the following quotes are from Macdonald 2008, which at the date of writing this essay was not yet published and no page numbers were yet available. Most of the points about that research are also discussed in the book.
As Jeffrey Olick has noted, the idea of ‘historical consciousness’ usefully avoids reifying a sometimes spurious distinction between ‘history’ and ‘memory’; and it directs attention not just to the content of history or memory but also to questions of the media and patterns through which these are structured, as well as where lines between, say, history and memory might be drawn in particular contexts. (Macdonald 2008)

One thing that I think it might open up here is how tourism offers up particular kinds of ‘memory complexes’; or that it plays a particular kind of role in wider processes of social identification and relating to the past, as well as to other places.

The way in which I want to use these ideas of ‘historical consciousness’, however, differ from some of the existing theorising:

… especially in the German tradition, there is an emphasis upon identifying universal ‘orientations’, in, for example, how people understand the relationship between past, present and future. Rather than revealing universally shared patterns, my own more modest aim is to highlight elements of a repertoire of possible approaches … and to chart some of their implications. That is, I seek to identify a non-exhaustive range of negotiating frames and tactics through which some kinds of past are evoked and engaged with in public culture. Unlike the universalist approach to historical consciousness, mine here is not concerned with presumed shared mental patterns but addresses the social and cultural situations and frames in which heritage … is assembled and negotiated. These situations and frames are simultaneously local and beyond local. That is, they involve specific local conditions and actors but these never act in a vacuum, even when they are actively producing ‘locality’. (Macdonald 2008)

Among other things that this rather located historical consciousness approach would seek to investigate, for example, how memory is being understood, or what kinds of relationships are posited between memory and materiality. On the latter, for example, rather than assume that things necessarily ‘hold’, ‘carry’ or ‘transmit’ memories, research would begin from the premise that this might not be the case and would open it up to examination. Here, cross-cultural studies can be especially important in alerting us to alternative possibilities. So, the famous studies of Melanesian Malanggan, for example, show us a cultural practice in which remembering is bound up not with the preservation of material objects but with their decay and disappearance (Küchler 2002). On a less striking kind of example, but one which was made possible by keeping open on such points, I was surprised to find in my Nuremberg research that although psychoanalytic arguments started to circulate in the late 1960s they weren’t applied to cases such as how buildings in the cityscape had been treated until the 1980s; and, more generally, whether or not material forms were invested with agency fluctuated over time, sometimes being strongly viewed as part of concentrated in certain material forms, such as swastikas. So removing these was often seen as a sufficient ritual purification – a denazification – and buildings could continue to be used without reference to their historical origins.

The effortful encounter and pre-memorisation: memory, materiality and tourism

Having set out some these reflections on approaches to memory, I now turn more specifically to tourism, in order to make some observations derived from my own work and to identify some other areas that I think would be interesting to investigate further.

Let me begin with materiality. As various tourism researchers have observed (e.g. Franklin and Crang 2001), tourism is a thoroughly material practice in all kinds of ways. The act of
travel is a material encounter which brings into our orbit all kinds of stuff – our suitcases and sun-tan cream, our guide books and train seats, our food and tummy-bugs, as well as landscapes and buildings, and the things that we buy or otherwise acquire to bring back home with us afterwards. As Franklin and Crang (2001), Sturken (2007) and others emphasise, the tourist experience is not just of ‘signs’ but of material things. Echoing what I have argued about memory above, tourism is not just a mental or intellectual engagement but an embodied or physical one. Indeed, we might note here the sometimes rather peculiar mixes of embodied action, and their fluctuating temporalities, involved in any holiday: from the strained muscles of carrying baggage, to the cramped legs on the airline seat, to the peculiar slow walking around sites and exhibitions, to the unusual postures that we might have to adopt in participating in local practices, such as the kneeling and bowing that are part of an immersive visit to Japan. The sensory dimensions of tourism are well-reflected too in the way in which movements and sounds – and especially smells and tastes – can especially ‘bring back’ memories of places that we have been.

Another point about this materiality of the tourist encounter is that it entails work. Going away, although typically cast as leisure rather than work, takes effort. If we go somewhere, we have to engage in some kind of preparation and planning. This builds into the activity a kind of investment: we are ready-prepared to want to get something out of it, we have already set it up as something that matters – as something ready to be remembered, as ‘pre-memorable’.

The latter is a point that became evident to me in my Nuremberg research. Part of this entailed participant-observation at the former Nazi Party Rally Grounds (see Macdonald 2008). One question concerned why people should make the effort to come – sometimes from considerable distances – to see Nazi architectural relics and an exhibition about them. The buildings can be seen in books or on the web, and the history of them – the information that is on the text panels in the exhibition – can be read about elsewhere, usually much more comfortably.

When visitors talked to me about going to the site or to the exhibition, they often spontaneously did so in terms of it being a place that they had wanted to visit for some time. This was often presented in terms of having been waiting to create the right kind of opportunity, something that might have entailed gathering together a set of ‘smaller opportunities’ – for example, who in their visitor group had time off work, when it might be possible for all to find time, when a child had reached an age to do this. They also often talked about their journey to the site, especially if it had been awkward, and especially about their difficulties actually finding the place. All these were empirical facts but their recounting was also a cultural account of input and effort. As they talked about the site itself, they nearly always mentioned things like the size of the place and the time taken moving between sites; or they might talk of the length of time they needed in the exhibition, the uncomfortable cool temperature, or the fact that its design meant that they couldn’t easily get out to go to the toilet. Observing them too, and even more so directly participating in the same activities, the physicality of the encounters were evident. I also went home with aching feet.

One consequence of this effort, I suggest, is that it marks this stretch of time off as a particular kind of event to be remembered. That is, it marks it physically as well as intellectually – and also memorises it physically as well as intellectually (our bodies begin to adopt the right kinds of exhibition-walking and viewing habits when we encounter similar sites). As other researchers have found, visitors talk about the importance of ‘seeing the real thing’ and ‘being where it really happened’ (e.g. Handler and Gable 1997). In Nuremberg too, they used such formulations to explain to me why they wanted to come to the place, rather than, say, just to read about it. As one said, talking of the impact that he felt the direct experience had had upon him and why it was worth having come, ‘it is something that I will never forget’. But they also talked about the concentrated experience of visiting. The implication was that they might never have spent so much dedicated effort on one place, and in this case on one history, as they did in this direct, effortful encounter. Perhaps the
experience of effort is especially important in morally-inflected tourism of this sort – a form that I have discussed as ‘moral witnessing’ (Macdonald 2008). In such cases, performing the fact that you have made such an effort is also a significant personal statement. This was evident too in ways in which visitors recalled other, related, places that they had been. These were lodged in memory as significant, concentrated moments able to be extracted and compared with the present experience. And some of these visitors, especially ones who had visited many places that they regarded as comparable, made comments that implied an awareness that this identified them as particular kinds of people, for example, ‘we do quite a lot of these kinds of visits’ or ‘it may sound odd to do in leisure-time, but….’.

Implications for tourism research

As I have noted, this is a particular kind of tourism, and one important outcome of the massive growth of tourism research is an awareness that we should not conflate all different kinds of tourism together but should be sensitive to their potential differences (Franklin and Crang 2001). So whether all kinds of tourist visits are pre-memorised as effortful potential concentrated memory-experiences in the same way would be worth investigating. The place of material souvenirs and photography in this would also merit further research. In the case of the former Nazi Party Rally Grounds there are few material souvenirs on offer to take away from the site (the exhibition-shop only stocks books) – though taking photographs is widely undertaken. Does this have any implications for the memory possibilities or constellations of this kind of visit?

Some of the kinds of questions that we might want to ask in tourism research on memory might, then, focus on specificities of different kinds of tourism. We no longer need to point out that people collect souvenirs or that they take photographs, but we do need to know more, perhaps, about when and why they don’t. What kinds of, probably variable, memories different groups build upon their visits, as well as the occasions in which these are mobilised, are further areas to which research might be directed. Equally, the ways in which public construction of ‘memory opportunities’ intersect with personal or group memory needs further work. If, as I suggested earlier, there are shifts towards trying to open up the possibilities for more individualised ‘memory work’ by tourists, how does this work in practice? And what might be some of its implications – personal but also political?

COMMUNICATING MEMORY: THE CREATION AND RETRIEVAL OF MEMORY

Birgit Braasch (Leeds Metropolitan University)

In recent years memory studies have attracted a growing interest across different disciplines. Especially in Germany, the memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust has been researched within different disciplines and in interdisciplinary collaborations. This paper gives an overview over the different approaches to memory to then try to apply the findings to tourism research.

Autobiographical Memory

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9 There is already work on these topics, e.g. Morgan and Pritchard 2005, but as yet not so much attending to differentials of kinds of sites.
Before I start to consider the different kinds of memory from a socio-cultural perspective I will move into the field of neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Although this is not my field of research, I think that it is useful to consider what other disciplines have to say about memory in order to get an idea about the processes of remembering. As Aleida Assmann has added, neuroscience was especially important for alerting the social sciences that memory is not just a container in which experiences are stored (2006:104).

The actual memory of the brain lies in synapses that are connected by neurotransmitters and form specific patterns and networks. Even before a child is born, these patterns start to be created by perceptions and their processing, and the creation of new networks continues at least into adolescence. After this, these networks and neurons change in reaction to external stimuli, but probably there are no new ones created. This system functions as the memory of the brain because a stimulus causes a neurotransmitter to activate a certain part of a network, and if a similar stimulus appears again, the same pattern is activated. The more often a specific pattern is activated, the more stable it becomes and the weaker a stimulus has to be to activate this pattern (Welzer, 2005: 53,60). As Siegel puts it: to retain something in memory means to increase the chance of a similar pattern being activated again (2006:21f.).

These mental representations of experiences are understood as multi-modal patterns of aspects of the experience. When memory is retrieved, first one part of the components is activated and then the activation spreads to the other components of this experience. This means that in the process of remembering patterns are completed associatively. Within this process of completion the patterns are changed through internal and external influences, so that experiences are hardly ever remembered “authentically”. Furthermore, if the neuron-patterns are not or very seldom activated they become weaker and might dissolve, so that representations of certain experiences cannot be activated any more. This means these experiences are not remembered (Welzer, 2005).

To consider a little more the multimodality of memory, I will now move to the different types of memory: On the basis of time memory can be divided into ultra-short-term, short-term and long-term memory. The ultra-short-term memory mainly encompasses neuro-processes of perception and only stays active for milliseconds. Short-term memory last for a few seconds to a few minutes, and all other memories are long-term memories.

Following Markowitsch, Welzer divides these long-term memories into different modes that mainly differ as to whether the memory is implicit or explicit. On the implicit or non-declarative side procedural memory and priming can be situated. Procedural memory encompasses skills that we have acquired and don’t need to think about anymore, for example reading or writing. Priming labels the ability of our brain to permanently process stimuli without us noticing. We have probably all heard of Coca-Cola’s campaign in the 1950s which tried to make use of this phenomenon. In the campaign consciously not detectable sequences with the company’s logo were put into films, so that the audience felt the need to drink coke. The perceptual memory is responsible for recognising things that we have seen before. This mode of memory is a stage in between implicit and explicit remembering since recognition can be a very conscious undertaking. For example, if we try to remember the colleagues at a conference. On the conscious level we find the knowledge we have acquired throughout our life. The contents of this memory can be consciously retrieved and include for example knowledge that we have learned in school. This knowledge is not closely connected to our own biography; whereas the other mode of declarative memory, that is episodic memory, is related to events of our own life. These events like a first date, a holiday or graduation are remembered by intensively thinking about them, telling someone about them or talking about them in a group that shares the memory of this particular event. This process of remembering also means that memories fade if they are not recalled. The recall can be helped by things such as photos. These photos could also be used to close gaps in memory and “invent” memories (Siegel, 2006: 24f.) (Welzer, 2005: 22ff.).
To throw a little light on which events are remembered and how these are remembered, I will now come to the interplay between memory and emotions. Before I start with this, I would like to throw in that Welzer makes a case that all out actions are never just cognitive operations but always have an emotional aspect (Welzer, 2005: 135). For memory emotions play an important role within the phenomenon of state-dependent retrieval. This heading describes the phenomenon that memories are more precise if a person is again in the emotional state in which the corresponding experience was made. On a personal level, for example, experiences that have been made while a person was drunk are better remembered if this person is drunk again. On a group level, war veterans’ meetings can be taken as an example. In these meetings, where veterans are in the same group in which they made their war experiences, much more is remembered than, for example, in interviews (Welzer, 2005: 37f.).

