Making Live and Letting Die:

Power-knowledge, Biorationality and Jerusalem’s Planning and Building Regime

Bradley Lineker
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Preface

This article originated from independent research conducted whilst the author was working with UN-Habitat’s Palestine office in spring 2013. The general thrust of the paper forms part of continuing doctoral research on critical methodologies of occupation in urban environments.

Acknowledgements

Bonaparte once said that ‘ability is of little account without opportunity’, and so whatever ability I may have expressed in this piece is largely due to the opportunity afforded to me by the staff of UN-Habitat’s Palestine program: who not only made this piece possible, but showed me great warmth and hospitality during my time with them.

Particularly Fiona McCluney, who gave me the platform to perform, and Frank D’Hondt, whose excellent company gave me the stimulus needed to take an avid interest in the riddle that is Jerusalem. Again, ability (or an idea) will often go to waste without proper tuning, so I thank Claire Smith, Jacob Eriksson and Tom Waldman for their time and effort in bringing this project to realisation.

Furthermore, I would thank my mother and my brothers and sister for their patience, strength and resolution in what has been a trying time. Courage – the woods are dark, but every hard-won step takes you closer to the light.

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About the Author

Bradley Lineker is a researcher in the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York. His research interests are varied. For instance, he has previously conducted studies into resource-based neo-patrimonial networks in Angola; ‘state capture’ in Mozambique; and the concept of liberty through the prism of the French Revolutionary terror. Bradley is set to do a fully funded ESRC PhD at King’s College London starting September 2014.
Abstract

In the city of Jerusalem, the discourse of ‘conflict’, or the struggle between two separate, armed, clearly-defined and opposing sides, has been emphasised by Israeli rhetoric to simplify and distort the actual processes of discrimination against Palestinians for dissemination abroad. Indeed, this narrative inserts a false semblance of parity and reciprocity into what is, in reality, a large-scale, systematic and deliberately obfuscated process of bureaucratic discrimination against the Palestinian residents of the city.

This paper maintains that it is the subtle bureaucratic tools that manage life, the healthcare, housing, infrastructure and schooling systems, where the conflict now emanates. It will use the planning and building regime – as the prime repository for shaping, changing and transplanting meaning onto the urban fabric – as a case study to delineate the soft power processes that go into framing the patterns of occupation. It introduces the concept of ‘biorationality’ – understood as the institutional rationality of a bureaucratic system that uses ‘processes of life’ to systematically mould and shape collective groups in society – to illustrate how on the one hand the bureaucracy is designed to ‘foster’ the lives of Israeli citizens through improved facilities, access, infrastructure and other incentives; whereas on the other hand, it systematically ‘disallow[s] to the point of death’ the biological existence of the Palestinian other.

Introduction

Jerusalem’s long-serving Mayor, Teddy Kollek, was known for many things: charisma, charm, the ability to forge great political compromises and he was arguably the man who made modern Jerusalem the city it is today – he seemed to have it all. Although his most memorable trait to his aides in the Mayoralty was perhaps his ability to fall asleep at the drop of a hat, in meetings, banquets or even international events – simply anywhere (Telegraph, 2007).

Somewhat typically then, amid the hustle and bustle of a City Council meeting in February 1993, Kollek’s head lolled down upon his chest, which rose and fell rhythmically. As if on cue, Kollek’s deputy, Amos Mar-Haim, took over from the slumbering Mayor and attempted to bring some order to the ensuing bazaar by banging the gavel. After things had settled a little, a city engineer presented a zoning plan for the Arab neighbourhood of Sur Baher, where according to the government’s limitations, an ‘additional 1200 housing units would be allowed ... but no more.’ (Chesin et al, 1999: 30). No one seemed particularly bothered by the presentation – typically the mayor had slept right the way through it – everyone, of course, but the Head of the City Council, a Palestinian rights activist named Sara Kaminker. Furious, Kaminker
startled Kollek out of his slumber and vigorously demanded answers for the apparent limitations on Arab construction. Like a boxer, Kollek quickly regained his composure and delivered a crisp reply: simply, it was part of a policy ‘followed by all governments since 1967’, which had aimed to restrict Arab numbers in the city. He did not say anything more, but instead tactfully assumed control from Mar-Haim and steered the meeting away from the subject.

This represented, for the first time, an Israeli official – the Mayor of Jerusalem of all people – publicly recognising a concerted institutional effort by Israeli authorities to alter the demographics of the city by specifically limiting Palestinian urban development (Chesin et al, 1999: 30). While the wider media, like the rest of the Council, had been largely indifferent to this announcement, it represented nothing less than the first unequivocal statement about the nature of ‘conflict’ in Jerusalem – that of ‘systematic discrimination’ (B’Tselem, 1995: 30) through Israeli controlled governance structures. To schematise this process, there is need for an analysis that critically reflects the general ossification of conflict in Jerusalem and how it has engendered a bureaucratic system (in this case, the planning and building regime) inculcated with a specific ‘logic of conflict’ – or the active and bureaucratised propagation of one group, while disallowing another to the point of death.²

This paper will use the planning and building regime in Jerusalem³ – or the prime repository of shaping, changing and transplanting meaning onto urban fabric – as a case study to argue that governance in the city is essentially infused with a dichotomous logic that on the one hand promotes the biological existence of the Israeli citizen,⁴ and on the other fractures and fragments the same life processes for the Palestinian individual. Here, based on Foucault’s formulation of biopower,⁵ I introduce the concept of ‘Biorationality’, or the intrinsic institutional rationality of bureaucratic systems that utilise the processes of life to systematically mould and shape collective groups in society, to accurately depict the systemisation of occupation in Jerusalem. This approach is necessary because it captures the essence of a ‘logic of conflict’, which itself operates in an array of governance techniques designed by the occupation regime to achieve specific objectives for certain categories of people.

This paper is divided into six sections. Following this introductory section, Section Two will utilise Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and governmentality to develop the general analytical approach, before outlining a new approach to urban planning and building theory. Building on this, Section Three will then use the ‘demographic variable’, an openly-admitted guiding principle of planning within Jerusalem, to demonstrate the zero-sum biorationality that suffuses the planning and building regime in the city. Next, in Section Four, I will show the mechanisms by which the occupation regime seeks to maintain a demographic advantage within the city. In Part Five, the discriminatory zoning and access measures against the Palestinians will be presented, before finally in Section Six concluding by highlighting the need to conceive of the planning and building regime as operating, not as an im-
partial and scientific entity striving for the greater good of the city, but as an institution that is inherently infused with a targeted zero-sum biorationality and directed to provide benefits to one group while systematically discriminating against the other.

