Budget Allocation and the Revealed Social Rate of Time Preference for Health

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**Abstract**

Appropriate decisions based on cost-effectiveness evaluations of health care technologies depend upon the cost-effectiveness threshold and its rate of growth as well as some social rate of time preference for health. The concept of the cost-effectiveness threshold, social rate of time preference for consumption and social opportunity cost of capital are briefly explored before the question of how a social rate of time preference for health might be established is addressed. A more traditional approach to this problem is outlined before a social decision making approach is developed which demonstrates that social time preference for health is revealed through the budget allocations made by a socially legitimate higher authority. The relationship between the social time preference rate for health, the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold and the rate at which the higher authority can borrow or invest is then examined. We establish that the social time preference rate for health is implied by the budget allocation and the health production functions in each period. As such, the social time preference rate for health depends not on the social time preference rate for consumption or growth in the consumption value of health but on growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold and the rate at which the higher authority can save or borrow between periods. The implications for discounting and the policies of bodies such as NICE are then discussed.

JEL Classification: I18, H43

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Introduction

Economic evaluation of health technologies, specifically cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), is commonly seen as a means of satisfying an explicit social objective subject to an exogenous budget constraint (Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al., 2005). Within this ‘social decision making perspective’, CEA cannot be used to make claims about social welfare or the optimality or otherwise of the budget for health care; its role is more modest, claiming to inform social decisions within the health care sector rather than prescribing social choice in general. It is this role that CEA has tended to play in policy and it fits well with the view (Claxton et al., 2007; Claxton et al., forthcoming) that decision making bodies such as NICE in the UK can be seen as the agent of a socially legitimate higher authority which is unable to express an explicit, complete and coherent social welfare function. These circumstances can be regarded as a hierarchy (Mookherjee, 2006) where the agent (NICE) acts as a delegated authority but one that cannot be asked to improve social welfare, since it cannot be specified by the principal. Rather, the principal allocates resources and gives the agent a responsibility to pursue explicit and specific objectives (such as maximising the present value of health). The implications of this process reveal a partial but socially legitimate expression of some unknown underlying latent social welfare function. For example, the budget allocated by the higher authority implies a particular cost-effectiveness threshold which is a revealed expression of how much society wishes to pay for improvements in health generated by collectively funded health care.

In these circumstances, appropriate decisions made by the agent based on cost-effectiveness evaluations of health care technologies depend upon the cost-effectiveness threshold, $k_t$, in each period $t$, the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold, $g_k$, (such that $k_{t+1} = k_t \times (1 + g_k)$), and some social rate of time preference for health, $r_h$ (Claxton et al., in submission). For a technology with costs and effects in two time periods, a decision rule expressed in terms of discounted net health benefit is to accept the technology if:

$$\Delta h_t + \frac{\Delta h_2}{(1 + r_h)} > \frac{\Delta c_1}{k_1} + \frac{\Delta c_2}{(1 + r_h) k_2},$$

(1)

where $\Delta h_t$ and $\Delta c_t$ represent the incremental health effects and incremental costs in period $t$ of accepting the technology, both discounted at a common rate of $r_h$. Alternatively, the decision rule can be rearranged and expressed as a comparison of the technology’s incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) to the current period cost-effectiveness threshold, $k_1$. The technology should be accepted if (see Claxton et al., in submission)$^2$:

$$\frac{\Delta c_1}{(1 + r_h + g_k)} < \frac{\Delta c_2}{(1 + r_k + g_k)} \times k_1.$$

(2)

The discount rate applied to $\Delta h_t$ remains:

$$d_h = r_h,$$

(3)

---

$^1$ Such decisions also necessarily assume divisibility and constant returns (Birch and Gafni, 1993).

$^2$ It is plausible to assume that $r_h$ and $g_k$ are small so that: $(1 + g_k)(1 + r_h) = (1 + r_h + g_k + r_h g_k) \approx (1 + r_h + g_k)$
but the discount rate applied to $\Delta c_i$ becomes:

$$d_c \approx r_h + g_k,$$

because some adjustment of the discount rate is needed to reflect any growth in $k_i$, e.g. if $g_k > 0$ (or $g_k < 0$) then future costs are less (more) important because they displace less (more) health and this can be reflected in a higher (lower) discount rate. Therefore, a common discount rate of $r_h$ is required if the cost-effectiveness threshold is believed to be constant over the period where costs differ. However, if $g_k \neq 0$ and decisions are based on an ICER decision rule, differential discounting of costs and health effects is required (Claxton et al., in submission).