Another important aspect in the interplay between memory and emotions is the difference between memory of emotions and emotional memory. The first case is related to the finding in memory research that it is probably the memory of the emotion, which accompanies a certain experience that is stored. Especially emotionally stirring experiences are stored in this way, and since the emotion is remembered strongly, details of the actual event might be pushed into the background and not be remembered. Nonetheless, this kind of a memory of emotions can be classified as an explicit memory of an event, whereas emotional memory denominates an implicit memory. This implicit memory would, for example, have an effect if we hesitate to do something but don’t have the explicit memory of an experience that has caused this hesitation (Welzer, 2005: 40, 146).

I will now come to the processes of remembering: I have already mentioned above that on a neurological basis neuron patterns are completed associatively. I would suggest taking this as a metaphor to describe the insight that we tend to close gaps in our memory immediately. We do so by taking material from other experiences or other sources that fit in the gaps. Like neurons that are activated by association, other material is associated with a particular memory. The gaps in the memory might be especially big if a person has suffered severe stress because there is evidence that this emotion can disturb the long-term storage of memory. The aspects of taking other material to fill up gaps in our own memory might be traced back to the phenomenon of source amnesia. This means that a person might remember a course of events but not the source from which he or she got the corresponding information (Welzer, 2005: 41f.). Memory research has shown that children are especially susceptible for taking events that have been told to them as their own memory, and this kind of memory has been denoted as “false” memory. However, it seems to be more useful to see this as a “normal” process of remembering and making sense of our lives.

This process of making sense of our lives in a certain way requires a sense of self and an autobiographical memory. In order to follow the development of autobiographical memory, I would like to refer back to the distinction between non-declarative and declarative forms of memory. A child is born with a functioning non-declarative memory and can remember things like routines and procedures that are saved without a conscious effort (Siegel, 2006: 24f.). This memory allows a child to start to appropriate the social and cultural system into which it is born. As Katherine Nelson has emphasized, language plays the most important role for the development of autobiographical memory. Language allows a child to explicitly store experiences and remember them. Furthermore, in “memory talk” the child acquires a sense of time in that parents talk to it about events that happened in the past and events that will happen in the future. In these talks the child also learns to relate the events to itself and become self-reflective (2006:82f.).

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10 Elisabeth Loftus has done research in the United States in which she suggested persons that they had been lost in a supermarket as a child. After hearing the story a couple of times, these people made the story a part of their life story and added more details. Welzer, H. (2005) Das kommunikative Gedächtnis: Eine Theorie der Erinnerung. München: C.H. Beck.
As an important part of this “memory talk” the child learns how to tell memorable events of the past to others. It learns how to tell a story about a personal event that is culturally understandable and accepted. This acceptance might, for example, be marked by the ability to tell a coherent linear story about one’s life that is personally important, without contradictions, and plausible. Since the acceptance of a story is culturally specific, memory is always socially grounded.11 At this point I would like to follow Kathrine Nelson in her emphasis that it is important to separate between this culturally coded story of memory and experiential memory. The story of memory denotes the events that people keep in their memory and talk about with others. These stories are not the same as the experience that has become memory. Aleida Assmann adds to this that knowledge (in the form of stories) can be conveyed to others but that the impressions which are bodily (that is emotionally) ingrained can never be fully translated or exchanged (Assmann, 2006: 102) (Nelson, 2006: 83) (Welzer, 2005: 101).

This distinction leads us back to the workshop about experience, and I would like to recall briefly Claudia Müller’s discussion of experience.12 She made the important distinction between lived experience (Erlebnis) and experience (Erfahrung). Concerning memory I would like to draw attention again to the influence of former experiences on the lived experience (Erlebnis). Furthermore, it is important that only meaningful lived experience (Erlebnis) can become experience (Erfahrung). Therefore, only this experience (Erfahrung) can be explicitly or declaratively remembered. Through the meaning that is attached the experience (Erfahrung) gets a shape in which it can be communicated to others. This need for a shape explains why explicit memories can only be saved after a child learns to speak.

I will now come to the memory of these experiences. Experiences are saved in a multimodal way. This means that all five systems of memory are involved, and we remember in this multimodal way. However, as stated above, only the part that can be told as a story out of the explicit part of this memory can be communicated to others. These stories of memory are influenced by cultural conventions and usually follow certain patterns. As Harald Welzer suggests not only these stories but all these different aspects of memory are parts of an autobiographical memory. He understands this memory as a superordinate system in which all these different aspects of memory are involved. I would follow this argument because in this model, the emotional aspect of memory would be included (Welzer, 2005: 144). To this model I would like to add that Aleida Assmann emphasizes that these stored experiences are always backed-up, changed and sometimes displaced by former experiences (Assmann, 2006: 107).

I would like to use this model because it allows us to include other aspects of memory: I have already mentioned the distinction between an explicit memory of an emotion and an implicit emotional memory. These different memories can be seen as part of the explicit and implicit aspects of memory. I will now come to the explicit memory in more detail: I have already mentioned that this explicit memory is closely linked to language and first established in communications between children and their parents. In these communications the memory does not stay the same but can be changed. Furthermore, other images might be included into the memory. This inclusion becomes possible because of the mentioned source amnesia, so that images from a different source that fit into this particular memory might be included. When German Second-World-War veterans, for example, were interviewed about their experiences in the war, the memories they related could often be traced back to well-known films. The scenes from these films provided images and a language to put the war experiences into stories (Welzer, 2005: 163ff.).

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12 Please see the paper about the experience workshop, which is also published by the CTCC in this series for further reference.
Major Concepts in Tourism Research - Memory

Aleida Assmann follows Proust in calling this explicit communicative memory *mémoire volontaire* (2006:96ff.). She uses the path as a metaphor to describe how memories are kept. Like a trail is sustained by people walking on it again and again this memory is stored because it is communicated again and again. Through this repeated communication so-called “false” memories, as mentioned above, can also be remembered. However, Assmann states that these memories are not necessarily false. They just don’t have a bodily or implicit memory corresponding to the communicated one. Assmann compares this communicative memory with a *mémoire involontaire*, which is marked by its emotional intensity and inscribed into the body. Whereas the communicative memory needs repetition, this one is experienced once and people feel that an authentic memory will stay with them unchanged. One specification of this kind of memory are so-called flashbulb memories. These memories are caused by the great impact of an experience and keep singular experiences in great detail. They are often connected to historically important events such as September 11th. People can still recall in detail what they were doing when the news reached them. Assmann distinguished further between an “I-memory” and a “me-memory”. The I-memory encompasses the autobiographical contents of explicit memory which can be consciously remembered and communicated. The me-memory, on the other hand needs external triggers to be activated. These triggers can, for example, be places of ones childhood. By being at a place like this or seeing a related object, the memory can appear, but it would not have been accessible consciously. After its surfacing this memory can be transferred into explicit memory and be communicated (Assmann, 2006: 105).

**Social Memory**

I will now come to social memory. Following Maurice Halbwachs and his concept of collective memory, Aleida and Jan Assman have developed a distinction between social memory and cultural memory (Welzer, 2005: 13f.). The main difference between these two forms of memory lies in the length of their existence. This length of existence is related to the means of memory. The main mediums for social memory are conversations. I have already mentioned that autobiographical memory is partly created in interactions between the child and its parents. This communication about the past, present and future is also the means by which social memory, which in its smallest unit is family memory, is created. This aspect shows that autobiographical and social memory are closely connected and intertwined. The social memory of a group is established through “memory talk” and “conversational remembering” (Welzer, 2005: 16). In these talks the members of a group construct their common memory and the stories can be told again and again. While these stories, for example the war experiences of the grandfather, are repeated, each member of the group has to make sense of the stories for him or herself (Halbwachs, 1985: 203). Accordingly, gaps in the stories are filled in with images that each person associates with the story. Since the members of the group are the carriers of this memory, social memory exists as long as the members of the group are alive and enter into exchanges about their common experiences. With the death of the living carriers of this memory the social memory is dissolved.

**Cultural Memory**

By using the term “cultural memory” I follow Jan Assmann who divides cultural memory into actual and potential cultural memory. In comparison to social memory actual cultural memory is more organised. Furthermore, as Peter Novick, who uses the term “collective memory”, states: “Collective memory simplifies; sees events from a single, committed perspective; is
impatient with ambiguities of any kind; reduces events to mythic archetypes” (Novick, 1999: 4). These archetypes are not considered as a part of the past, but their creation is influenced by the present and they continue to exist in memory (Novick, 1999: 4). Historical experiences are taken out of their context, so that they can be conveyed as (hi)stories from generation to generation. Actual cultural memory is formed by an organised and ceremonial communication about the past. In his book about the memory of the First World War in Canada, Jonathan Vance has shown how the cultural memory was constructed by the building of memorials, literature and art and the participation of people at Remembrance Day. This memory was important for the present of the interwar years because they met Canada’s need for the creation of a national identity (Vance, 1997). This layer of memory exists as long as it is functional for a group and its self-image (Assmann, Soziales Gedächtnis).

In contrast to the actual cultural memory, potential cultural memory is characterised by its institutionalisation in libraries, museums and archives. These institutions determine the period of existence of cultural memory, and professionals in these institutions use the potential memory of the material culture to interpret this memory (Assmann, Soziales Gedächtnis).

Memory in Tourism Research

For me as a researcher the most important implication lies in the communicative social and cultural determination of memory. This means that experiences can only be recalled through a specific sign system and that different characteristics are conveyed as (emotionally) worth to remember. Katherine Nelson takes this argument even further in making clear that autobiographical memory is mainly the memory of a self in a certain social and cultural environment. We should therefore expect that memories reflect these different norms in relation to the self. Especially in cross-cultural research we have to keep in mind that people are also influenced differently by the public discourses about talks about autobiographical memory. Nelson cites an example from an Indian village in which people refused to talk about childhood memories and said that there wasn't anything to remember. This example illustrates the care with which we have to approach memory in tourism research (Nelson, 2006: 88).

In addition to culturally specific systems the frames in which memory is narrated change over time. In a recent conference at the German Historical Institute London Bernd Weisbrod, Göttingen, has for example argued that the frames for remembering violence in the interwar period were mainly determined by literature about “manly behaviour” (Weisbrod, 2008). Over time a growing knowledge in the realm of psychiatry has changed these frames, so that war experiences since the 1950s have increasingly been framed under psychological aspects like Post-Traumatic Disorders. Similarly, different frames can probably be found in the realm of tourism.

As Susan Stewart has shown in On Longing, souvenirs function as material objects that “carry” memory with them as there is a narrative attached to them (Stewart, 1993: 135). This narrative can become part of the explicit autobiographical memory if it is told as an autobiographical story or part of social memory, if it is, for example, told as a family story. At the conference of the Centre for Tourism and Cultural Change Things that Move: The Material World of Tourism and Travel in July 2007, Petra Karlshoven, McGill University, Montreal, discussed how self-made replicas as souvenirs of 19th-century Native American life embody memories, albeit these are not memories of a visit to North America, but social memory constructed through communication and material culture. In addition to the role of material culture as souvenirs, I would add that objects that have been brought back from a
holiday or are connected to it can also function as triggers to access the implicit “me-memory” that Aleida Assmann has defined. All these functions show that it might be important in tourism research to include material culture into interview practices. At the same conference Jo-Anne Lester and Catherine Palmer, University of Brighton, have for example shown how personal photos can be used in such interviews. Furthermore, the addition of other material can also paint a broader picture considering the construction and instability of memory (Assmann, 2006: 108)

CONSUMING SPACES DIFFERENTLY: TOURISM, PEOPLE, MEMORIES, AND GHOSTS

Allison Hui (Lancaster University)

Though it is widely accepted that tourists visit and consume vastly different spaces, little attention has been devoted to how tourists consume spaces differently. This paper suggests that even when in the same space, people do not consume uniform tourism goods, but rather undertake markedly different tourism performances. Individuals consume the material, social, and immaterial aspects of spaces in different ways, and thus even one tourist attraction can be the site for diverse performances of tourism consumption.