Power-Knowledge, Biorationality and a New Planning Theory

State of the literature
An overview of the academic literature on Jerusalem quickly shows that much of it not only stems from the wider conflict (Stern, 1990: 400), but also generally falls into three rough thematic areas (Gordon, 2008). These are: (1) A focus on international events ('high politics') or the efforts of wider peace initiatives), 6 (2) the need to put Palestinians back into the narrative7 and (3) descriptions of the manifestations of Israel’s occupation (Gordon, 2008: 2).

This paper is primarily focused on the latter of these three areas and it will maintain that much of it fails to sufficiently account for the internal configuration of the mechanisms of control. Indeed, in the general literature on the occupation, there have been many who have summarised the occupation using terms such as ‘colonialism’ (Weizman, 2006: 90/91), ‘neo-colonialism’ (Isaac, 2009), ‘apartheid’ (Davis, 1987) or even as an Agambenian ‘state of exception’ (Lentin, 2008). The general ambivalence in labelling the occupation, in this paper’s view, is symptomatic of a wider uncertainty surrounding the mechanics of power in the occupied territories. In short, there has never been a systematic attempt to understand the core rationale of the power-mechanics of occupation (Eliezer, 2009: 331). More often than not, the regime of control is assumed to be fixed, unyielding and largely unchanged since 1967 (Gordon, 2008).

Similar problems occur in view of in-context planning literature. While Faludi (1997) argues for a wider Israeli ‘planning policy’ and Khamaisi (2002) illustrates the steps needed to be taken for a bi-national capital city to emerge, neither does enough to explore the relationship between the planning and building regime and the intrinsic logic of the occupation. Yiftachel (1998) and Jabareen (2009) both accurately state the need to re-conceive planning policy in terms of a focus on Israeli interests, but their focus on ethnicity potentially negates any effective analysis of the make-up, direction and underlying rationality of the institutions in the occupation regime. Furthermore, Weizman’s reconceptualisation of space (2006) does not effectively account for the mechanisms of control, seeking instead to only describe the surface manifestations of power rather than delve into the system’s internal rationale. Due to these limitations, this working paper has utilised Foucault’s theory of power; specifically drawing from his ideas about the way that power operates in society. In short, the utility of this approach, in view of the ordering of space in a contested city like Jerusalem, is that once the power-relationships behind specific
decisions and policies are revealed, we can uncover the institutional trajectory of the occupation system itself.

Reconceiving power and introducing ‘governmentality’

In order to understand issues of inclusion and exclusion in systems of knowledge like professional planning, one must first begin with the concept of power (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002: 8). Indeed, according to Foucault, power should be conceived as an ‘agonism’ – a ‘relationship [of] reciprocal incitation and struggle’ (Foucault as cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 221–222). In this model, struggle thus makes up a constant factor in society, where the outcome depends upon – and shapes – power relations. Thereby, to document this process we must piece together the various parts of the separate ‘technologies of power’, which are designed to ‘observe, monitor, shape and control the behaviour of individuals’ in society (Gordon, 1991: 3/4), because, like footprints, these invariably lead back to the core rationality of the system of power in place.

Considered in this way, power and knowledge are thus part of the same conceptual continuum (Foucault, 1991): rationality, then, is tempered by power-relations that form in the conflicts that occur within society. Thereby, to ‘respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail [so as] to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Foucault, 1980b; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002: 11). This is especially pertinent in planning and building in a contested city like Jerusalem, where the struggle for power plays out in the minutiae of everyday life – as the provision of healthcare, roads, or other goods and services are permeated with the indelible footprint of the conflict.

Foucault extends this approach to the way that governance is applied in society – and this has special relevance in a context like Jerusalem. Here, the activity of urban planning has a direct correlation to the way governance is enacted in-context and so also the general patterns of occupation. Contrary to modern state theory, Foucault maintains that we cannot understand the activities of government through the inherent properties of the state, because it intrinsically has no essence: there is, in fact, an overemphasis on institutions at the expense of actual practices and the real rationalities concealed within them (Gordon, 1991: 4). Government, for Foucault, is the ‘conduct of conduct’: the aim being to generally condition the behaviour of a series of individuals (Gordon, 1991). Thus, the act of governance has its own rationality, or ‘Governmentality’, which is the underlying current that seeks to actively condition citizens to a particular mechanism of control. This has a particular resonance in Jerusalem as it is firstly an occupation, where control is an integral element of governance, and secondly, the concept provides a good mechanism to base a schematisation of the power mechanics at work – which will be seen further below.
Spatial planning theory: the need for a narrative of power

Spatial planning, according to planners, is supposed to be the impartial professional expression of a more or less unified vision of society for the ‘public interest’ (Glass, 1959; Simmie, 1974: 148) of the totality, expressed geographically. However, it is clear that, ‘A scientific body to which [has] been confided the government of society would soon end by devoting itself no longer to science at all, but to quite another affair (Bakunin, 1999). Whether it be ‘taking sides’ in areas with social discord by making areas more ‘defensible’ for a particular side (Newman, 1972; Herbert & Thomas, 2001: 257) or a planner’s particular predilection for a specific policy, planning is not an objective exercise. Indeed,’... neither cities nor places in them are unordered, [or] unplanned; the question is only whose order, whose planning, [and] for what purpose...’ (Marcus, 1995; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003: 673). Again, an,

architect who builds a house or who designs a site plan, who decides where roads will and will not go, and who decides, which directions the houses will face and how close together they will be, also is, to a large extent deciding the pattern of social life among the people who live in these houses (Festinger et al, 1950; Herbert & Thomas, 2001: 255).

This is certainly the case in Jerusalem and while it may not be due to social discord, as highlighted by Davies’ excellent book on Los Angeles (2006), the scientific body in this case – the planning and building regime – is ultimately poised to maximise the interests of a particular group of people at the expense of another (Jabareen, 2010: 27). Thus, once we have understood that power informs discourse – more so in a contested space like Jerusalem – and that professional ‘rationality’ is itself jeopardised, we can begin to re-evaluate spatial planning as another form of Foucauldian power-knowledge.