Irrespective of whether the decision maker adopts a decision rule based on ICERs or on discounted net health benefit, appropriate estimates of $\Delta h_i$, $\Delta c_i$, $r_h$ and $k_i$ are required to ensure that decisions are made in line with objective delegated to the agent by the higher authority (which for the purposes of this paper is taken to be to maximise the present value of health). While the modelling of health care technologies to obtain estimates of $\Delta h_i$ and $\Delta c_i$ is now well-established, there is far less understanding of: i) what the cost-effectiveness threshold, $k_i$, represents and how this threshold might change over time; ii) what rate of time preference for health, $r_h$, ought to be used by the agent in making decisions within the health sector; iii) how $r_h$ might be related to the budget allocations made by the higher authority and the resulting values of $k_i$; and iv) how $r_h$ is related to the social rate of time preference for consumption, $r_c$, and the social opportunity cost of capital, $c_r$.

This paper is presented as follows. The concepts of the cost-effectiveness threshold, social rate of time preference for consumption and social opportunity cost of capital are briefly explored before a discussion of how a rate of time preference for health might be established. A more traditional approach to this problem is outlined before a social decision making approach is developed which demonstrates that social time preference for health is revealed through the budget allocations made by a socially legitimate higher authority. The relationships between $r_h$, $k_i$, $g_k$ and $r_c$ or $r_c$ are then examined. The implications for discounting and the policies of bodies such as NICE are then discussed.

The cost-effectiveness threshold

The cost effectiveness threshold represents an estimate of health forgone as other health care activities are displaced within a budget constrained health care system to accommodate any additional costs of a technology approved by the agent (McCabe et al., 2008). A national body, such as NICE, needs an estimate of what is expected to be forgone across the health care system in each period. This will change as circumstances are expected to change, tending to rise with increases in budget and health care costs but tending to fall with increases in productivity (Culyer et al., 2007).

In each period the state of technology and the efficiency of the health care system as well as the prevailing prices of inputs can be regarded as fixed. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that health output, $H_i$, is a positive function of the health system budget in that period, $B_i$, and that this function is concave so that incremental increases in the budget result in diminishing marginal increases in health output:

$$H_i = F_i(B_i), \text{ where } \frac{dF_i(B_i)}{dB_i} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{d^2F_i(B_i)}{dB_i^2} < 0.$$
This relationship between budget and health output in two periods is illustrated in Figure 1. The threshold, $k_t$, is the reciprocal of the slope at the point on the production function corresponding to the budget. Since the slope of the production function represents the ‘shadow price’ of the budget (health gained for a marginal increase in budget), the threshold is the reciprocal of this shadow price. In period $t$ the prices of inputs and technology are fixed so $k_t$ will unambiguously increase with the budget, i.e. $k_t$ is greater at $B^2$ than at $B^1$. However, whether or not $k_t$ increases over time will depend on changes in prices, technology as well as the budget. In Figure 1, $H_{t+1} = F_{t+1}(B_{t+1})$ is drawn to represent a health care system that is more productive in the next period, possibly due to innovation in health technology and medicine, greater efficiency in the delivery of health care services and/or a fall in the prices of particular inputs, e.g. due to the entry of generic drugs. In these circumstances, with a constant budget of $B^2$, the threshold will fall ($k_{t+1} < k_t$). As such, the threshold will not necessarily grow with increases in the budget and only if the effect of budget growth is greater than that of improvements in productivity. Figure 1 illustrates this situation where the effect on the threshold of an increase in budget from $B^1$ in $t$ to $B^2$ in $t+1$ more than offsets that of the growth in productivity (so $k_{t+1} > k_t$); nevertheless, $g_k$ is much smaller than if prices and technology had remained unchanged.