This paper muses on issues of memory and ghosts by considering the different ways people might interact with tourism spaces, and the way immaterialities such as memory and ghosts point to important relationships across space-times that are a part of tourism performances. The first section of this paper uses Jansson’s modes of spatial appropriation to suggest that tourism spaces can be either specifically or generically appealing. This distinction is then paired with Walter’s concepts of material and positional tourism goods, and a new matrix is created for categorizing different types of tourism engagements. In the following section, an immaterial category is added to this model, which acknowledges the way that immaterialities such as memory can come to play a significant role in tourism performances. Rather than being tangential, I suggest that the immaterial can be the object of engagements in space. It is important then to distinguish a new type of touristic gaze that focuses not on romantic sites or family, but upon the ghostly. Considering the immaterial also provides new understandings of embodied tourism interactions and the relational nature of tourism consumption and performances. In the closing section, attention is drawn to the absent presences and haunting ghosts of tourism, which open up and facilitate opportunities for immaterial types of tourism performances.

Specifying context – what is it that tourists consume?

The changing nature of tourism has inspired many efforts to re-categorize and gain new insights into types of tourism. While trying to dispute the end of tourism, Jansson for example develops a model of modes of spatial appropriation in tourism (2002). His three modes of spatial appropriation describe different ways that individuals might identify the distribution of possibilities for activity in space. The antagonistic mode is identified with the easily identified tourist and the classic ‘tourist gaze’, the symbiotic mode involves individuals who wish to blend in and not be recognized as tourists, and the contextual mode “implies that certain scapes are important merely as an environmental resource for carrying out activities that actually could have been carried out elsewhere, even at home” (Jansson, 2002: 433). For
Jansson, the existence of these three types of spatial appropriation is a testament to the proliferation of differences within contemporary tourism.

Though I agree that considering the different uses of space is productive for highlighting the diversity in contemporary tourism, Jansson’s categories become problematic means of doing so. Considering his intriguing concept of a contextual mode of spatial appropriation, however, reveals new possibilities for understanding tourism engagements. The examples Jansson gives of contextual activities include golf trips, sun-and-beach packages, wine tasting trips, and watching sport programmes or movies, while other activities such as organized bus trips, train hiking, wilderness camping, and city sightseeing are included in the symbiotic and antagonistic modes (figure 1, 2002: 435). A close look at these examples reveals the divisions between categories to be somewhat arbitrary. After all, a golf trip still depends on the particular spaces of golf courses in the same way that a wilderness camping trip depends on the existence of places to camp. The localized characteristics of a space might be a significant factor in deciding to go camping, but it is difficult to make an assumption regarding whether this is more or less true than for someone who undertakes a golfing trip. On the basis of Jansson’s examples then, it is difficult to see where one type of spatial appropriation ends and another begins. It would appear, however, that many of the time spaces are specifically important in symbiotic and antagonistic modes, whereas in the contextual mode they become generic sites that make certain activities possible. Touristic engagements in space then cannot be assumed to be centrally focused on the particularity of a space, as the space may only be important for its generic characteristics, and how these facilitate particular performances.

This argument that spaces can hold a specific or generic role within tourism practices and performances can be extended by looking at what Walter calls material and positional types of tourism (1982). Walter’s argument relates to the social context of tourism activities, and he suggests that tourism goods come in two types. In the first case, tourism is a material good, where the value of the experience is independent of the social context. Walter illustrates this with the example of a mountain, which holds value as a tourist site to be gazed upon. This value is not affected by the number of people who are also there gazing on the mountain, because the good is independent of the social context. This is not true, however, for the second case, where tourism is a positional good. As a positional good, tourism becomes dependent upon social context, such as when the good is a deserted mountain. There is now a stipulation on the relationship between social context and tourism experience, and the presence of too many people can therefore prevent the experience of this good.

Whereas Walter’s discussion addresses the role of social context in tourism, this paper has been considering the issue of whether the spaces of tourism are specific to tourism performances, or rather serve as generic contexts. That is, we have begun to explore whether the spaces involved in tourism are substitutable or rather central to tourism. Reading these two sets of categories against each other, we arrive at a matrix characterizing the consumption of tourist spaces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Positional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>this mountain</td>
<td>this deserted mountain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>Generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a mountain</td>
<td>a deserted mountain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this way, the specificity of spaces and the specificity of social contexts can be seen to play up against each other in different combinations. The generic attribute of space would at first
Major Concepts in Tourism Research - Memory

appear to correspond with a contextual mode of spatial appropriation, because within this mode the particularity of space is not important. Contextual tourism, however, is also framed in Jansson’s usage as centred upon particular activities, and it is the primacy of these activities that renders particular spaces unimportant. A focus on spaces then leaves this discussion in the realm of Jansson’s antagonistic and symbiotic modes of spatial representation. If we were instead to consider activities, the matrix would change thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Positional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>climbing this</td>
<td>climbing this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>mountain</td>
<td>deserted mountain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here the bottom row of the matrix is consistent with Jansson’s contextual mode of spatial appropriation, while the top row could be antagonistic or symbiotic. The difference between the two matrices is subtle, but indicates the way in which the discussion of specific or generic spaces of tourism is connected to issues of the centrality of practices or spaces. In the first matrix, a generic material site might be chosen because of an unspecific desire to gaze upon a particular landform, whereas in the second matrix, the same generic material site might be chosen because it could facilitate a preferred activity – climbing. Both situations include sites that could potentially be substituted for many others, but for different reasons. Furthermore, this matrix points out that even Jansson’s contextual mode can be seen to have divisions within it – in this case, that contextual spatial appropriation can be dependent upon social context or not.

Considering the prevalence of tourism interactions that involve visiting or interacting with friends and relatives, we can see that the social context Walter refers to with his category of positional goods of tourism can also be positive and involve specific social relations. Though the example of a deserted mountain emphasizes the way in which the presence of other people can prevent a particular tourism experience, Walter also gives the example of certain tourism sites such as seaside resorts, where the presence of other tourists is positive and creates part of the desired tourism experience (1982: 299). Thinking about this potentially positive role of social relations in tourism experiences, it becomes apparent that tourism can involve not only the positive presence of unknown groups of tourists, but also the positive presence of personal intimates. The first matrix then could be completed using examples that echo visiting friends and relatives tourism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Positional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>this city</td>
<td>this city inhabited by friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>a city</td>
<td>a city inhabited by friends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But, recognizing the difference between intimates and other tourists, we would have to revise this matrix again to include divisions within each cell. That is, each cell could involve friends or not, and then the positional column would consider the wider social context of other tourists. This would result in divisions between going to this city with friends or without
friends, and going to a deserted city with friends or without. Such a matrix would better align with Larsen et al.’s observation that “sociality matters in sightseeing” (2006: 98). The complication of adding this distinction again points out the way in which multiple factors are balanced in these comparisons. Space, activities, personal acquaintances and unknown crowds are all involved in these negotiations and it is difficult to say what balance is struck between them.

**Acknowledging memories – space for the immaterial**

Considering further the personal dimensions of tourism experiences, it is possible that not only personal friends, but also personal memories can become involved. It would then be not ‘this mountain’, but ‘this mountain that my father and I used to visit years ago’ that is the focus of tourism engagements. In such situations, it is possible to conceive of a category that serves as an intermediary between the material and positional consumption of space:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Immaterial</th>
<th>Positional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>this mountain</td>
<td>this mountain I</td>
<td>this deserted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>a mountain</td>
<td>a mountain I</td>
<td>a deserted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
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The possibility of each category involving sociality or not refers to the way in which ‘my father’ might play into the example given. You could wish to return to a mountain you remember, or you could wish to return to a mountain you remember visiting with your father. Similarly, sociality can play a role in material and positional consumption, in that it might be important to visit ‘this mountain’ with one’s extended family, or to visit ‘a deserted mountain’ with a close friend. Whereas the positional category takes into account the role of unknown others in the experience, the determination of sociality being involved or not being involved refers rather to the role of those personally known to you in the experience.

In this matrix, the immaterial mode of tourism is centrally tied to memories of a space or object or activity, and is unique because of its relationship to the material and the social contexts. Though there are likely to be ideal material and positional qualities related to the immaterial consumption, for example those that would replicate the conditions of the first experience that is being remembered, these qualities need not be replicated for the immaterial ‘good’ to be experienced. Returning again to the mountain you hiked with your father years ago, you could be disappointed in the way in which the space has changed, perhaps becoming more commercial and developed, but this disappointment does not necessarily preclude satisfaction at having visiting the mountain again, undertaken the hike you did with your father again, or interacted with the memory of this experience again.

Though immaterial engagements may have ideal material and positional components, satisfaction is not necessarily related to the realization of these ideals, but rather involves a complicated interplay between the fulfilment of material, immaterial, and positional expectations.

Attempts to interact with an immaterial good can be complicated by the difficulty of finding spaces that are connected to places of memory. Individuals can have imperfect memories of
the spaces of previous events, and so tracking down a particular location can be incredibly difficult in some instances. Finding these spaces of memory can also be hindered by spatial changes that have occurred since the events – locating the childhood home of a grandparent can be made difficult by changes to the building facade, vegetation, or street numbering system. In addition to material, immaterial, and positional expectations then, there may also be expectations about the ease with which these elements can be found. If one expects to easily locate a space linked to memories and this space cannot be identified, immaterial tourism can lead to significant disappointment.

Such immaterial engagements can be linked not only to personal memories, but also to the memories of others. In addition to visiting ‘this mountain that I remember’, one could visit ‘this mountain I remember my father talking about’. Sociality can thus become a factor not only in the actual visit to the mountain that is being undertaken, but also in the memories that influence the trip. As with personal memories, second-hand memories can be attached to spaces that are visited alone or with others, and groups seeking immaterial interactions with space can include both individuals for whom the memory is first-hand as well as others who know the memory only through stories. This distinction between first-hand and second-hand memories highlights that the immaterial category is not necessarily linked to previous personal experience in a space, but is rather marked by looking beyond the present space-time, and engaging with the absent presence of the past through visits to a particular space.

Considering the various parts of this matrix can also help us to think productively of the different ways in which gazes can be performed. The romantic tourist gaze is most associated with the specific mode of interaction, particularly in conjunction with the positional category. Gazing upon a deserted mountain exemplifies this type of romantic consumption of landscape. The family gaze that Bærenholdt et al. speak of (2004) could be located in any case where sociality mattered. As Bærenholdt et al. note, however, photos which enact a family gaze are often taken with little regard for the site or landscape in which the participants are situated. In their case study, many photos of this type were “made at, not of Hammershus” (2004: 99), as it was the performance of a unified family that was important, and which dominated the photographs. Thus even if a site is specifically important to a family, in their practice of taking photographs the site may become generic because it is not important to the performance of family, and therefore is not highlighted in pictures.

The immaterial category also brings attention to the way in which the tourist gaze can be focused on things not entirely material. In the case of return visits to engage with memories and the changes that have occurred over time at a site, the gaze is not only directed towards the material elements of the location, but is also concerned with the comparisons that can be drawn to memories and representations held within the mind’s eye. This type of recollecting or ghostly gaze aims to see the present locale in order to see again the past. One photographic practice that might accompany this recollecting gaze is the re-staging of existing photographs. I, for example, visited the Tower of London as a 5-year-old, and had my photograph taken while standing on a walkway with White Tower looming behind me. When in London again 17 years later, it was my memory of the photo that prompted me to return to this attraction. After wandering around and looking at exhibits, I sought out the same location and asked a friend to take a picture of me in which the framing and my stance closely replicated the original photograph. This type of re-enacting of a photographic practice aims to preserve not simply the material surroundings, but also the act of engaging with the immaterial, in this case the memory of being a cheeky 5-year-old posing expertly for a touristic photograph. The tourist gaze can thus involve ghosts and memories that dance with, through, and against the materiality of the site/sight.