The need to reincorporate power:
Foucault, power-knowledge and Jerusalem

At this point, we turn to what has been labelled the ‘dark side of planning’ (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002: 44); where, in order to appreciate the meaning behind certain planning policies, we must incorporate ‘power’ back into the narrative. This process has particular pertinence in Jerusalem, which few other places can perhaps match: here, the openly acknowledged grand-strategy of Israeli planning has been the advancement of one group over another (Marom, 2006). Indeed, in 1978, Matityahu Drobless developed the grand strategy for the development of settlements in Judea and Samaria, declaring that, ‘state ... and uncultivated land must be taken immediately in order to settle the areas between ... [the Palestinian] populations and ... [therefore] being cut apart by Jewish settlements, the minority population will find it hard to create unification and territorial continuity’ (Weizman, 2006: 42). The same sort of rationality also developed within the city of Jerusalem, as the planning and building regime aimed to:
It was a harsh policy and not only because they disregarded the needs (not to mention the rights) of the Palestinian citizens. Israel believed that imposing stringent city planning that limited the number of new homes constructed in Arab neighbourhoods would ensure that the percentage of Arab residents – 28.8% in 1967 – would not grow. To get Arabs out and Jews in, housing policy in East Jerusalem has focused on this game of numbers (Cheshin et al., 2001: 44).

Indeed, while these mechanisms are apparent (and openly acknowledged) on the grand scale, they are also occurring at the local level. In Jerusalem, one can perceive an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single comprehensive security effort (Davies, 2006: 224), which is poised against the Palestinians. This culture of security leads to the ‘architectural policing’ of social boundaries, which becomes a ‘master narrative in the emerging built environment,’ as ‘... upscale, pseudo-public spaces – sumptuary malls, office centres, culture acropolises, and so on – are full of invisible signs to the underclass “other”’ (Davies, 2006: 224). These observations are about Los Angeles, but Davies’ words can be equally applied to Jerusalem: this is because we are essentially witnessing a social struggle and not a traditional ‘conflict’. Here, notwithstanding the often furious denials by Israeli planners that their work is for the ‘public good,’ the power-knowledge that underpins grand planning strategy (i.e. the location of settlements like Pisgat Ze’ev or the Gush Etzion block) is also reflected at the everyday, local, and human levels. While security is often the overt excuse put forward by the occupation regime, it is only one of many manifestations of a specific power-knowledge that aims to relegate Palestinians from the social fabric of the city.

Thus, to understand the processes of occupation in such a complex and contested city, we must move beyond traditional accounts of professional-rational planning theory (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002: 45), to perceive the power struggles behind these decisions in order to document a wider rationality.

### Building biorationality

Power diffusion in modern western societies, according to Foucault, is not about the domination of populations, but of their management – and there is an important difference. Instead of looking to harm or regulate its subjects, the contrary is now the case: the logic is now geared towards ‘generating forces ... [and] making them grow’ (Foucault, 1998: 136). From territoriality, the focus of governmentality now resides instead upon the population (Foucault, 1978c: 129): the modern state has a supreme focus upon the intricacies of biology as the individual has become part of a species (Foucault, 1978a: 1). Instead of merely ‘letting live’, the state now wants to ‘foster’ life or disallow it to the point of death (Foucault, 1998: 138). Foucault labelled this phenomenon as ‘biopower’ and defined it as: ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy of power’ (Foucault, 1978a: 1). The hallmark of this system is the general...
conditioning of the species: through the management of birth, death and other forms of population regulation (Foucault, 1998: 139). Certainly, the modern state is replete with the relevant experts, bureaucratic systems and management techniques – public health experts, school inspectors, city planners, health and safety legislation and the micro-management of traffic systems, to name only a few – which are all needed to effectively care for and manage the biological needs of the population (Rose, 2007: 53/54). Thereby, the development of an institutional rationale to underwrite the biological essence of the population is the vital ingredient in the progression of this mode of governmentality.

Crucially however, in the current Foucauldian-orientated literature on the occupation, there is a general tendency to develop analytical summaries on the occupation regime based on literal utilisations of Foucault’s biopower. As is well known, Foucault developed his theories of governmentality and biopower in relation to specific processes occurring in western society in the middle of the twentieth century and while we will show the analytical utility of this approach, there is a need to evaluate its literal use in Jerusalem. As in many other cases where occupation in Jerusalem has been framed in particular theoretical terms, there is a need to ensure that the theory actually reflects the processes occurring in-context. For this reason, this paper seeks to reinterpret the basic tenets of Foucauldian governmentality and biopower to accurately depict the underlying rationality of the administration of the city.

In order to document the zero-sum mentality within the governance structures, I have developed ‘biorationality’ as a concept. Here we define biorationality as the nexus of its two ancillary concepts: (i) rationality – the underlying logical trajectory of a given system, nominally built upon shifting power dynamics and (ii) biopower, according to Foucault’s maxim of ‘making live and letting die.’ The essence of biorationality, as distinct from biopower, is that it can take into account the mechanics of occupation – the two interconnecting strands of security and the settler conceived as a consumer. This is because, while in biopower we can depict the development of biological variables into the political strategies of the state, in Jerusalem – where we are talking about its application institutionally to not only secure geographical and social domination of an area, but also the systematic disintegration of the cohesion of a people – we have to talk about an underlying rationality, one that suffuses the entire system of occupation. Thereby, ‘biorationality’ is an attempt to develop Foucault’s position to better suit a modern consumeristic society, notably – in this case – in its interaction with a non-western social system.

Conceiving biorationality and Jerusalem’s planning and building regime

In Jerusalem, and specifically in relation to the central theme of this paper, I argue that the logic upon which the planning and building regime operates is based on a fundamental distinction between whether it wants a particular group or individual to thrive or wither – and its methodology of governance reflects this distinction. Figure 1 captures this process, as it demonstrates two
separate mentalities of governance in Jerusalem’s planning and building regime, which treat the Israelis and Palestinians differently. On the one hand (the ‘making live’ part), the rationality of governance imposes little in the way of sanctions or regulations for the Israelis – or the group it seeks to ‘make live’ (Israeli citizens). In fact, here we can see the active promulgation of the life processes of a specific group through incentives and other measures designed to foster the best possible conditions for these to grow and thrive. However, on the other hand (the ‘letting die’ part), the rationality of governance is designed to inhibit, hinder and to ultimately make growth and development impossible for the other group (the Palestinians). These separate rationalities are linked in that the former often acts at the expense of the latter.

