

THE UNIVERSITY *of York*

**Degree Examination 2007**

**ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT**

**BSc in Environment, Economics and Ecology**  
**Part 1b**

**ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY**

Time allowed: **one and a half hours**

Answer **THREE** questions from **FIVE**

Calculators and graph paper will be provided

*Pay adequate attention to spelling, punctuation and grammar, so that your answers can  
be readily understood*

1. Consider Firm 1 and Firm 2 with the following marginal abatement costs:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Firm 1: } \text{MAC}_1 &= 225 - 1/2 E_1 \\ \text{Firm 2: } \text{MAC}_2 &= 130 - 1/2 E_2\end{aligned}$$

where E is the level of pollution emission.

- a) Compute the total quantity of pollution emitted by Firms 1 and 2 if there is no environmental policy intervention. (*10% of marks*)
- b) The Environment Agency decides to reduce total emissions by 40%. Assuming that Total Costs are not known discuss the possibility of achieving the cost-effective allocation of pollution emissions comparing the following scenarios:
  - i. An equal reduction in emissions across the two firms. (*10% of marks*)
  - ii. A uniform Pigouvian tax per unit of emissions. (*30% of marks*)
  - iii. The establishment of a transferable permit system in which permits are auctioned. (*30% of marks*)
- c) Discuss the limitations of implementing a Pigouvian tax to achieve the target. (*20% of marks*)

2. The following is the demand function for a product generating a negative externality:

$$P = 30 - 1/2 Q$$

where P and Q are price and quantity of output produced respectively. The firm's Private total costs (PTC) is  $PTC = 5Q + 0.2Q^2$  while the Social Total Cost (STC) for the society is  $STC = 10Q + 0.2Q^2$ .

- a) The equilibrium output and price that maximises net private benefit.  
*(10% of marks)*
- b) The equilibrium output and price that maximises net social benefit.  
*(10% of marks)*
- c) The equilibrium output and price if the producer is a monopolist.  
*(15% of marks)*
- d) Plot using the graph paper provided PMC, SMC, SMB and PMB on a diagram indicating equilibrium prices and quantities from parts (a) (b) and (c).  
*(20% of marks)*
- e) Comment on the results and plots produced.  
*(15% of marks)*
- f) Discuss the implications of the results for policy.  
*(30% of marks)*

3. Consider 2 goods (X and Y), 2 consumers (A and B), and 2 factors of production (capital K, and labour L), together with the following Utility functions:

$$\begin{aligned}U_A &= U_A(X_A, Y_A) \\U_B &= U_B(X_B, Y_B)\end{aligned}$$

and Production functions:

$$\begin{aligned}X &= X(L_X, K_X) \\Y &= Y(L_Y, K_Y)\end{aligned}$$

Describe analytically how the utility and production functions would change if the following externalities were taken into account:

- a) Consumption affecting consumption. (*5% of marks*)
- b) Production affecting production. (*5% of marks*)
- c) Production affecting consumption. (*5% of marks*)

In cases (a) and (b):

- i. Given a suitable assignment of property rights, discuss how private bargaining can correct externalities and help to achieve efficient outcomes. (*20% of marks*)
- ii. Discuss the limitations of implementing private bargaining to correct externalities. (*15% of marks*)

In case (c):

- i. Discuss alternative ways for government agencies to correct market failures. (*20% of marks*)
- ii. Consider a second-best problem produced by the presence of externalities and a monopolist in the market. Comment on the gains, if any, achieved by implementing a second-best tax on emissions. (*30% of marks*)

4. Describe in words and diagrammatically the use of emissions taxes and abatement subsidies. Explain, if any, the limitations of these policy instruments. (100% of marks)

5. The following tables, *Table 1* and *Table 2*, illustrate the pay-off matrices of net profits for countries A and B, with two strategies: to “pollute” or “not to pollute”.

*Table 1*

		Country B	
		Pollute	Don't Pollute
Country A	Pollute	3,1	0,0
	Don't Pollute	0,0	1,3

*Table 2*

		Country B	
		Pollute	Don't Pollute
Country A	Pollute	1/2,1/2	4,0
	Don't Pollute	0,4	1,1

a) Find the Nash Equilibria and any dominant strategies in *Table 1* and in *Table 2*. (50% of marks)

b) Evaluate the feasibility and the implications for environmental policy of Country A and Country B in *Table 2* agreeing to cut emissions if the pollutant is a global pollutant. (50% of marks)