In addition to involving a new type of ghostly or recollecting gaze, immaterial engagements can involve particular embodied sensations. Returning to the example of climbing, we arrive at a new matrix:
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<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Material</th>
<th>Immaterial</th>
<th>Positional</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>climbing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific</td>
<td>this mountain</td>
<td>the climb I remember</td>
<td>climbing this</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>climbing for</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the sensation of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>a mountain</td>
<td>climbing I remember</td>
<td>deserted mountain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(sociality or not)</td>
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In this case the embodied activity, rather than the place, is forefront. The immaterial category then becomes interactions with specific or generic memories of climbing – that is, practices undertaken to re-experience and compare previous memories of climbing with new experiences of climbing undertaken either at the same location or at different ones. One could set off to climb to the two teahouses above Lake Louise because of the embodied memory of that particular climb (and the memory of having rested at each teahouse during the climb). Alternately, the same climb could be undertaken to get in touch with the general memory of climbing. It is likely that visual memories would be a strong component of these immaterial engagements, but many other senses can also be remembered and desired in the re-engagement – the smell of snow on the summer mountainside, the sound of the wind whistling through trees, the taste of warm water hitting your sticky and parched mouth, the feeling of your foot gripping sharp rocks as you scramble along a narrow ledge.

Focusing in this way on an activity rather than a location can bring attention to the sensuality of touristic practices. Our understanding of not only immaterial engagements, but also positional engagements must be adapted then to include an awareness of the senses. Positional engagements are concerned with the role of others in touristic practices, and this is not solely an intellectual concern. The difference between a busy mountain and a deserted mountain is related not only to discourses of what each of these performances means, but also to the sensual experiences connected to them. A busy, peopled mountain can be experienced as visually cluttered, smelling of body odour, tasting of hot cooked meals (thanks to the service providers catering to the large crowds), sounding of the noise of excited chatter in many languages, and embodied in muscular tension as you try to squeeze through crowds and make sudden stops so as to not get in other people’s photographs. A deserted mountain, on the other hand, might be seen as a scene with less movement, in which the smell of fresh air, the taste of a bagged lunch, and the sound of birds splashing in a stream can settle within your relaxed body as you take off your shoes and let your toes stretch out in the sun. Whether we are speaking of a location or an activity, there is a marked difference between the sensual experiences of different types of positional engagements and these must also be considered part of the appeal of the positional consumption and performance of space.

The possibilities of immaterialities – tourism performances as relational

The addition of the immaterial category to the matrix of touristic consumptions of space is important because of the way in which it pushes the boundaries of the touristic experience. Considering the immaterial reveals how tourism can also involve memories that link the experience not only to material or social conditions, but also to comparisons between
temporally-dispersed experiences. This category thus brings attention to life mobilities and the way in which having been in a space, or having previously undertaken a particular tourism activity can impact subsequent visits. The notion of immaterial tourism characteristics draws attention to the way in which previous tourism experiences in space can be related to future tourism experiences in space, and how this return can change the nature of the experience in such a way that change within the space and personal memories play a much larger role.

To expand upon this, let us consider the relational nature of events and places. Using an understanding of the construction of space and place through practices, we can firstly note that all performances of place in space are events which by definition have a connection to others. As Hetherington notes, “[r]ather than taking a place as a site that stands for something, that has intrinsic or mythic meaning because of its supposed fixity in space, we should think of places as relation, as existing in similitude: places as *being placed in relation* to rather than being there” (1997: 187-8). Places are recognizable because of the way they are marked as different from other places and other things. This is certainly the case in classic oppositions of tourist places and home places. Therefore, even though people may speak of places in isolation, they “come into existence through relationships. They move around within global networks of humans, technologies, imaginations and images that situate them within a cultural economy of difference and similarity” (Bærenholdt et al., 2004: 72). The place of a mountain destination like Lake Louise then has a meaning that is not isolated, but rather is established through relationships with other mountains, both nearby and in different locations around the world, with postcards and friends’ pictures and promotional films, with historical narratives and shared personal narratives. These relationships are often glossed over when speaking of touristic performances in and of Lake Louise, but to do so is to overlook very important context.

David Sedaris, in *Dress Your Family in Corduroy and Denim* (2004) tells of a neighbourhood family who piqued his curiosity as a child because they did not have a television. Seeing the children from this family in the lunchroom at school one day, Sedaris comments that he looked at an Elmer Fudd lunchbox and tried with all his might to imagine what it would be like to not know about Elmer’s inability to pronounce ‘r’ or his habit of hunting wabbits, but found it impossible to separate the cartoon figure from its context and celebrity (2004: 6). Engaging with places or performances is no different. Try as we might, it is impossible to separate places and performances from the relationships that constitute them, though we may forget about or omit these relationships when we speak of them.

Seeing events as relational, then, requires a much broader focus than that found in many studies of tourism. A tourism performance at Lake Louise or the Great Wall of China is not limited to the spatial location that can be seen to constitute each as a regional tourist destination. Rather, multiple spaces and places become enwrapped in the practice of tourism and the performance of these spaces as touristic.

Before a trip, while at a physical and imagined place of home, an individual can interact with objects such as guidebooks, representations on television or the internet, stories shared by friends, and memories of previous visits. The interactions with Lake Louise as a concept and place begin then before arriving there, and can include virtual tourism and imaginative tourism, as well as interactions with objects that represent constructions and preferred performances of Lake Louise as a tourist site.

Once having arrived at Lake Louise, performing the space as a tourist location can involve interacting with temporally dispersed places evoked through historical narratives and the stories of guides. Performing the space and place of Lake Louise will be accomplished through comparisons to other spaces – Bow Lake near Banff that was visited on the previous day; the dugout on your grandparents’ farm, which has much dirtier water; or Chinatown in Manchester where you last heard a group of people speaking excitedly in Cantonese. The relational nature of this experience of Lake Louise is also notable in the sociality of the
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performance. A Canadian family showing their foreign relatives around Lake Louise will have a particular performance that is relational both in terms of creating personal connections and creating images of family (see Bærenholdt et al., 2004: 69-124). Furthermore, this event will be related to others in which the relationships of extended family were similarly performed, both in Canada and in other countries.

Finally, having left Lake Louise, the touristic performance is in some sense continued, as individuals recreate it for both those who were there and for those who weren’t. Telling someone else about a tourist engagement such as this can add many more relationships to spaces and places. If the listener had been to Lake Louise, her own experiences and evaluations of Lake Louise and how it compares to other sites could become part of the conversation. If not, an even more diverse set of relationships, similes, and metaphors could be drawn upon, in order to find a common reference point for communicating the experience – perhaps the crowds were like those at the summer fair, the water the colour of an outdoor swimming pool, or the mountains as jagged as those in Colorado. New websites such as www.tripntale.com also endeavour to facilitate the sharing of tourism memories and experiences, collecting photographs and journals in one location to help facilitate discussion (see http://www.tourcms.com/blog/2007/10/29/post-travel-memory-sharing/ for further discussion of internet tools for photo and memory sharing). In any case, there are many ways in which discussions of touristic performances and events can connect the practices themselves to many more events, spaces, and places, further increasing the relational nature of these performances and the places they create.

Identifying relationships between events and places in this way can seem frivolous, and certainly not all relationships carry the same importance. More attention must be given, however, to the relational nature of events and performances because they can be directly formed with nods to each other. For example, as a small child I watched a Sesame Street movie in which Big Bird walked on the Great Wall of China. Having relatives living in Hong Kong, I had already claimed a link to China as a central part of my identity. Yet watching Big Bird walk in a physical space that already held a symbolic importance for me cemented my desire to walk on the Great Wall of China someday. Many years later when I was finally able to undertake the corporeal travel to this infamous space of my imaginative travel, I found myself experiencing the space in relation to the movie and my childhood home. I took a brief skip along a flat section of the wall, as I remembered the Sesame Street characters having done, and I posed for photographs while imagining how I could Photoshop in an image of Big Bird standing beside me. My performance was not simply a performance in space, but rather a performance that was constituted by its relationships and nods to other spaces and times and images.

A consideration of immaterial tourism engagements is thus important because it incorporates temporality and relationality into understandings of tourism performances. The consumption of tourism spaces as specific or generic material sites can be understood independently of other spaces, times, and performances, but having seen how important these relationships over time are to immaterial engagements, to do so could be unwise. It is therefore important that the connections between consumption events and performances located throughout lifetime mobilities are taken into account as potential influences upon touristic performances of space.

**The absent presences in tourism – invoking a ghostly gaze**

Despite the difficulty of tracing the fluid relationships within tourism performances, it is crucial that such relationships are recognized because they significantly affect understandings of the meaning and substance of tourism performances. As Urry notes, leisure travel came to be justified by the concept of “connoisseurship, of being an expert collector of works of art and buildings, of flora and fauna and of landscapes. In particular, travel became more obviously bound up with the comparative aesthetic evaluation of different natures, of flora and fauna,
landscapes and seasides” (1999: 37). Such comparisons, such a collection of experiences and performances are better understood as composed of many types of relationships than of isolated sites. Furthermore, relationships to things not there are as important as the relationships to things that are. Collecting works of art as a connoisseur involves not only viewing the painting in front of you, but also comparing it to those you have seen before. As a result, connoisseurship becomes as much about hauntings and ghosts, connections to absent things and people and places, as it is about presence.

Though the concept of ghosts can carry significant baggage, it is particularly useful for highlighting several aspects of the immaterial relationships that can become central to tourism interactions. Ghosts are immaterial figures that are still present and can be felt or seen. They mark an important connection between the past and the present that is a part of sensuous experience. Suggesting a connection then between the immaterial aspects of tourism and ghosts highlights the role of memory as not only something ephemeral, but also something that has a sensuous component. The temporality of life links memory to all interactions, but just as not all people become ghosts, not all memories become the focus of immaterial tourism engagements. Certain memories of spaces or activities (such as climbing this mountain) become more salient, haunting presences that demand a response. Unlike conventional understandings of ghosts, some of these hauntings may be desirable, demanding pleasant exorcisms through the undertaking of trips or leisure activities, but it is also possible that tragic memories or grieving can spur movement and performances that aim to engage with and release haunting presences.

Ghosts then are an important figure to consider because of the way in which they mark a sensuous and demanding connection between various times and spaces, between things present and absent. They claim a space outside of discourse, and can thus express things in a ‘language of the figure’ that cannot be otherwise represented (Hetherington, 2001). They speak to many of the relationships discussed above. Relationships between spatializations become characterized by ghosts when new spatializations emerge over time but do not entirely eliminate previous ones. Edensor demonstrates how this occurs in the case of industrial ruins, which challenge the order of the city and suggest previous performances and modes of organization (2001). Relationships between embodied activities in space can also become haunted, as when the redevelopment in cities re-organizes the sensory constitution of spaces, marginalizing but not eliminating particular sensory affordances of space (Degen, 2001). Activities within personal biographies can also come to haunted. Photographic performances of the family gaze, for example, can be connected to a ghostly anticipation of future viewings and a presence of the absent future memory which will be preserved in the photograph. One can also experience ghosts of tourism performances that were not enacted. The website www.unphotographable.com, for example, consists of descriptive entries of photographs that the author did not take, for a variety of reasons. These non-existent photographs exist as ghosts, and suggest the way that tourism performances can also be notable for the actions they do not include.

Ghosts, as virtualities, also problematize and confuse understandings of time and chronology. They make present competing times, as in the case of industrial ruins or not-yet-redeveloped city areas (Degen, 2001: , Edensor, 2001). Conserving particular times in tourist sites such as the Nimrod camp in Antarctica (Pearson, 2005) is in many ways an effort to preserve materialities that will call upon ghosts. Ghosts also confuse time through their absent presence. Hetherington, in discussing ghosts as unfinished disposal, notes that “[s]ometimes the absence of an object (brought to recollection by a similar one on view) can be so strong that people still think they have things long after they have got rid of them” (2004: 167). The time when the object was materially proximate is confused with the time when it no longer is. In the case of tourism performances, we have also discussed the ghostly gaze that belongs with immaterial modes of engagement. While in a space, performing place and activities, there can be a gaze towards ghosts – absent presences that
are crucial to these events, and which represent a relationship between spaces and times, a bringing of the past or future into the present.