![Figure 1: Biorationality depicted: an ideal-typed depiction of the institutional rationale of the planning and building regime.](image)

**Power-Knowledge Expressed:**

‘The Demographic Balance’

Building upon this new approach, we will now begin to deconstruct the rationality behind planning and building in Jerusalem, to demonstrate how a specific power-knowledge, based upon biorationality, has operated since 1967. Indeed, reflecting on past Israeli planning policy, Israel Kimhi, former director of the Policy Planning Department of the Jerusalem Municipality and urban planner, maintains that:

*Government policy toward Jerusalem has continued to be based, as in the past, on three principles: strengthening the Jewish hold in the city and its surroundings, entrenching its physical unification, and emphasizing its centrality as the capital of the Jewish people. The most concrete expression of this policy is the continuation of the building plans, and the populating of new neighbourhoods and the surrounding satellite settlements with Jews (Kimhi, 1993 as interviewed by B’Tselem, 1995: 34).*

This three-pronged objective finds expression in not only the promulgation of incentives for further Israeli settlement, but it is also manifested in restric-
tions against Palestinian development. On the one hand, nearly 60,000 hous-
ing units have been constructed for Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem since
1967 – in line with reducing the Palestinian majority in that area; while on the
other hand, only 13% of East Jerusalem has been zoned to allow Palestinian
construction – largely in areas that have already exceeded capacity for con-

Here, a distinct logic of operation, or rationality, to increase Jewish control
over the city has occurred through distinctly biorational means. A central
strand of this process is the policy regarding ‘demographic balance,’ which has
been a constant principle followed by the municipal authority since 1967
(Marom, 2006: 350); as Israel Kimhi points out, the ‘cornerstone,’ or the essen-
tial logic, of planning in Jerusalem is tied into the ‘demographic question’
(Kimhi, 1977; B’Tselem, 1995: 31/32). Instead of drawing up plans to improve
the general-haphazard construction in Palestinian areas, following the impos-
sition of zoning post-67, the practice has been used to ruthlessly restrict Pales-
nitin development (Hutman et al, 1999: 32), which has led to general
stagnation in Palestinian areas (Yiftachel, 2006: 263). Israel Kimhi again ex-
plains this process rather aptly when he states that: ‘From the very first [then],
all major development [in Jerusalem] represented politically and strategically
motivated planning’ (Kimhi in Bollens, 1998: 733).

Here, the city’s planning and building regime makes up what Bollens calls
a ‘passive regulatory control system’ (Bollens, 1998: 731) with its own power-
knowledge, and which is expressed through the apparent impartial profession
of planning. As figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, one of the main purposes of the
2000 Master Plan, for instance, is to incorporate a number of different demo-
graphic scenarios (see Figures 2 and 3) and to plan for ways to create the de-
mographic circumstances that best suit the increase of the Jewish ratio in the
city with regard to the number of Palestinians (Jerusalem Masterplan, 2000:
6). We can see how the essential methodology of planning under such ration-
ality is intrinsically a zero-sum mentality: incentives for Jewish residents and
a sustained bureaucratic process to undermine the Palestinians in the city. We
must perceive this process as a social struggle and not as a conflict between
two equal sides.

Figures 2 and 3 show how if action was not taken, a combination of i.)
Jewish emigration, ii.) high Palestinian birth-rate and iii.) lack of productivity,
would have enabled Palestinian demographic superiority (Jerusalem Master-
plan, 2000: 6). Therefore, the ‘Gafni’ Committee’s recommendations of 1972,
where the ratio of Jews (73.5%) and Palestinians (26.5%) should be strictly
maintained (see Kahilliah, 1993; B’Tselem, 1995: 30), have not only been im-
plemented by the plan but they have also clearly become an entrenched plan-
ing principle (Nasr-Makhoul, 2006: 8). The chosen strategy of the plan is
overtly biorational, because on the one hand it calls for the improvement of
general Jewish living standards through increased services etc., while at the
same time it aims to limit the lifestyles of Palestinian residents through the
‘opposite logic’ – a lack of services, building rights, etc. (Nasr-Makhoul, 2006:
8). This further demonstrates the zero-sum rationale that suffuses the planning
and building regime.
The plan is symptomatic of the wider institutional logic, or governmentality, that has existed within the planning and building regime since at least 1967. The aim here was essentially to ensure continued Israeli control over the city through the creation of inalterable ‘facts on the ground’ (Chesin et al, 1999: 55) through biopolitical methods. This policy has largely been composed of two components: i.) the transfer of Jews across the Green Line to first alter, but later to maintain, Jewish numerical dominance (through incentives designed to increase their livelihoods) and ii.) due to the naturally higher Palestinian birth rate, restrictions upon Palestinian growth through a combination of restrictive building and zoning policies, confiscation and destruction of property, and other subtle mechanisms (the inverse logic: attacks against Palestinian livelihoods). This process intrinsically entails the control of the dispersion of people within the city, in order to ‘establish... a physical reality that guarantees Jewish superiority ... [and] prevents the physical division of the city

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<th>2020</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Without migration, fixed productivity</td>
<td>Without migration, decreasing productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (000)</td>
<td>657.8</td>
<td>1,069.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Jews</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Arabs</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
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*Figure 2: Palestinian/ Jewish population figures 2000–2020. (Jerusalem Masterplan, 2000: 5)*

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<th>Population of 2000</th>
<th>Additional population between 2000–2020</th>
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*Figure 3: Palestinian/ Jewish population figures (with population addition) 2000–2020. (Jerusalem Masterplan, 2000: 5)*
in any way’ (JECP, 1970 as cited in Chesin et al, 1999: 34). In this way it is inevitably infused with biorationality, as it controls the physical make-up of populations by on the one hand incentivising what the state wants Israeli citizens to do, while at the same time undermining continued cohesive Palestinian existence. In sum, planning in the city of Jerusalem has turned into a correlative of the expression of a particular power-knowledge, based in biorationality, premised upon the advantage of one group at the expense of another.

Institutional Logic of the Planning and Building Regime (i): Settlements, Incentives and Securing a ‘Jewish Majority’

As discussed above, the core institutional logic of the planning and building regime and of the city municipality in general is the preservation of the Jewish majority in the city. According to the 2000 Master Plan the only realistic way to achieve this is to artificially manage net-migration, so that fewer Jews leave the city and more migrate from other parts of Israel (Jerusalem Master Plan, 2000: 6–7). The method to achieve this aim was to increase the livelihoods of Jewish residents and to incentivise others to come. In other words, the biological status of Jewish citizens as *consumers in a market* is the fundamental principle of the planning and building regime in the city.