In making an assessment of whether $k_t$ is likely to increase with the budget it is also necessary to consider whether the agent has full and equal discretion over all types of health care expenditure. For

$$k_t = \frac{dB_t}{dF_t(B_t)} = \frac{dB_t}{dB_t}.$$

The growth rate of the threshold is given by

$$g_k = \frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} - 1 = \frac{dF_t(B_t)}{dF_{t+1}(B_{t+1})} \frac{dB_{t+1}}{dB_t} - 1.$$
example, if any growth in the overall budget is spent on national initiatives or other activities that cannot or cannot easily be displaced by the agent’s decisions, then any additional costs of approved technologies must be accommodated by displacing other more effective activities elsewhere. If none of the additional budget is spent on activities that can be displaced then the threshold will remain constant (or fall with increased productivity). Therefore, it is growth in expenditure on more ‘discretionary’ parts of the budget and changes in the productivity and input prices of those health care activities which more likely to be displaced which are most relevant.

**The social time preference rate**

The social rate of time preference for consumption, \( r_c \), often referred to simply as the social time preference rate (STPR), represents the proportionate increase in consumption required in period \( t+1 \) for society in period \( t \) to be indifferent between period \( t \) and period \( t+1 \) consumption. It is subject to an extensive literature (Ramsey, 1928; HM Treasury, 2003; Zhuang et al., 2007), and is generally regarded as comprising of three elements: a catastrophic risk premium; a rate of pure time preference; and a third element which accounts for the diminishing marginal utility of future consumption when per capita consumption is expected to increase over time. Therefore, STPR represents social preferences over current and future consumption but the particular value of \( r_c \) is also linked to production possibilities and the observed rates of return to capital.

![Figure 2. Intertemporal choice and production](image)

The social time preference for consumption and the possibilities of transforming current consumption into future consumption through investment returns are simply illustrated over two periods in Figure 2. Social preferences for consumption between the two periods can be described by the dashed indifference curve which represents an intertemporal social welfare function (ISWF). The slope at any point on the ISWF is given by \(-1 + r_c\) and describes the rate at which society is willing to trade current for future consumption. However, which point on the ISWF society will choose to locate depends on the intertemporal production possibilities, i.e. how current consumption can be transformed into future consumption by forgoing current consumption which can be invested at a rate of return to provide future consumption opportunities. These production possibilities are described by
the intertemporal production possibility frontier (IPPF). The shape of the IPPF is determined by the marginal productivity of capital, which in this case exhibits markedly diminishing returns. The slope at any point on the IPPF is given by $-1 + r_s$, where $r_s$ represents the marginal rate of return on capital. In the absence of distortions it also represents the social opportunity cost of capital, i.e. the social value of what is forgone elsewhere by government using capital (borrowing) for other purposes (Pearce and Nash, 1981; Gold et al., 1996).

If society chooses to consume at point $C_t^*, C_{t+1}^*$ this presumably is a point on the highest attainable ISWF which must be tangent to the IPPF. At this point the slope of the ISWF and IPPF are equal and STPR must be equal to the marginal rate of return (so $c_r = r_s$). Therefore, STPR can be estimated directly from the sum of its elements or inferred from observed rates of return (Gold et al., 1996). For example, the UK Treasury has stipulated 3.5 per cent as the “standard real discount rate” for public sector investment appraisal (HM Treasury, 2003) based on the sum of the three elements: a pure time preference rate of 0.5%, a catastrophic risk premium of 1%, and 2% to represent the combined effect of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and the growth in per capita consumption. Alternatively, STPR could be inferred by observing $r_s$, the rate at which the higher authority (government) can save or borrow. If markets are complete and undistorted, and the higher authority that allocates budget is regarded as a safe investment, then $c_r = r_s$, which would be equivalent to the real yield on a bond issued by the higher authority in period $t$ which matures in period $t + 1$. However, where distortions exist, for example uncorrected negative externalities or corporate taxation, then observed market rates will tend to be higher than $r_s$ (Pearce and Nash, 1981). Similarly, where there are effects on future generations capital markets may be incomplete and observed rates will tend to be higher than the social opportunity cost of capital (Dasgupta et al., 1999). For the purposes of the remaining discussion we denote $r_s$ as the rate at which the higher authority that allocates resources is able to borrow or invest and initially assume that markets are complete and undistorted so that $r_s$ also represents the social opportunity cost of capital ($c_r = r_s$).