Hetherington discusses ghostly issues of absence and presence in the context of disposal, suggesting that “disposal is about placing absences and this has consequences for how we think about ‘social relations’” (2004: 159). Disposal, he argues, is not definitive in the sense of being permanent, and so departure is not separation. Rather, absence is something to be managed, and physical absence can be substituted with a nonrepresentational presence.

To work through this model with tourism, we can consider how tourism performances are about placing certain familiar spaces and performances as absences. The evaluation of tourism as involving change is only possible in relation to an absent presence – this relates to Hetherington’s formation of places in the placing of differences discussed above (1997). In this way, like with disposing of objects, disposing of home places and practices doesn’t “necessarily get rid of its semiotic presence and the effects that are generated around that” (2004: 159). People manage this absence, taking tourism trips to try and make home absent, and yet they are also managed by it: their habits from performances at home come to be reproduced in new spaces and new performances of tourism. Performances of tourism then are “performed not only around what is there but sometimes also around the presence of what is not” (Hetherington, 2004: 159) – places such as home. Excluding something can bring about haunting, and getting rid of familiar spaces and practices is a means of temporarily not having to deal with them (see 2004: 163).

There is an interesting difference between Hetherington’s use of this concept of disposal and an application of it to tourism performances because spaces – physical environments – or embodied performances can’t be ‘disposed’ of the in the same way that objects can because they are not possessed or held as objects are. It is difficult to speak of disposing of a performance of space by not using it, or hiding it in the back of a cupboard, as Hetherington notes one can do with pots. The embodied performance of space is a process and experience that is grounded in the present, and which can be stopped, truncated, or distracted from, but not disposed of temporarily. Embodied performances do have a type of physical burial, Hetherington’s metaphor for getting rid of the materiality, in that once they are finished and the space is left, the performance ceases. The way in which people choose or don’t choose to have a virtual burial though, thereby disposing of the immaterial aspects, is undetermined. Some people return from enacting tourist performances to speak of them incessantly and others do not. Considering this virtual burial, however, is an excellent opening for examining immaterial tourism. Previous completed experiences and performances can become the ghosts that haunt individuals, just as Hetherington notes discarded or broken family heirlooms do. Though discarded heirlooms are very difficult to find again, the complex experiential nature of performances offers a possibility for re-creating or re-engaging with ghosts. Those who never fully dispose of their previous performances and experiences may then be driven to reconnect with the spaces and memories through forms of immaterial tourism engagements, climbing ‘this mountain I remember’ because of the ghosts of a previous climb in that space. Incomplete disposal can in this way lead to tourism engagements that are of a very different qualitative character.

Though embodied performances demonstrate different relationships with disposal than the objects Hetherington speaks of, it is important to also recognize that embodied performances can involve interactions with objects. Individuals buy souvenirs and take photographs with their cameras as part of tourist performances. These objects, which are involved in and speak to the performance of spaces, can also be kept present or disposed of. When present, they can function as materially present ghosts by standing in for the absent spaces of performance. They can also be disposed of on shelves, to be interacted with only when others come to visit or, in the case of cameras, only when it is time for another performance of family or tourism. Objects can also connect spaces – so that home or work isn’t really disposed of on vacation because of the cell phone or pager that maintains a connection and allows the demands of those spaces to interrupt performances of tourism. Hetherington’s
stages of disposal are thus actively involved in the negotiation of objects that are a part of touristic performances of space.

Performances of space also accumulate into spatializations, which can be used to think of another type of disposal of space. Particular spaces can be spatialized and re-spatialized in many ways, and these processes of changing spatial meanings, codes, and values are exercises in disposal. Many urban renewal projects play with this type of disposal, hiding away spatializations that speak to urban decay and supplanting them with spatializations of the city centre as vital, newly developed, and safe. Attempts can also be made to dispose of various sensual experiences of the city, as Degen notes in the case of the redevelopment of el Raval in Barcelona (2008). Furthermore, the disposal of spatializations can be temporary: like the pots Hetherington speaks of, certain spatializations can be put away for a time, overshadowed or forgotten, until a later date when they are reclaimed and re-enacted. Particular historical periods or events, for example, can be ignored for a time and later re-claimed for the purpose of developing tourist attractions.

There can be many ghosts of tourism then – people encountered, spaces traversed, homes left, objects discarded. These ghosts become present in their absence, and speak to what Hetherington calls an ‘unfinished or unmanaged disposal’ (2004: 170). Though Hetherington’s use of this concept follows closely with actor-network theory, the same idea can be articulated using the concept of virtuality – though physically apart from something you can be virtually close, or conversely you can be virtually close and physically apart, as in the case of haunting memories of tourist experiences.

Conclusion

As this paper has shown, tourists’ consumption of spaces is not as simple as it often seems. Rather than being isolated in particular space-times, tourism performances can involve ghosts and absent presences that call upon other spaces and times. It is important then to incorporate an understanding of immaterialities and multiple types of consumption into studies of tourism. Tourist spaces are not consumed uniformly, but rather involve many differentiations based on the specific or generic importance of the space, the activities that are to be performed, the role of personal acquaintances and unknown strangers, and the role of immaterial memories that are personal or second-hand. In particular, the inclusion of an immaterial mode of consumption and performance is important because of the openings it provides to consider ghostly gazes, sensual memories, and the temporality of touristic engagements.

In the end, an understanding of how tourists consume spaces differently is centrally tied to issues of presence and absence. Whereas in the past tourism has been largely concerned with the economic and cultural implications of the presence or absence of tourists in particular locations, this paper argues that a consideration of absent presences is indispensable. Law has argued that method in the social sciences is about placing certain things as absent presences (2004), and Hetherington notes that disposal concerns a similar process (2004). Studies of tourism must now turn attention towards their own ghosts, and consider the differentiations and immaterialities within tourism that have often been unacknowledged.
Memory is – as Maurice Halbwachs has shown in his Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire – always embedded in and determined by the structure of society. Individual recollections are configured by group identities: ‘il n’y a pas de mémoire possible en dehors des cadres dont les hommes vivant en société se servent pour fixer et retrouver leurs souvenirs’ (Halbwachs, 1925: 63). Following the premise that all memories are socially mediated, I will explore the ways in which the memory operative in travel and tourism has been socially mediated by overarching pedagogies of travel. People have been travelling by the rules of explicitly or implicitly formulated pedagogical ideas since the invention of pilgrimage. These pedagogies taught them not only how to gaze at sites of interest, but also how to interpret them, contextualize them, and eventually – remember them. A broad array of travel narratives reflect the relationship between individual travel memories and the historical culture of a specific epoch – or to use Jan Assman’s concepts: the relationship between the realm of everyday communicative memory and the realm of the sedimented cultural memory (Assmann, 1988).

My concern with the pedagogy of travel is threefold. First, I would like to show that changes in the pedagogy of travel are closely related to the rise of modern historical consciousness and changes therein. Second, I will focus on the ways in which the pedagogical prefiguration of travel affected the content and appreciation of travel destinations, as a consequence of the changing historical culture.

I shall start with the Grand Tour, the pedagogical journey par excellence. I will demonstrate how the classical past was conceived as a teacher for life and how the Grand Tour functioned as the final stage of the formal education of the sons of the European nobility. Next, I will discuss how Romanticism and the emerging modern historical consciousness affected the Grand Tour in the way the past was conceived. Although Romantic travel was in fact a continuation of the Grand Tour, it had lost the idea of history as a teacher for life. Instead of becoming acquainted with the exemplary images of antiquity, the traveller had to discover the world for himself. Encounters with the past had to awake his senses and sensibilities that would eventually lead to self-realisation (Bildung). Finally, I will explain how and why the relationship with the past at the end of the nineteenth century became troublesome. The invention of the category of adolescence evoked the idea of a youth that brings something new. Youth had to reinvigorate history, not just appropriate it. In practice the younger generation used travelling and roaming about Europe as a critique of modern society. At the same time, educators implemented the model of travel as a narrative structure to present national history in attractive ways, so that young people would grow up as model citizens within the modern nation state. Modern tourism itself lacked official pedagogical capacity as it became a family event.

I will mainly focus on the “long nineteenth century” (Hobsbawm, 1962), the period positioned between the French Revolution and the First World War. This period was crucial for the development of modern historical consciousness, and therefore for changes in the culture of travel, due to its “transitory” character (Mill, 1831: 20-21). The “long nineteenth century” was an era of political and industrial revolutions that marked a world of rupture and change. As the pace of social change increased, contemporaries themselves started to interpret their life-world in terms of rupture and change, thus shaping a modern historical consciousness, which conceives the past as being intrinsically different from the present. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck points to the emergence of a “historical time”, a time-conception that arose in the 1750-1850 period. Historical time is shaped by the “enlightened” idea of progress and is thus regarded as an irreversible process towards the future. The
Enlightenment broke with pre-modern conceptions of time that reposed for a large part on the rhythms of nature – a process that was consummated by the historical imaginary of the Romantic movement. Modern historical consciousness implies a breach between what Koselleck (Koselleck, 1979a) calls the “space of experience” (*Erfahrungsraum*) and the “horizon of expectation” (*Erwartungshorizont*). In pre-modern times, change occurred so slowly that people could rely on the space of experience (the totality of memories and heritage transmitted from past to present) of their predecessors to shape their horizon of expectation (the hopes and prospects of the future that make the future present). With the rise of modernity, the gap between past experiences and future orientations widened. The present was no longer a logical consequence of the past, nor was the future a logical consequence of the present.

**The humanist pedagogy of the Grand Tour**

The Grand Tour is often recognised as the predecessor of modern tourism (Urry 1990:4). It emerged in the seventeenth century as a secular successor of pilgrimage and stood in the tradition of the travels of Renaissance humanist scholars. The Grand Tour was an educational journey through continental Europe that could last from a few months to several years and was usually undertaken by male youths of noble descent. Although aristocratic women of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had some liberties to travel, their families did not officially allow them to travel on their own or to undertake a Grand Tour. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Grand Tour was firmly established as an institution for the final education of aristocratic youth. As the tour was usually undertaken at the end of the youth’s education, it was regarded as a “rite of passage” (Van Gennep, 1909) into adulthood. It was the youth’s last opportunity to roam free (but often under guidance of a tutor), before entering the responsible life of the (male) aristocratic adult. The Grand Tour was, however, more than just an adventurous journey; it was a pedagogical venture. According to John Locke, the most common age to travel was from sixteen to twenty-one. This was the age between school and marriage, which was “commonly thought to finish the Work, and to compleat the Gentlemen” (Locke, 1693: 253). The pedagogy of the Grand Tour was twofold. On the one hand, the journey was an opportunity to get acquainted with foreign nobility and gentry, to be introduced to the principles of diplomacy and to master a foreign language (usually French). On the other hand, the Grand Tour was the apotheosis of the classical education of the young travellers. As I am concerned with the relationship between history, memory and travel, I will focus on the second pedagogical principle.

Until the end of the nineteenth century, the education of Europe’s elite was a classical education. Throughout the continent, humanistic education was institutionalised in the gymnasium, in England in the grammar school. Since the Renaissance, the study of the classical languages had become the core of the curriculum. Whatever was taught about history was taught in relation to antiquity. It was only in the nineteenth century, with the rise of nationalism and the making of nation states, that history became a specific course in the curriculum. By then, history was taught beyond the classics: a national history within a broader West-European context.