Creating housing for artificially-created positive net-migration: settlements and limited densification

The overall aim, as mentioned above, is to create a reservoir of housing that actually *far exceeds* the projected long-term demand in the city. This would then not only drive down housing prices for Israelis in Jerusalem, but also demarcate a definitive stake on the land to eventually be taken over at some-point (Nasr-Makhoul, 2006:18). This process has been in place since 1967 (Yiftachel, 2002: 262): while this strategy is a recommendation of the 2000 Master Plan, this is a mere reaffirmation of a long-followed policy (see Jerusalem Master Plan 2000). Indeed, following a series of master plans, and their various updates and amendments, twelve Jewish settlements – clad in the famous ‘Jerusalem stone’ (Nitzan-Shiftan as cited in: Wiezman, 2007: 36) and at enormous public cost (B’Tselem, 1995) – were established at strategic locations across the Green Line after the armistice in 1967 (Thawaba & Al-Rimmawi, 2012: 66) to aggressively fragment Palestinian communities in the near-east of the city (Weizman, 2007: 25–26) in a wider process of ‘divide and conquer’. Further settlements, like the Gush Etzion block or Ma’ale Adumim, were created outside of the major Palestinian built-up areas, to act as a ‘second organic wall’ against Palestinian expansion (Weizman, 2007: 26), so to help maintain the demographic balance of 70% Israeli and 30% Palestinian. Through an ever-expanding road network (Thawaba & Al-Rimmawi, 2012: 66), ‘Greater Jerusalem’ thus became a sprawling metropolis that now incor-
porates nearly 75% of all Israeli settlers in the West Bank (Weizman, 2007: 26). While there was an initial surge in settlement activity after 1967, which continued into the 1970s, the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993-95 augured an intense period of settlement construction – as demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5.
In total, some 64,870 new housing units, which constitute some 88% of all dwellings constructed (50% publicly initiated), have been constructed for Israelis since 1967 (B’Tselem, 1995: 5). The first and widely reported part of this huge increase in housing is the creation of illegal settlements, which fulfils both of the aims listed above. Unsurprisingly then, the number of Israelis in East Jerusalem rose from 0% in 1967, to 47% in 2007 (Isaac et al., 2008: 2), and around 200,000 settlers now reside within the municipal boundaries (BBC, 2014) with perhaps 50% more in the ‘Greater Jerusalem’ area (Margalit, 2010: 33). Where the change has come, however, is the transition from using Israeli citizens as a ‘living human wall’ (Ben-Gurion, 1986; Rothbard, 2006: 106) (perhaps in part due to the pressures of immigration in the late 1960s and 1970s), to consumers with needs (see Kroyanker, 1999). After the 1970s we can see a shift in strategy, as the neighbourhoods that looked simply to incorporate people have been augmented by a new focus on the consumer (Kroyanker, 1999). Here there is a deliberate attention to ‘neighbourhood location, building placement, architectural shape, [and] reference to open spaces, parking spaces and investment in public buildings’ (Kroyanker, 1999).

Much of the literature and focus is typically on the creation of settlements, like Ramat Shlomo, which are easy to document and propagate through the media, although one of the key and unacknowledged strategies employed by the planning and building regime is that of limited densification (Jerusalem Master Plan, 2000: 7). For example, on 11 August 2011, the Israeli Minister of Interior announced Plans 11085, 11647 and 5834A that augured the develop-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year built</th>
<th>Area (Dunums)</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Eshkol</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>11,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’alot Dafa</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>3,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Alon</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>39,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Yakhov</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>20,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Ze’ev</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,468</td>
<td>40,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Hill</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>6,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Scopus</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>1,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Talpiyot</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,196</td>
<td>12,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,859</td>
<td>27,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Homa</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2,523</td>
<td>4,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atarot (Including Airport)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access Roads to Settlements</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>24,551</td>
<td>183,913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Number of Jewish settlers within municipal boundaries in East Jerusalem. (source: Margalit, 2010: 33)
ment of new housing units in Ramat Shlomo (1600 units), Pisgat Ze’ev (625 units) and Givat Hamatos (2337 units) (Terrestrial Jerusalem, 2011). While these are in fact settlements, they are nonetheless illustrative of a wider trend to implement the 2000 Masterplan’s recommendation to not only improve the amount of houses in the ‘old’ areas, but also increase the quality of service provision in these areas (Nasr-Makhoul, 2006: 18). In terms of planning, the aim in Jewish areas seems to be ‘publicly dense and privately spacious’ (Marom, 2006: 351), or the general maximisation of space while maintaining a high standard of living (Marom, 2006: 351).

So, the construction of new settlements, as well as limited densification, is designed to fulfil the aim of creating a surplus of housing that will be utilised to keep the demographics of the city at a manageable level for Israeli planners.

**Incentives to attract new migrants: biorationality in action**

The idea is to make these areas attractive to potential residents (whether in existing neighbourhoods or settlements) through a number of incentives: such as bigger cheaper and in some cases free houses, proximity to the city centre (‘five minutes from Kfar Saba!’ – as one slogan claimed) (Newman, 2006: 115) easy access to working places, entertainment centres and increased service provision (Nasr-Makhoul, 2006: 18). Indeed, all planning schemes conducted by the municipality have come with a system of bypass-roads and tunnels that link the sprawling settlements in the east with the Israeli heart of the city in the west (Thawaba & Al-Rimmawi, 2012: 66). Here we can discern the focus on access, which is in place for two reasons: i.) to enable the functional connection between new areas that are often located far from the hub of the city and ii.) to establish an emotional connection between these new areas and the city by the ‘apparent’ proximity but also by the relegating the Palestinians to other, older roads.17 Today, some settlements in ‘metropolitan Jerusalem, like the Gush Etzion bloc, Ma’ale Adumim and Beit El, together act as illegal Jewish suburbs of the city (under international law), where settlers can return home along exclusively Jewish highways to large and comfortable housing (Newman, 2006: 116).

Even the form of the newly built settlements was designed to engender a specific emotional response regarding the city. For example, the 1970 construction of Gilo and its many courtyards were developed within the trend of ‘new urbanism,’18 whereby outlying urban areas are designed architecturally to create an emotional bond with a central area, which in this case was the Old City of Jerusalem (Weizman, 2007: 46). As demonstrated in Figure 7, there are a number of architectural and emotive similarities between, in this case, the Damascus Gate (as the old main entrance to the city) and an entrance to a part of Gilo: the imposing duel-towered facade, high ‘walls’ and the famous ‘Jerusalem stone’, together create a conscious link between the ‘home’ of Judaism and that of the settler. While the process of ‘fostering a critical Jewish mass’ has already been noted (Margalit, 2010: 7), we need to see how in order to influence the demographic issue, the chosen mechanisms to implement this process have reflected the interests of consumers with biological needs to be fulfilled.
‘Making live and letting die,’ the Institutional Logic of the Planning and Building Regime (ii): Palestinian Building rights, Access and Zoning

This paper has so far demonstrated how a focus upon the methods utilised by the Israeli occupation regime to facilitate the continued existence of Jews in the city are inherently biorational in their underlying logic; or, in other words, the system recognises the intrinsic nature of the Jewish individual as a consumer with needs to be fulfilled. As stated earlier, here we are primarily interested in seeing how this process is part of a zero-sum biorationality: where on the one hand the aim is to achieve a positive good through ‘incentivisation’, while on the other the same logic and methodology is used to segregate the livelihood and general position of the Palestinian ‘other’. Simply stated, this process of giving with one hand and taking with the other is nothing short of what Foucault formulated as being: ‘to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (Foucault, 1998: 138).