The rate of time preference for health

A welfarist prescription

Traditionally economic analysis is more ambitious than the social decision making perspective described earlier, claiming to make statements about social welfare and prescribing social choice rather than simply informing decisions made by an agent with devolved and narrowly defined responsibilities (Mishan, 1967; Boadway and Bruce, 1984). This requires a particular view of social welfare, commonly resting on individual preferences revealed through choices that individuals make (especially in markets) or modified by specification of an explicit social welfare function which will have consumption as well as health as its arguments. Since both consumption and health enter the social welfare function it provides a clear link between the social time preference rate for consumption, $c_r$, and the social time preference rate for health, $h_r$ (Gravelle and Smith, 2001).

If consumption and health are either the only social arguments or they are separable from all other arguments of social value then decisions which maximise the consumption value of health will also maximise social welfare (Gravelle et al., 2007). A decision based on net health benefits in (1) can be extended to express the consumption value of net health gains. The technology should be accepted if:

$$v_1 \Delta h_t + \frac{v_2 \Delta h_t}{1 + r_c} > \frac{v_1 \Delta c_i}{k_i} + \frac{v_2 \Delta c_i}{k_2 (1 + r_c)},$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)$$

where the consumption value of health in period $t$ ($v_i$) is the amount of consumption in period $t$ that is equivalent to 1 unit of health in period $t$ and $\Delta h_t$ and $\Delta c_i$ are both discounted at a common rate of $r_c$. 

This can also be expressed as a comparison of the ICER to the current cost effectiveness threshold (Claxton et al., in submission). The technology should be accepted if:

\[
\frac{\Delta c_1 + \Delta c_2}{(1 + r_c + g_k - g_v)} < k_1, \quad (6)
\]

\[
\Delta h_1 + \frac{\Delta h_2}{(1 + r_c - g_v)} < k_1, \quad (6)
\]

where \( g_v \) is the growth rate in \( v_t \) such that \( v_{t+1} = v_t(1 + g_v) \). The discount rate applied to \( \Delta h_t \) becomes:

\[
d_h \approx r_c - g_v, \quad (7)
\]

because some adjustment of the discount rate for health is needed to reflect growth in \( v_t \), e.g. if \( g_v > 0 \) then future health is more valuable in terms of consumption and this can be reflected in a lower discount rate. The discount rate applied to \( \Delta c_t \) becomes:

\[
d_c \approx r_c - g_v + g_k = d_h + g_k, \quad (8)
\]

reflecting both growth in the consumption value of future health forgone and any changes in the rate at which future health will be forgone (\( g_k \)). Therefore, the traditional approach to economic analysis provides a clear prescription for the social rate of time preference for health, and its relationship to the rate of time preference for consumption:

\[
d_h = r_h \approx r_c - g_v. \quad (9)
\]

However, the clear prescription that \( r_h \approx r_c - g_v \) comes at some considerable cost. Firstly, it requires specification of \( v_t \) and \( g_v \). Even if a particular consumption value of health could be agreed, the social welfare function it presupposes is unlikely to be complete and capture everything of social value. Nor is it likely to be carrying some broad consensus or social legitimacy, particularly when considering decisions with direct health impacts. In this case it implies that health and consumption are the only arguments of social value, or that they are separable from other arguments (e.g. education, equity, social solidarity, etc.) in some more complete description of social welfare. Adopting an incomplete description will lead to prescriptions which conflict with other legitimate objectives of social policy and other social arguments which – although difficult to formalise – may be important (e.g. widely held notions of social justice, intertemporal health equity, etc.). For example, observing \( g_v > 0 \) would suggest that greater social weight should be given to health gains for future patients, even though they are expected to enjoy more health, for no other reason than they are expected to have higher incomes and consume more than current patients. This might be regarded as a socially unacceptable conflict with equity concerns and widely held notions that access to health care should not be based on income but on capacity to benefit.