Humanistic education was based on the principle of *Historia Magistra Vitae*: history is the teacher of life. In this topos, history was regarded as a “pedagogical reservoir of past *exampla* of which lessons for the future could be derived and in which thus predominated a continuity that did not exactly foster an incongruence between the given and the expectation” (Ireland, 2005: 72). The past, which is the classical past – as the Middle Ages were literally conceived as middle-ages, a period of no scientific significance – possessed an all-abiding truth and authority. As Lessing puts it: “Lassen Sie uns bei den Alten in die Schule gehen. Was können wir nach der Natur für bessere Lehrer wählen?” (Gay, 1967: 30) From this
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perspective, it may not surprise that the Grand Tour focussed mainly on Italy, as Italy was regarded to be the cradle of European civilisation. In An Italian Voyage, Richard Lassels (Lassels, 1670) advocated the tour by stating that “no man understands Livy and Caesar […] like him who hath made exactly the Grand Tour of France and the Giro of Italy” (Buzard, 1993: 109). By visiting the sites of the text he had studied, the traveller could gain full understanding of these texts that functioned as guidance for the present. The classical past and the present were situated in the same, “continuous”, space of experience. This made it possible for past experiences to be immediately transposed for present use.

In the itineraries, classical heritage was not only the goal of travel; the classics were also a legitimisation for travel. It was a natural outflow of the pre-modern postulate of temporality to adhere to the voyages of classical figures when looking for an argument for travelling in the present. Thomas Nugent stressed in his seminal Grand Tour (Nugent, 1749) that “the first civilized nations had so exalted an idea of those who had been in foreign countries, that they honoured even such as made but short voyages, with the title of philosophers and conquerors. [...] If travelling was in such high esteem among the ancients, no wonder that the moderns should be fond of imitating their example.” (Bohls & Duncan, 2005: 15-16)

Antiquarian thought was expressed in the collection of antiquities. No Grand Tourist would come home without relics, be they archaeological remnants of classical times, capricci, replica figurines or fashionable portraits depicting the traveller in front of a classical landscape. Many art collections started off with the works of art that a young nobleman gathered during his Grand Tour. In Italy, the art world flourished. Piranesi’s etchings were immensely popular among the Grand Tourists, as were Batoni’s portraits. The latter painted 154 British tourists alone (Black, 2003: 184). The most characteristic artistic feature related to the Grand Tour is the capriccio. A capriccio is an imaginative picture or print of a land- or cityscape in which the artist brought elements together that were dispersed in reality. Tourists and peasants, classical and contemporary architecture, sculptures and statues, all were assembled in one composition. In this imaginative way, the artist literally put past and present together, symbolizing the presence of the classical past in eighteenth-century Italy in one temporal realm. Not surprisingly, painting or drawing capricci was a flourishing business in the Italy of the Grand Tour. An Enlightened attitude towards the past manifested itself not only in the collection of artefacts, but also in the description and classification of them. The excavations at Herculaneum (1738) and Pompeii (1748) had stimulated this indexation to a great extent. The basis for Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s famous Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums (1764) was laid in the measurements and cataloguing he made during his Grand Tour.

All in all, the pedagogy of the eighteenth-century Grand Tour was intentionally humanistic and reflected an antiquarian mode of thinking. The present was imagined as being part of one continuous space linked to the classical past. Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont were so interwoven that the experience (Erfahrung) of antiquity provided sufficient basis for present expectation (Erwartung) of the future. As Voltaire put it: “Boerhaave is worth more than Hippocrates, Newton more than all antiquity, Tasso more than Homer; but glory to the first” (Gay, 1967: 31). However, for a “real” experience of antiquity, it was necessary to have seen the sites with your own eyes. Hence the overall importance of the Grand Tour in the historical culture of eighteenth-century Europe.

Romantic travel: Bildung and the Machbarkeit der Geschichte

By the end of the eighteenth century, *historia magistra vitae* was no longer the core axiom of the pedagogy of travel. With the rise of Romanticism, the traveller’s “Self” was transplanted in the pedagogy of travel as a cognitive force in opposition to history. Travellers became aware of the fact that their point of view mattered, that historical remnants were not there to envisage or to measure, but that the past should be mastered and conceived through empathy. The philosophical foundations of this “anthropological turn” can be found in Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant refuted the position that our experience of reality is a passive receiving of impressions. In his philosophy, the categories of mind constitute reality, a point of view that highly stimulated the post-Kantian Romantic movement. The consequences of this change of perception – that reached beyond the realm of academic philosophy and was foundational for the formation of modern historical consciousness – are concisely summarised by Arthur Schopenhauer: “Vor Kant also waren wir in der Zeit; jetzt ist die Zeit in uns” (Schopenhauer, 1997: 522). With the change in conceptions of temporality, the conception of history was altered. The past did no longer serve as “a model, as an example, as an oratorical arsenal, or a lumber room crammed with curios”, it now brought a longing about for things that were different, distant and foreign. “The historical sense was replete with nostalgia and haunting memories.” (Huizinga, 1934: 93)

**Travel as educational self-realisation**

The evanescence of the historical passivity of the subject had two major consequences for the pedagogy of tourism. It led in the first place to the pedagogical postulate of modern Bildung (education as self-realisation) and in the second place to the idea of the “makeability of history” (*Machbarkeit der Geschichte*). In the Enlightenment, educational goals were both pious and platonic in nature: man should grow up in the image of God. Bildung however, was not teleological, but holistic: men had to grow up as men, in the image (Bild) of themselves. To achieve this, it was necessary to educate sensibility as well as reason. According to the Romanticists, sensibility is just as human as reason, for it is a trait that animals do not possess. The pedagogical postulate was no longer “duty”, but self-realisation. The Grand Tour became one of the main instruments of the pedagogy of self-realisation. The gathering of knowledge and curiosity devaluated as goals for travel and were replaced by the idea that travel responded to personal impulses and feelings that were to be realised. Goethe, for example, explained his longing for Italy from his childhood memories of the artefacts that his father brought home from the Grand Tour (Goethe, 1981: 126). Especially the etchings in his father’s reception room enchanted Goethe with a passion to experience his childhood dreams to the fullest.

With the anthropological turn in Romantic travel, history became entangled with biography, and thus with autobiographical memory. Itineraries were no longer mere accounts of the findings of one’s journey, but they had to express the path of the personal development of the traveller. This transition is made clear by Chateaubriand in his *Voyage en Italie*: “Je rendrai compte de mes courses et de mes sentiments à Athènes, jour par jour et heure par heure […] cet itinéraire doit être regardé beaucoup moins comme un voyage que comme les mémoires d’une année de ma vie.” (Chateaubriand, 1843 : 85) Literally, itineraries were now mémoires. Whereas the Enlightened itinerary used to be characterised “by an absence of personal or autobiographical reference”, as this would jeopardise the objective transparency of the traveller’s discoveries and measurements for the reader (Adler, 1989: 18), autobiographical narrative dominated Romantic itineraries. To a certain extent these itineraries were non-fictional Bildungsromane, in which the protagonist described his personal venture towards self-realisation.

The sensory primacy in the Grand Tour shifted from the eye to the heart. Lord Byron “took no notes, asked no questions”, he just “gazed at the stars and ruminated” (Adler, 1989: 23). The past had to be experienced in order to be meaningful in the present; the past no longer had presence, but had to be made present through historical experience. Encounters with the
past did no longer reassure the knowledge one already had, but it provided people with an experience they did not yet have.

The object of Romantic experience had since the late eighteenth century been called the “picturesque”. Originally referring to natural beauty, the picturesque could be defined quite literally as “that kind of beauty which would look well in a picture.” (Gilpin, 1798: 328) The best example of the power of the picturesque is the discovery of the Alps as a destination for travel on its own. The Alps used to be regarded as an annoying obstacle on the way to Italy, but now they represented the splendour of nature as a source for Romantic self-transcendence. William Coxe noted on traversing the Furka Pass: “I frequently quit my party, and either go on before or loiter behind, that I may enjoy uninterrupted, and with a sort of melancholy pleasure, these sublime exhibitions of nature in her most awful and tremendous forms” (Mead, 1914: 259). But, as both nature and history were regarded as antidotes of modernity, the picturesque could signify either of them. Searching for the picturesque was a form of aesthetic sightseeing, a quest for sublime natural or historical experience.

In essence, the pedagogical emphasis on experience meant the decline of the classical past as the primary object of historical interest. As Bildung through experience had become the main goal of travel, it did not matter what the object of experience exactly was, because the only requirement was that it had to be picturesque. Whether it was a ruined abbey, a medieval cityscape or the Forum Romanum, as long as it awoke the sentiments and provided historical experience, it would do as a travel destination. As the Danish traveller Hector Frederik Janson Estrup remarked on a visit to Normandy in 1819: “Splendid ruins! Why does one then go to Italy to contemplate the remains of antiquity? […] How the ruins of Christian temples surpass the beauty of the pagan temples?” (Anghelescu, 2004: 169)

The makeability of history and temporality of travel

The second consequence of the rise of subjectivism and modern historical consciousness – besides the pedagogy of Bildung – is the emergence of the idea of the “makeability of history”. In the “age of transition”, the future became open ended: “der Erwartungshorizont war weit geöffnet und auf einen unumkehrbaren “Fortschritt” hin ausgelegt.” (Titze, 1992: 103) People could influence the course of history and direct their own future. The Enlightened awareness that people could control nature sublimated in the Romantic idea that even the course of history was controllable, or at least plannable (Planbar). The counter side is that the space of experience (Erfahrungsraum) did no longer come down on people from history, but was based on one’s own historical experience (Koselleck, 1979b: 61). In the Grand Tour, the makeability of history manifested itself in twofold ways: as an idealisation of the past and as an idealisation of the future. It was now possible to interpret the past as a realm of forebears that still possessed the noble vices that were lost in modernity. On the other hand the future could be seen as a realm of gain; mostly in the technological sense. Both the future and the past were available in the present and were seen as travel destinations: the past in the form of locations with a picturesque “backwardness” and the future in locations with an industrial “progressiveness”.

When travelling to picturesque locations, it was the couleur locale (local colour) that enchanted travellers. In romantic literature, couleur locale designated the use of distinctive details of customs, objects, peoples and places in order to ensure the historical accuracy of the narrative. Prolific examples can be found in the historical novels of Walter Scott and Victor Hugo. In the preface of his play Cromwell, Hugo stressed that couleur locale even surpassed the notion of the picturesque: “ce n’est pas le beau, mais le caractéristique” that the author describes with local colour (Hugo, 1844: 37). The author should not only describe but recreate the past in his writings. In this respect, couleur locale was a literary strategy to generate what Roland Barthes has called a “reality effect”. The reality effect functions as a way to overcome the gap between Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont (Ankersmit, 1994). Local colour was not just at the surface, but at the very heart of the narrative.
For the Romanticists who were passionate with the empathical but accurate reinvigoration of the past, the anachrony that was present in the capriccios was unheard of. In the Grand Tour, local colour referred to characteristic features such as habits, gestures, traditions, folklore, myths, architectural characteristics, etcetera, that characterise a region or locality. As local colour intertwines spatiality and temporality, Romantic travel focussed not only on remnants of the past (which, as we have seen, included by now non-classical remnants), but it also included present-day cultures that were “untimely”; that leaped behind in the pace of progress. In this respect, local colour was – just as the picturesque – often attributed to rural areas and to the barren regions in the outskirts of Europe. These were areas that were regarded as untouched by modernisation, and thus preserved some authentic historical characteristics. An example can be found in Romantic travel narratives on Spain. Travellers like Washington Irving, Prosper Mérimée, George Sand, and Theophile Gautier created a “mythical Andalusia” in their writings. A mystic country abound with matadors, Gypsies, machismo, underdevelopment, brigands, passion and political chaos. Washington Irving wrote in a letter home: “the countenance, figure, air, attitude, walk, dress of a Spaniard, all have a peculiar character. The common people are wonderfully picturesque in all their attitudes, groups and customs.” (Kagan, 2002: 23) The then popular saying that “Africa begins in the Pyrenees” added a flavour of Orientalism to the perception of Spain. Spanish otherness was both spatial and temporal in nature. When crossing the Spanish border into France, the Jewish American Mordechai Manuel Noah symbolised this step with the crossing from the past into the present (Gifra-Adroher, 2000: 78).