In this section, we will document how the planning and building regime in the city of Jerusalem is geared towards disallowing the livelihood and general status of the Palestinian individual.
Zoning

Undoubtedly the single most important strand of this process is that of the restrictive zoning system operated by the Israeli authorities. In East Jerusalem, strict zoning was seen as a way of limiting the number of new homes built in Palestinian areas and thereby ensure that the demographic ratio would never change to any substantial degree (Chesin et al, 1999: 32). According to government instructions, city planners drew up plans that restricted Palestinians to the areas that they had largely already inhabited, while areas immediately surrounding these were either un-zoned (so disallowing construction) or zoned as being ‘green’ (Chesin et al, 1999: 37). Figure 8 visually demonstrates the effects of this policy. Here, it can be seen how the settlements have been deliberately positioned so that, in the words of Drobless, ‘[once Palestinian areas] have been cut apart by Jewish settlements, the minority population will find it hard to create unification and territorial continuity’ (Weizman, 2006: 42).

Figure 8: Zoning in East Jerusalem. (source: UNOCHA, 2010)
Another important component of this physical division is the Separation Barrier, which effectively chokes any expansion eastwards. If we take the example of Beit Hanina in the north (marked by the arrow), it can be seen how it has prevented expansion by a mixture of the Separation Barrier, the settlements of Pisgat Ze’ev to the east; Atarot to the north; French Hill and Mount Scopus to the south, and finally a belt of ‘green’ land to the west. Here, especially when ‘green’ land is considered as another method to mask Palestinian areas (simply look at the southern parts of the map for other examples), one can perceive a collection of zoning methods designed to disrupt, fragment and contain Palestinian development.

Indeed, ‘green areas’ have provided a useful mechanism for Israeli planners to reserve land for future Israeli growth. For example, the Custodian of Ab-

Figure 9: Proposed settlement on the Grand Mufti’s Grove. (source: Ir Amin, [no date])
sentee Property acquired the Karm el Mufti (an olive grove of 40 dunums named after its previous owner, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) and then leased it to the Ateret Cohanim settler organization (UNOCHA, 2011: 55). The land was designated as a ‘green area’ which prohibited construction – but Ateret Cohanim has since developed plans to build 250 housing units on the site (see Figure 9). While their proposals have been waylaid in court, this process is indicative of what often happens in the so-called ‘green areas’.

The confluence of the ‘demographic balance’ and restrictive zoning has created, on a number of occasions, a series of contradictions in planning and building (Marom, 2006: 348); whereby planners have been tasked to create development plans in certain neighbourhoods that, according to the government’s objectives, have had no scope for expansion. For example, Figure 10 demonstrates how several areas have been deliberately restricted in their development due to political or demographic concerns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Existing units</th>
<th>Potential units</th>
<th>Units planned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beit Hanina-Shuafat</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issawiya</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Jarrah</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Joz</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Tur</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silwan</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras al-Amud</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Tur and Jabal Mukaber</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab A-Sawarha</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sur Baher</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>1,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit Safafa</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Hillweh</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuafat R.C.</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafr Akab</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 10: Potential for expansion in Arab areas within the allotted demographic balance. (source: Hutman et al, 1999: 31)*

For example, in 1993, the City Municipality released a report on the ‘potential housing construction in Jerusalem’ (Figure 10 is from this report), whereby each Palestinian area was assessed and potential growth within the aforementioned percentages was documented. Instead of utilising congestion rates, overcrowding indexes, or any other indicators used in urban planning, the municipality used the demographic principle to give the appearance that the Palestinians were provided with opportunities, albeit limited, for growth (Hutman et al, 1999: 31).
One such example of the contradictions in the planning and building system (Marom, 2006: 348) due to the need to enforce ratios is that of the planning of the Palestinian neighbourhood of Kafr Akab. Here, the Israeli planner was informed by the municipality that there were 590 housing units in Kafr Akab and that he had scope to only plan for 1,300 – largely restrained to the area that the neighbourhood already occupied (Chesin et al, 1999: 51). However, upon further research, he not only discovered that the ‘neighbourhood’ was a picturesque village that did not have a single second story building, but it also already had 1300 building units in place (Chesin et al, 1999: 50). The planner realised that he could not present a plan to the municipal authority that allowed for zero-growth, so instead the decision was made to divide the village in half and only allow growth in one of the halves – and still only on the ground where building had already taken place (Chesin et al, 1999: 51). This proposal was accepted by the municipal authority despite the very obvious flaws (for example, the new plans failed to account for infrastructure or services – gas, electric, water, and so forth – which cannot be realistically maintained when you cannot build in one half of a tiny locality). Additionally, the plans ignored the fact that the area was ripe for further development (Chesin et al, 1999: 51). Other neighbourhoods were not so lucky – as Shuafat and Beit Hanina were categorically restricted from any development whatsoever.

The planning and building crisis: denying existence

Currently there is what UN OCHA has described as a ‘planning crisis’ in East Jerusalem (UN OCHA, 2011); this is directly due to the underlying biorationality and the chosen surface-policies enacted by the Jewish municipal authority. A lack of meaningful planning building rights for Palestinians has coalesced into the Israeli authorities’ disallowing their existence to the point of death.21 Indeed, some 64,870 dwellings, constituting some 88% of all housing units built since 1967 (50% by public construction) were built exclusively for the Jewish population, while only 8,890 apartments – only 12% of all new housing construction – were intended for Palestinians (B’Tselem, 1995: 5). Furthermore, in 2000–2008 Israeli authorities demolished 670 homes in East Jerusalem due to a lack of permits (HRW, 2010: 48–49). The difficulties facing the construction of new houses and other structures by Palestinian owners in East Jerusalem are considerable. Indeed, Marom (2006: 348) locates the interaction between prospective new Palestinian development of the municipal authority along an analytical continuum:

1.) conception of urban plans and their approval,
2.) the transformation of the projected plans into planning permits,
3.) official inspection and planning law enforcement of the new structure, and finally
4.) the demolition of new structures when they break the law.