Furthermore, under this prescription, the budget allocation decisions made by a socially legitimate higher authority have no normative significance whatsoever. Indeed, it is \( v_t \) alone which expresses social value. The budget constraint and the implied value of \( k_1 \) is not a legitimate expression of social value. Rather, the higher authority’s budget allocation is simply a nuisance, an inefficiency which prevents the maximisation of (this particular definition of) social welfare - unless by chance

\[\text{Using the plausible assumptions that } r_c, g_v, \text{ and } g_k \text{ are small so that:} \]

\[
(1 + r_c)/(1 + g_v) \approx (1 + r_c - g_v) \text{ and } (1 + r_c)(1 + g_k)/(1 + g_v) \approx (1 + r_c + g_k - g_v) \]
\( \nu_t = k_t \), and the budget is regarded as ‘optimal’ with respect to the presupposed welfare function. In short, it requires the imposition of a particular social welfare function, which will not be universally acceptable or even likely to carry some broad social consensus (Arrow, 1950; Sen, 1970), but nevertheless can stand above legitimate social democratic processes.

**A social decision making approach**

In contrast, the more modest social decision making perspective described earlier regards the value \( \nu_t \) as a revealed partial expression of the value society places on health generated by collectively funded health care. Similarly, a partial but legitimate expression of the social time preference rate for health (generated by collectively funded health care) is also revealed by the allocation of budgets over time. A simple two period model is used to graphically illustrate this in Figure 3. It demonstrates that \( r_s \) is implied by the budget allocation and the health production functions in each period. As such, \( r_s \) depends not on \( r_c \) and \( g_e \), but on growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold, \( g_k \), and the rate at which the higher authority can save or borrow between periods, \( r_s \), which will be equal to \( r_c \) if markets are complete and undistorted.

**Budget allocation**

The higher authority’s choice in allocating total resources between two periods is illustrated in bold in the south west quadrant of Figure 3. The total resources of \( B^* \) available at the start of period \( t \) must be fully allocated between the two periods, so for each possible choice of budget in period \( t \), \( B_t \), there is a unique budget in period \( t+1 \), \( B_{t+1} = (B^* - B_t)(1 + r_c) \). Therefore, the budget constraint depends on the rate of return on those resources saved in period \( t \) to provide budget in \( t+1 \), i.e. \( r_s \) is equal to \( B^* - B^* / B^* \) in Figure 3.

**Production functions for health**

The relationship between budget allocated in each period and health output in each period is represented by the health production functions in the south east and north west quadrants. In each period the state of technology and input prices can be regarded as fixed, however, just as in Figure 1, \( H_{t+1} \) is drawn to represent a health care system that is more productive in the next period, e.g. due to innovation in medicine. \( H_{t+1} \) is also drawn conditional on budget allocated in period \( t \), i.e. health care provided in period \( t \) with costs that fall on \( B_t \) may also generate health improvements in the next period which is reflected in the positive intercept of \( H_{t+1} \). As in Figure 1, the slope of each production function at the corresponding budget represents the shadow price of the budget constraint or the reciprocal of the cost-effectiveness threshold, \( k_i \) or \( k_{i+1} \). Therefore, in making budget allocation choices between periods, the higher authority determines health output in both periods and in turn the respective thresholds.

**Intertemporal health production possibility frontier**

Each unique budget allocation described in the south west quadrant is, through the production functions described in the south east and north west quadrants, associated with a combination of health outputs in each period in the north east quadrant. The combinations of \( H_t \) and \( H_{t+1} \) which result from the possible choices of \( B_t \) and \( B_{t+1} \) describe the intertemporal health production possibilities frontier (IHPPF). The slope of the IHPPF is given by \( \frac{dH_{t+1}}{dH_t} = -(1 + r_s) \), which represents the rate at which current health output can be transformed into future health through
budget reallocation. The health production possibilities are determined by the productivity of the health care system in each period. The choice for the higher authority is where to locate on the IHPPF by allocating health budgets over each period.

![Diagram of IHPPF and budget allocation](image)

**Figure 3. Budget allocation and time preference for health**

**Revealed social time preference for health**

By allocating budget between periods the higher authority in effect chooses a point on the IHPPF. It is reasonable to suppose that this point is regarded as socially preferred to other possible points that could have been chosen by allocating the budget in a different way. Therefore, the slope of the IHPPF at this point not only represents how current health can be transformed into future health but also reveals the rate at which the higher authority is willing to trade current for future health, i.e. an expression of social time preference for health. This expression is only partial in the sense that a complete intertemporal social welfare function cannot be specified and there will be many other arguments of social value at play when budget allocations are made. Therefore, although the dotted line in the north east quadrant suggests an indifference curve with common properties, it remains unknown. The things that can be reasonably known are $B_i$, $B_{i+1}$, the associated estimates of $k_i$ and $k_{i+1}$ and therefore $r_h$ at the chosen point on the IHPPF.