Another example of Romantic tourism seeking nostalgic imagery can be found in the case of Scotland. Just as Spain, Scotland was left largely untouched by urbanisation and industrialisation and was therefore regarded a fine destination for the Romantic traveller. In contrast to Spain, Scottish historical tourism cannot be understood without regarding its symbiotic relationship with England. The binary opposition between “barbaric” Scotland and “civilised” England that already existed in pre-modern times was thoroughly historicised in the Romantic era, now designated as a “historical” Scotland and a “modern” England that still mutually defined each other. In Scotland, one could be “free of one’s century” (Grenier, 2005: 150) and be painfully aware of it at the same time.

In the age of transition, travellers’ temporal outlook did not only turn to the past; the more “progressive” regions of Europe also received attention. Travel into those parts of Europe that witnessed an early industrialisation “became a journey into the future” (Hachtmann, 2007: 51). Modern architecture, city planning, machinery, factories, but also new social problems all became attractions. In the industrialised cities of England, or in post-Haussmann Paris, one could witness the conditions that were approaching the rest of Europe. The best examples of future-oriented tourism are the World Expositions (or: World’s Fairs). Organised since 1851, the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations stood already in a tradition of industrial expositions, which demonstrated a great variety of industrial products and artefacts. In the World Exhibitions, the participating nations competed to show the best their country had to offer. The makeability of the past was a tourist attraction that attracted millions. By putting progress at display, the World Exhibitions underscored the idea that the past was never to recur (Grever & Waaldijk, 2004: 25-29). But, with the emergence of the World Exhibition and the rise of mass consumerism, a shift in historical consciousness took place (Grever, 2001: 18).

What exactly characterised the pedagogy of Romantic travel? The postulate of historia magistra vitae did no longer suffice, but the basic dispositions of the Grand Tour were still alive: Romantic travel remained reserved for young males of noble descent, albeit that an increasing number of bourgeois male and also female travellers appeared on stage. The goals of travel were, however, altered. The project of self-realisation encompassed a pedagogy of identity construction. One had to find oneself in the stream of time (Strom der Zeit) (Assmann, 1999: 101), through reflexivity and introspection (Selbst-Beobachtung). These characteristics can be found abundantly in Romantic itineraries. The discovery of the
Self in history is the adage of Romantic travel. The souvenirs that travellers brought home did no longer represent the overarching past, but represented the presence of the traveller at a certain location. Thus, the past became mediated mentally by memory and physically by souvenirs.

**The rejuvenation of educational travel and the quest for citizenship**

Halfway through the nineteenth century, technological developments changed the nature of travel itself. The emergence of new, faster means of transportation meant the demise of the Grand Tour and the emergence of what has been called “modern” or “mass” tourism. Travel became affordable for larger groups of people, for whom a Tour had to be squeezed into the few days, and later: weeks, of spare time that the average worker had at his disposal. Organised railway and coach tours, as developed by Thomas Cook became increasingly popular. Modern tourism revoked a lot of anti-tourist sentiments. As Henry James remarked in 1882: “The sentimental tourist’s only quarrel with his Venice is that he has too many competitors there. He likes to be alone; to be original; to have (to himself at least) the air of making discoveries.” (Buzard, 1993: 135) He continues by stating that the “shallow inquirers” will never be able to establish a “love-affair” with the city, due to their short stay. In contrast with upper-class Romantic travellers such as James, modern tourists did not have the resources for a long and contemplative stay. Their visits were swift and well-organized by thriving travel agencies, which lead to a process of commoditisation of sites of interest. The past became consumable and had to become consumable, because the modern tourist was no longer in the position to discover and to “ruminate”. Visitors of the Flemish beach resorts could, for example, attend package excursions to the “picturesque” island of Walcheren in the Scheldt estuary, which were regularly organised in favour of the short-stay visitors. Due to this process of commoditisation, itineraries became remarkably descriptive, guiding tourists along the “hotspots” of their destination and providing them with enough information to interpret the site. Where the neoclassical travellers used Livy as a guide and where Romantic travellers were guided by Rousseau or Walter Scott, the Baedecker and Guide Bleu were the modern tourist’s escort. A return to the knowledge-oriented pedagogy of travel of the Grand Tour, one might say, but without the pedagogical emphasis on discovery and association – and certainly without the imaginative wonder of Romantic travel. What then is left of history and memory in the pedagogy of “leisure” tourism in this – so often criticised – modern condition? In order to answer this question, I will focus on two important developments in Europe in the late 1890s. First, cultural pessimism and the readdressing of the Bildungsideal, second the “invention” of adolescence as a social category.

**Fin de siècle cultural criticism and the burden of history**

The fin de siècle – dated between 1880 and 1914 - was a period with two faces. The period was characterized by optimism, frivolity, nationalism, fashion, sophistication and art nouveau on the one hand, but on the other by decadence, individualism, mass culture, confusion, ennui, Weltschmerz and nihilism. The ideas of progress and the makeability of history manifested themselves in the optimism of the splendour of technology, as exhibited in the World Fairs, and an eschatological pessimism that fed the idea that the world was “going to the dogs” through atheism, alcoholism, boredom, dandyism and decadence in general. The great unknown that lies beyond the horizon of expectation was both frightening and exhilarating.

It was cultural criticism that challenged the past as a source of experience. In literature, the modernist movement with authors like Proust, Italo Svevo, Yeats, Kafka, Mann, Gide, Baudelaire and Flaubert, was obsessed with the way in which a progressive and
constructible past dominated the present. They “all reflect the currency of the conviction voiced by Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus, that history is the “nightmare”, from which Western man must awaken if humanity is to be served and saved.” (White, 1966: 115) In the pre-war years the European intellectual world had the ahistorical conviction that the fixation on the past did not so much incline a strong control over the present, but exactly the opposite: the unconscious neglect of the fear for a deteriorating future.

The uneasiness with history was nurtured by the underlying premise that history is related to identity. This premise consists of the idea that national (or other collective) identities are historically determined through collective memory, just as the memories of one’s life history shape one’s personal identity. The cultural critic to attack this claim was Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, one of the greatest burdens of man is his inability to forget. In opposition to the unhistorical animal, which forgets immediately, man is intrinsically historical, carrying an ever-growing past with him. With this growing past, man was to see everything in flux; he could lose himself in the stream of becoming. “Es gibt einen Grad von Schlaflosigkeit, von Wiederkäuen, von historischem Sinne, bei dem das Lebendige zu Schaden kommt und zuletzt zugrunde geht, sei es nun ein Mensch oder ein Volk oder eine Kultur.” (Nietzsche, 1954: 213) According to Nietzsche, one does not get to know oneself better by perpending history; exactly the opposite is the case. All action is basically a- or anti-historical, for it means a rupture with what the past has been like. An overdose of history then means a loss of identity, for “bei einem gewissen Übermaß derselben zerbröckelt und entartet das Leben” (Nietzsche, 1954: 219). This does not mean that one should deny history, but one should determine history, instead of being determined by history.

With his radical views on historical culture, Nietzsche challenged the concept of Bildung, for it still distinguished between life and knowledge. Culture should be generated from life itself and not the other way around. Nietzsche believed that the literal “rejuvenation” of history by youth was the way out of this impasse, as youth was not yet obfuscated with conventional concepts of thought. Youth had the will to live intensively, was hopeful and had no need to feign the presence of a ready-made culture. Therefore, youth should be able to be both unhistorical (Unhistorisch; able to forget) and super-historical (Überhistorisch; able to divert the focus on becoming [Werden] to super-historical qualities as art and religion). Youth should have the creative power to create culture, without capitulating to the voices of history. Therefore, Nietzsche called upon youth to protest “gegen die historische Jugenderziehung des modernen Menschen”, to demand “daß der Mensch vor allem zu leben lerne, und nur im Dienste des erlernten Lebens die Historie gebrauche” (Nietzsche, 1954: 277).

Before attending to the consequences of the cultural critics’ attitude towards history, it is necessary to look at the way these attitudes were socially embodied in what has been called the “fin-de-siècle culture of adolescence” (Neubauer, 1992).

Adolescence and the rejuvenation of history

The period of life that Nietzsche has classified as “youth” was soon to be defined as adolescence. In order to be able to “rejuvenate” history, it is necessary to understand the concepts that enable us to think in these terms. Adolescence as a social category did not exist until the late 1800s. By that time, psychologists began to remark that what was usually referred to as “youth” carried a set of characteristics that were not present – or were at least not noted – before.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the young were starting to become economically irrelevant. On the one hand, because migration and urbanisation created a flux of cheap (male and often female) labourers to take over the jobs that used to be done by children and “youths”, causing them became “economically worthless, but emotionally priceless” (Zelizer, 1994: 14). On the other hand, because industrialisation caused the production process to become increasingly specialised, there was a growing need for educated labourers. In the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, child labour became abolished throughout Europe. After the turn of the century, education became compulsory. This created a situation in which youth could grow up in companion of age-mates, separated from adults. "Peer-" or "youth cultures" developed a whole set of characteristics related to, for example, sexuality and identity formation became increasingly visible and were allocated to this "period of life". Adolescence was now recognised as the transitory period in which one had no longer the innocence of a child, but still lacked the sense of responsibility of the adult. These economical and sociological changes made way for the emergence of adolescence as a social category.

The social construction of adolescence, however, was a case of conceptualizing this phase of life in pedagogy, psychology, sociology, youth movements, legislation, and churches. The "upsurge" of the focus on adolescence visible in these fields, emerged in the last decades of the nineteenth century throughout Europe and the United States (Neubauer, 1993). The "invention" of adolescence as a social category can mainly be attributed to the American psychologist Granville Stanley Hall, who devoted a two-volume work to "Adolescence", published in 1904. Being one of the main psychologists in the United States at the time, his work was soon "felt in every department of the school system and in all fields of activity in which human welfare is an ideal, both at home and abroad" (Partridge, 1912: v). For Hall, adolescence is a period of "storm and stress"; a characterisation he borrowed from the German Sturm und Drang movement. In the age of adolescence, which Hall defined as the period in life from 14 to 24, every person has to go through a phase of behavioural upheaval, before reaching the stability of adulthood. Depressions and mood disruptions dominate this period of life. Hall refuted the sentimental pedagogy of Bildung. From his own observations he concluded that in adolescence "there is a new sense esthetic or enjoyment of the sensation itself for its own sake." (Hall, 1904: 2) Thus, sensationalism was now conceptually detached from an object of inquiry (i.e. the past) and was regarded as a goal itself. By connecting sensation-seeking to risk behaviour, Hall psychologised the seeking of pleasures that was already tacitly present in the Grand Tour: "[Y]outh must have excitement, and if this be not at hand in the form of moral and intellectual enthusiasms, it is more prone […] to be sought for in sex or in drink." (Hall, 1904: 74)

As Hall’s Adolescence counts more than 1300 pages and discusses a great range of topics, both biological and psychological, it is not possible to give a concise account of his conceptualisation of adolescence. What is important, both within the work of Hall as in the wider "fin-de-siècle culture of adolescence", is that adolescence was a new conception of youth. This conception broke with the diachronical associations of temporality and historical affiliation that dominated the Grand Tour and established the idea that the adolescent had to “master” the world he was born in; that he had to create his own Erfahrungsraum synchronically, for the space of experience of former generations did not suffice in the "age of transition".

The pedagogy of modern tourism

How does the synchronic orientation of adolescence relate to the pedagogy of travel? Thomas Cook started his business by organizing a railway excursion in 1841 to divert the youth of the working class from the alcoholic temptations of the Leicester race week. This is, however, not a representative case. Modern tourism may have started off with a pedagogical venture, but tourism would appear to be a hard field for pedagogy.

The decline of tourism as a pedagogical venture may for a large part be caused by consumerism, another factor is in my opinion the fact that tourism was “domesticated” by the family. The Grand Tour could only take place because aristocratic youth had the time for it: they finished school or university, but were too young to marry and to carry adult responsibilities. Modern tourism, on the contrary, was restricted to the holidays. These were
times in which the whole family could go on vacation. The domestication of tourism by the family made tourism not a suitable domain for the pedagogy of history. This does not mean that historical encounters did not take place in modern tourism – far from that! – but it does mean that these encounters were no longer guided by a corresponding pedagogy.