A potential Palestinian developer could encounter problems at any part of this continuum, whereby permission is either revoked by the municipality or his
Figure 11: Demolitions in East Jerusalem, 2010. (source: UN, 2011)
structure destroyed in its entirety and his investment wasted. A study of the destruction of structures is also indicative: between 1996 and 2001, 82% of building violations in Jerusalem occurred with structures owned by Jews, although in the same time period, 80% of demolition orders were in Palestinian areas (Marom, 2006: 351) (see Figure 11). Indeed, the system of house demolitions itself is broken – because it is random, arbitrary, and only manages to carry out about a third of the demolition orders the municipality issues and it fails to act like anything other than a system of deterrence (Marom, 2006: 350).

Furthermore the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, whilst afforded such privileges like health and social assistance; national insurance; education services; and some degree of increased mobility and legal protection (compared to their counterparts in Gaza and the West Bank), are still subjected to a number of restrictions designed to hinder and to limit their position in the city (Passia, 1994). For instance, the 208,000 Palestinians in Jerusalem (32% of the city’s population), receive less than 12% of the municipal budget and are forced to pay the same taxes as the Israelis, despite having an income of approximately eight times lower (Passia, 2001). Many homes remain unconnected to water, gas and sewerage lines and roads are left in a perennially poor condition (Halper, [no date]). Indeed, Teddy Kollek, Jerusalem’s most famous Mayor, infamously declared:

*For Jewish Jerusalem I did something in the past twenty-five years. For East Jerusalem? Nothing! What did I do? Nothing. Sidewalks? Nothing. Cultural institutions? Not one. Yes, we installed a sewerage system for them and improved the water supply. Do you know why? Do you think it was for their good, for their welfare? Forget it! There were some cases of cholera there, and the Jews were afraid that they would catch it, so we installed sewerage and a water system against cholera...* (B’Tselem, 1995: 38).

Thus, the inability for Palestinians to effectively build either on the small scale, or the large scale (the 2020 Jerusalem Masterplan has no area for future Palestinian growth) (Isaac et al, 2008: 2), represents the underlying biorationality of the municipality to ‘disallow’ Palestinian existence in Jerusalem ‘to the point of death’.

**Conclusion: To Make Live and To Let Die**

On 2 November 1993, at the ripe old age of 82, Teddy Kollek was finally beaten in pursuit of his seventh term as Mayor of Jerusalem (Morello, 1993). Although the ravages of cancer, old age and exhaustion had slowed him in his later years (Parks, 1993b), the city had become virtually unrecognizable during his 28 year tenure. Indeed, then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin deplored the loss of ‘the great[est] builder of Jerusalem in the modern age’ (Parks, 1993a). Kollek despaired at the appointment of his successor, the Likud candidate Ehud Olmert, stating ‘This is not the right way for Jerusalem to go, I am sorry for all Jerusalem
residents who will have to endure what lies ahead’ (Parks, 1993b). This sound-bite however was aimed to some degree at the Palestinian residents who failed to vote for him. However, despite his attempts to have himself considered a great champion for Palestinian rights, Kollek’s motivations matched those of the system he directed: Jerusalem for the Jews. In this regard, nothing had really changed: the settlement policy actually increased during the 1990s, the same empty rhetoric around securing Palestinian rights and access to services continued, and even Olmert’s delivery of the much publicized light-rail system simply represented the logical extension of how the city’s planning and building system had always operated.22

Normally, there are at least some changes when great political events occur. In the recent history of Jerusalem, the final goodbye to the great Kollek was certainly one of these occasions. One could expect, especially after a campaign as bitterly fought as the one in 1993, that the new oppositional leader would do at least something different regarding ‘the Arabs’. However, as demonstrated throughout this paper, the core rationale that drives the gears of occupation cannot be explained in this way. The election of Olmert in 1993 did not impact the institutional rationality of the planning and building regime.

Whilst the inherent discrimination in Jerusalem’s planning and building regime has been previously covered a number of times (HRW 2010; Weizman 2007 and B’Tselem 1995, to name a couple referenced in this paper), it has never been systematised conceptually in ways which link the constituent elements of planning – and its associated bureaucracy – together with the concerted aim of the system to enhance or hinder the biology of categorised individuals. To explain this, there is a need for an analysis that captures how the general ossification of conflict in Jerusalem has engendered a bureaucratic system (in this case the planning and building regime) inculcated with a ‘logic of conflict’ – or the active propagation of one group, while hindering another to the point of death. This subsequently necessitates an approach that critically reflects the social inequity and outright discrimination that occurs against a clearly-defined population group, for the benefit of another.

This paper addressed that gap in the literature by highlighting an overarching rationality within the occupation regime that utilises an array of governance techniques to ensure its carefully defined objectives are achieved. In particular, it has used the planning and building regime – as the prime repository for shaping, changing and transplanting meaning onto the urban fabric – as a case study to delineate the essential methodology of a governance structure enthused with a zero-sum mentality: incentives for Jewish residents and a sustained bureaucratic pressure to undermine Palestinians in the city. Thereby, in Marom’s words:

*Instead of an efficient, even-handed planning system we see a draconic, discriminatory enforcement system, where building inspectors, prosecutors, and demolition crews have replaced planners. It is a punitive planning system rather than a facilitating one – a perverted system indeed (Marom, 2006: 350)*
This paper has introduced the concept of ‘biorationality’ to encapsulate this process – a concept expressed in the insistence on demographic ‘balance’; where, on the one hand, there is a focus on the biological development of Israeli citizens primarily as consumers, while on the other hand disrupting, fragmenting and containing Palestinian development to the very edge of their continued existence – or as Foucault formulated, a general policy of fostering or disallowing life. By demonstrating the directed rationality behind the supposedly ‘impartial’ planning, this paper went beyond this and argued that the discipline itself is contributing towards furthering this process of discrimination against Palestinians. Furthermore, it depicted how the municipal authority and the Israeli government attracts settlers by appealing to their biological status as consumers through incentivisation. Finally, this paper argued that the restriction of Palestinian planning and building rights equates to a general biorationality which, through zoning and other restrictions, bureaucratically ‘disallows’ Palestinian existence in the city.