As pedagogy had shifted to a synchronic of sense temporality, the divergence between past and present was now literally embodied in the social order as adolescence. In contrast to Romantic travel, personal development was now a case of learned experience, instead of aesthetic (or: historical) experience. Even the picturesque was robbed of its aura, as it was typified (in the Weberian sense) in travel guides. Modern travel guides answer in fact “none of the questions which a modern traveller can ask himself while crossing a countryside which is real and which exists in time. To select only monuments suppresses at one stroke the reality of the land and that of its people, it accounts for nothing of the present, that is, nothing historical, and as a consequence, the monuments themselves become undecipherable, therefore senseless.” (Barthes, 1972: 75-76) The senselessness of the past can in a broader way be attributed to the synchronicity of the present. As adolescents have a hard time mastering their time and shaping their identity in contrast with the temporal orientations of the generation of their parents, the past that lies beyond the living generations is both unattainable and irrelevant for their personal identity construction. Seen from a collective viewpoint, generations base their identity on their experience of historical rupture that takes place in their adolescent period (Mannheim, 1952). They constitute identity in reference to their peers, instead of the classics (as in the Grand Tour) or the “self” (as in Romantic travel).

How the synchronicity of modern identity formation worked through in travel is clearly demonstrated by the example of the Wandervogel. Founded in 1901 in the spirit of the fin-de-siècle cultural criticism, the aim of the Wandervogel was to shred off the restrictions of the German Bürgergesellschaft and the patriarchality of parents and schools. It strove to re-establish creativity, fantasy and play in life and a return to nature. The burden of history was clearly felt by the Wandervogel, as they set out to answer Nietzsche’s call. The movement was a formalisation of adolescence in general and of the Wandervogel-generation in particular. In opposition to top-down movements as, for example, Baden Powell’s Boy Scouts, the Wandervogel (and at a later moment the youth hostel associations) had no official pedagogical venture other than the establishment of synchronic identity in the incalculable present. However, with its focus on simpler life, the Wandervogel reincarnating a Romantic imaginary with an emphasis on folk culture and the middle ages (Laqueur, 1984: 6). This new Romantic imaginary contributed – ironically enough – to the nationalist rhetoric of the official German education.

The synchronical identification of adolescents in generations lead to rigid detachment of youth’s identity from the past. The historical past now had to be endowed upon them and be appropriated by them. History ceased to be a “Lehrmeisterin des laufenden” in the classical sense of historia magistra vitae, but history became “lehrhaft” (Mommsen, 1922: 477). Where historical features used to be patrimony, ancestral inheritance to which one is indebted, it now became heritage in the modern sense: “the past manipulated for some present aim” (Lowenthal, 1996: 102). At the fin-de-siècle, these aims were mostly nationalistic. The French schoolbook Le Tour de France par deux enfants (Bruno, 1877) features two orphans of fourteen and seven years old who make a mimic Grand Tour through the France of 1871. During their journey they narrate extensively on the historical events, famous persons, monuments and traditions they encounter. With this schoolbook, both geographical and historical pedagogy was served. Moreover, the French schoolchildren were reminded of the taunting nature of the Germans, who had occupied the Lorrain hometown of the young travellers by the time they came back. Another example of the modern pedagogy of travel can be found in the American book Picturesque Journeys in America of the Junior United Tourist Club. The book features a club of “ten or twelve young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty” (Bromfield, 1883: 1), who have taken or are about to take one of the numerous tours through the various parts of the United States that are described in the book.
In a comparable way of *Le Tour de France par deux enfants*, the club members encounter the highlights of American nature and history. Along the way, they meet a great range of experts who explain it to them. Thus, where travel ceased to be a pedagogical venture (and was even radicalised as an anti-pedagogical venture by the Wandervogel), the encounter model of travel continued to be a pedagogical strategy to endow the younger generation with a knowledge of the past, a knowledge that would lead to exemplary citizenship within modern society.

The consequences of the synchronic orientation of adolescents are clear: history needs to be transmitted from generation to generation, and has to be re-appropriated by each generation to realign it with its space of experience and fit it in its horizon of expectation. Travel and tourism devaluated as a means of unmediated transmission of cultural values to younger generations. Travel was used as a medium of transmission of history by educators, for it provided a model for narrating geographical and historical encounters. The extent to which the pedagogical outset of these educational travel writers did affect the travelling practice of adolescents remains the question and needs further research.

**Concluding remarks**

I hope to have shown in the preceding paragraphs how the function and practise of memory and the traveller’s attitudes towards the past are strongly related to changes in historical consciousness. The rise of modern historical consciousness at the end of the eighteenth century did not accidentally coincide with an important shift in travel culture, namely, the shift from the “classical” Grand Tour, to its Romantic version. The estrangement from the past that came with the rise of modern historical consciousness contributed to the installation of a new pedagogy of travel. The *bourgeois* pedagogy of self-realisation replaced the humanistic topos of *historia magistra vitae* as the leading pedagogy of travel. Even though the rise of modern leisure tourism halfway through the nineteenth century denoted the demise of travel as a form of education, the growing uneasiness with the traditional *Bildungspädagogik* and its inability to forget made way for other uses of travel as a pedagogical tool. *Bildung* changed from an individual concept of self-realisation into a collective pedagogy of citizenship. Under influence of the invention of adolescence and the rise of generationalism, the new pedagogical goal was to initiate every generation anew into the cultural memory of the rising nation-state. Travel was used as a way to explore the fatherland within – for example – youth movements, or as a narrative structure in schoolbooks. Travel bound the geography and history of the fatherland together. The memorial focus of the pedagogy of travel shifted from a patrimonial Italy though the picturesque outskirts of Europe, back to the reinvented fatherland.

However, the changes in the pedagogy of travel are not only brought about by changes in historical consciousness. When we recall Halbwachs’ thesis on the social frameworks of memory, the question of how changes in the social composition of the travelling public influenced the pedagogy of travel still remains open. It is obvious that there are connections between the rise of bourgeois travellers and the *Bildungspädagogik*, and between the rise of middle-class and working-class tourists and the collective pedagogy of citizenship. How this altering travelling public influenced the cultural memory and the pedagogy of travel remains open for further research. The same question is viable for the relationship between gender, pedagogy and memory, as the number of female travellers steadily increased during the nineteenth century.
DISCUSSIONS

Simone Abram (Leeds Metropolitan University): Binding Nature into the Nation: materialising memories in the mountains

Birgit Braasch (Leeds Metropolitan University)

Simone’s presentation about the Norwegian hytta pointed to the important material and bodily aspects of memory. As the discussion after the presentation emphasised, these aspects are important for the individual as well as the collective parts of memory. The embodied aspect of life at the hytta is characterised by the feeling that you have to do outdoor life there. This outdoor life takes place in a group; whereas the more individualised form of sport is part of the urban life. This form of a collective and active outdoor life is the deeper ingrained because children learn from early on how to move around the hytta, for example, on cross-country skies. Furthermore, they often spend time at the hytta year after year, so that they get to know the details of the place. Since the experiences at the hytta are framed in a similar way and the hyttas are built alike, this example shows the importance of materiality for memory. Also, the life connected to the hytta shows how important it is to conceptualise memory as multi sensory and multi modal. The practices at the hytta and specific movements that are connected to skiing or hiking are remembered as part of the non-declarative part of procedural memory, but they are also connected to other aspects of life at the hytta such as the stories that have been told or the images that are connected to certain events.

Furthermore, the hytta plays an important role for autobiographical memory, social memory and cultural memory. Life at the hytta becomes part of autobiographical memory in that personal stories can be told about events that are connected to the outdoor life. Closely connected to this autobiographical memory is social memory in the form of family memory, which seems to be the most important aspect of memory related to the hytta. Accordingly, it became clear in the discussion that vastness and intimacy cannot be separated in regard to the hytta because inside and outside are not separated either and being at the hytta is about sharing, experiences in and around the hytta. An example would be that families or friends also stop outside to recount former experiences. Especially in summer, different practices can blend together. Furthermore, activities are often accompanied with songs, so that another sensory aspect becomes part of the multi-modal memory of being at the hytta.

Since the practices relating to the hytta have, on the one hand, a long tradition and are, on the other hand, shared by approximately half of the population, the images connected to the hytta are not only shared on a family basis but also on a national basis. However, the discussion made clear that the practices of the hytta only involve the majorities within the population and, for example, ignore Sami claims. In comparison to other Scandinavian countries in which it is also popular to fly the national flag, practices at the Norwegian hytta are marked by the activities that are done there in contrast to the conceptualisation of the hytta as a place for relaxation. These flags mark the activities as national activities and, therefore, the collective memory of these activities become national memories.

Furthermore, the memory of activities to the hytta is kept by the persistence of the idea of the hytta. Although modern hyttas look more like townhouses and often have all the anemnities like running water and electricity, these houses are still called hytta and have a similar status to the old ones. Thereby, the memory is kept alive by the material culture of the hytta itself.
Tourism, Memory and Art: Marina Stacpole (Leeds Metropolitan University) on her recent art project on travel and memory

Claudia Andrea Müller (Leeds Metropolitan University)

Marina de Stacpole’s presentation on her recent art project focused on her own travel memory around war remains especially in Vietnam and Laos. She expressed, that she was struggling to locate her memory of this places of war within her other memories of other tourist spaces in this countries.

Marina converted this conflict in her visual art with a collage of photographs and stylized painting. Parts of the discussants felt this art to be very much aesthetic and even romanticizing, which Marina expressed was not her aim. Instead, she intended to work with the ambiguity between the aesthetic appeal of the paintings and the representation of a place of war. Therefore, she tried to use photographs one would not find necessarily in a guide-book. Her audience, however, was not entirely convinced that she accomplished this aim. The discussants argued that there are very well guide books which use photographs of those places of war. The question was raised, if not every representation of war will end up being romantic. Ruins, for example, traditionally were used as a metaphor of war and decay and at the same time were romanticizing them. Especially at the end of the eighteenth century those ruins were even newly build. Goethe, for instance, realised some of those new ruins in the park of Weimar, Germany.

There was another dichotomy in Marina’s paintings. She was dividing them into three parts. On the upper edge there were the photographs of the places of war. Beneath, and the major part of each piece, was the stylized painting – perhaps representing Marina’s emotional memory of the places. Below these paintings, were other pictures of the respective country she visited. She described them as representative for the more everyday-experience of the people and her own (?) in Vietnam and Laos. So that, she separated the war remains from the everyday life or the tourist-impression of the everyday-life in those countries. This separation, however, might not hold true. Instead, the war, its places, and remains are often part of the everyday life.

The last discussion arose on the role of the places Marina is representing in her art. The photographs in relations to the paintings were quite small. She already reflected this challenge during her presentation, acknowledging that the patterns she used in these paintings were dominating over the photographs. Thus, she wanted to rework them. Locating the photographs more within the centre of attention would, as some of the participants suggested, contribute to creating knowledge of the places, Laos and Vietnam. This is also related to the audience this art is directed at. This audience would be mainly British or European and does not necessarily know Laos and Vietnam. Accordingly, the challenge for Marina is to draw on this audience’s imagination and stereotypes about these countries, yet at the same time communicate her own memories of the places.

During this discussion Marina suddenly found herself in the role of a tourist. She was trying to express in her work the emotions and memories, which made the trip special for her. She thought herself seeing different things, visiting unknown places. One might argue that this longing is a typical quest of a tourist. As one of the participants commented, she was translating a common feeling and memory. She tried to express this, for her unique experience, in her art. The present tourism-scholars doubted that her expression matched the uniqueness of what Marina felt to have experienced. The audience only found the common in her art, something they had seen very often, in the thousands of pictures they had looked at. So, on the one hand, the audience succeeded in making Marina a tourist. On the other hand they failed to see the very special and individual in her expression of her
memory. Or, was it the variance between her exceptional experience and its expression in art which ended in her being a tourist. Would this mean that an artist needs the ability to express memories in a special way, while the tourist's expression remains in the ordinary and conventional?

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