Whilst one cannot reliably generalise beyond the context of the study, it is clear that this method – the focus upon the logic of a particular system and its subsequent relationship with various groups – has potential resonance beyond the specific focus of this paper. Whereas this paper has focused upon Jerusalem’s planning and building regime, it is clear that this process is endemic in the occupation regime in general and this model can readily be exported to study other facets of the occupation. Furthermore, this method of analysis fills a critical gap in conflict analysis and critical security studies in conflicted areas, as it allows for a more nuanced view on discrimination that joins other sociological approaches (of social inequality etc.) with that of conflict analysis. Moreover, it is also evident that this method locates the important relationship between power, the bureaucracy and the disparate conflicted groups from a sociological perspective, in order to transcend the limited traditional discourse of conflict and division and instead focus upon reality as it is actually lived.
Notes

1 This anecdote comes from Chesin et al, 1999: 29–31

2 While the reference to ‘death’ is undoubtedly emotive in this context, it should be noted that Foucault’s conception is not based upon a juridical ‘hard’ power approach. Instead, much like a homeless individual in a Western society, the Palestinians are simply ‘left’ to their own devices – the institutions around them have no intrinsic stake in their general state of welfare – and in this way they are merely ‘left’ to die.

3 Whilst this paper will primarily focus upon what is occurring in the east of the city, the city itself has been artificially constructed by the Israelis into one defined sociological environment (due to their illegal annexation of a swathe of land to the east into the city’s administrative purview) and so will be treated as such. The processes that I describe regarding settlement in the east are natural extensions of those that are already occurring in the west.

4 Whilst this paper utilises the term ‘Israeli’ somewhat ideal-typically, it is aware of sub-divisions in the social make-up of this group. However, the purpose of the paper is to demonstrate how in general terms the institutional rationality of the structures of governance favour the ensemble of sub-groups that make up ‘Israeli’ over those that make up ‘Palestinian.’ It is perhaps an interesting point of further research to explore the relationships between the various Israeli sub-groups and the institutional logic of governance.

5 His definition rests on the distinction between a state: ‘foster[ing] life or disallow[ing] it to the point of death’ (Foucault, 1998: 138).

6 There are some excellent accounts that document these events that originate in the Israeli ‘new historian’ movement. See for example Segev’s 1967 or Pappe’s The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.

7 Here, the seminal work is obviously Edward Said’s The Question of Palestine.

8 Work in this area includes publications from the Jewish Agency, Housing Ministry and other ‘official’ Israeli accounts, sympathetic Israeli NGO reports – Bimkom, Rabbi’s for Human Rights and B’stelem, Palestinian NGOs – IPCC, INGO publications (Oxfam, the UN, etc.), and various other academic books and articles.

9 See in particular: Foucault, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c

10 Here I am referring to the definition put forward in the EU’s Torremolinos Charter: Regional/spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the physical organisation of space according to an overall strategy (The Torremolinos Charter, 1983: 13).
I label this process ‘consumo-securitisation,’ and will develop the conceptual basis for it in another work.

Whilst the Israeli administration actively seeks to capture the governance practices and visual style of the west in the construction of Jerusalem, here we are talking about this system’s interaction with non-western traditions. Another way to depict this dynamic would be the struggle between a regularised, standardised western system of governance with that of a relatively unordered, unstandardized way of life.

Israel Kimhi was an active urban planner who worked in Jerusalem from 1963–1983. He was also director of the Policy Planning Department for the Jerusalem Municipality for 1973–1983. Since then he has worked as a senior researcher for the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies as head of the Jerusalem desk.

The Inter-ministerial Committee to Examine the Rate of Development for Jerusalem – shortened to Gafni in Hebrew. (See: B’Tselem, 1995: 30).

The full quote is: ‘...not with silent stone fortifications but with labour and the creation of a living human wall – the only wall that is able to resist the enemy’s weaponry...’. It was a speech to the inaugural members of the Pioneering Fighting Youth (NAHAL) (Rothbard, 2006: 106).

Early construction in West Jerusalem consisted of standardised and cheap prefabricated buildings that were designed to provide accommodation for the huge waves of immigrants that came following the Second World War (Kroyanker, 1999).

More often than not Israeli roads are constructed with the Israeli consumer in mind: they are well-made, disallow Palestinians and enable an effective physical link between the far areas (such as Efrat) and the centre of the city. This is one of the biopolitical methods that this sense of ‘greater’ Jerusalem is gradually inculcated.

Although, stylistically, there was a struggle to either engage with ‘brutalism’ (simple, peasant houses that reflected the landscape) or with neo-orientalists (the created conception of Jerusalem) (Nitzan-Shiftan, 2007: 234).

While the reference to ‘death’ is undoubtedly emotive in this context, it should be noted that Foucault’s conception is not based upon a juridical ‘hard’ power approach. Instead, much like a homeless individual in a western society, the Palestinians are simply ‘left’ to their own devices – the institutions around them have no intrinsic stake in their general state of welfare – and in this way they are merely ‘left’ to die.

These include: A-Tur, Shuafat Refugee Camp, Wadi Joz and Silwan – all of which are politically sensitive areas. For instance, A-Tur is on the Mount of Olives, whereas Wadi Joz and Silwan both border the Old City.
Note this does not entail the ‘murder’ of the Palestinian people. Instead, based on Foucault, it is the state pressing, confining, disallowing and disowning them to a point in the grey area before death. Therein, this is neither ‘genocide’ nor ‘ethnic cleansing’ as other commentators have suggested but something altogether more nuanced, as it is primarily focused upon limitation and not suppression. This is where the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ distinction of power becomes useful, because it is only by conceiving of it in these terms that we can fully conceptualise the occupation in its proper terms.

The light rail system – whilst ostensibly for anyone to use – deliberately linked a number of long-standing (illegal) Israeli settlements in east Jerusalem with the Israeli west of the city. Not to mention that its route ran along the old ‘no-man’s’ line, it also required the remodelling of a number of Palestinian roads and junctions. These were improved and updated – but in an Israeli style, which starkly clashed with the Arab environment. Many Palestinians boycotted it, as they saw it as another alien imposition on their territory.
Bibliography


Mission Statement
The PRDU links theory and practice for the enablement and development of war-affected societies.

The Unit’s work focuses on three core areas:

Conceptualisation:
Facilitating the development of a vision for reconstruction with participatory needs assessment, context analysis and strategy development.

Institution Development and Transformation:
Supporting the development of human resources, appropriate administrative systems and institutional responses in the transition from crisis management to long-term development programmes.

Participatory Evaluation:
Promoting people-centred evaluation of progressive goals and strategies and the dissemination of good practice.