**Deriving $r_h$ from $r_s$ and $g_k$**

The relationship between the revealed social rate of time preference for health, the rate at which the higher authority can borrow and invest and the growth in the cost effectiveness threshold can be
established. For example, consider an increase in the period $t$ budget of $\Delta B_t$. This will result in an increase in health output in period $t$ of $\frac{\Delta B_t}{k_t}$. Given that the total budget for the two periods is constrained, this increase in the period $t$ budget is financed by borrowing against the period $t+1$ budget at an interest rate of $r_s$, resulting in a decrease in the period $t+1$ budget of $\Delta B_{t+1}(1 + r_s)$. This in turn results in a decrease in period $t+1$ health output of $\frac{\Delta B_{t+1}(1 + r_s)}{k_{t+1}}$, which can be discounted to represent the decrease in terms of period $t$ health as $\frac{\Delta B_{t+1}(1 + r_s)}{k_{t+1}(1 + r_h)}$.

For the budgets chosen by the higher authority to be consistent with its objective of maximising the present value of health, there must be no discounted net health benefit to choosing an alternative pair of budgets. Where $\Delta B_t$ is marginal, the resulting increase in period $t$ health output is therefore equivalent to the resulting decrease in period $t+1$ health output represented in terms of period $t$ health:

$$\frac{\Delta B_t}{k_t} = \frac{\Delta B_{t+1}(1 + r_s)}{k_{t+1}(1 + r_h)}.$$  

This rearranges to $\frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} = \frac{1 + r_s}{1 + r_h}$ and, since $\frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} = 1 + g_k$, this rearranges to:

$$r_h = \frac{1 + r_s}{1 + g_k} - 1. \quad (10)$$

Where $r_s$ and $g_k$ are small, this simplifies to:

$$r_h \approx r_s - g_k \quad (11)$$

If markets are undistorted, so $r_s = r_g$, then $r_h \approx r_s - g_k$, which is very similar to the traditional welfarist prescription in (9). The important difference is that it is growth in the social value of health revealed by budget allocation that matters rather than growth in the consumption value of health derived from some external social welfare function.

Thus the higher authority’s rate of time preference for health, $r_h$, may be derived from the interest rate the higher authority faces, $r_s$, and the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold, $g_k$. Since the threshold in each period (and, in turn, the rate of growth of the threshold, $g_k$) is determined by the budgets set by the higher authority, the setting of these budgets implies the higher authority’s preferred value of $r_h$. This derivation of $r_h$ is intuitive. Where $g_k = 0$, $r_h$ is simply the rate at which the higher authority can borrow or save, $r_s$. If $r_s$ increases, it becomes relatively more desirable to decrease $B_t$ and increase $B_{t+1}$ so as to take advantage of the higher interest rate; for a particular set of budgets to remain consistent with the higher authority’s objective therefore requires a higher rate of time preference for health, $r_h$. Meanwhile, any increase in $g_k$ makes it relatively more desirable to increase $B_t$ at the expense of $B_{t+1}$, since relatively less health is forgone due to a marginal decrease in the budget in period $t+1$ (due to the relatively higher threshold) than is gained due to the marginal increase in the budget in period $t$. As such, for a particular set of budgets to remain consistent with the higher authority’s objective requires a lower rate of time preference for health, $r_h$. 
Appropriate discount rates in CEA

The discount rates to apply when cost-effectiveness is expressed as an ICER can be based on information which is already assumed to be available. The discount rate applied to $\Delta h_t$ from (3) becomes:

$$d_h \approx r_\delta - g_k,$$

and the discount rate applied to $\Delta c_t$ from (4) becomes:

$$d_c = r_c.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

It should be noted that where $g_k = 0$, $d_c = d_h$, so differential discounting of costs and health effects is only appropriate when there is expected to be growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold. If the UK Treasury rate of 3.5% is regarded as an appropriate estimate of the STPR and if markets are regarded as complete and undistorted (so $r_c = r_\delta$) then the current NICE policy of discounting costs and health effects at 3.5% will be appropriate if the cost-effectiveness threshold is expected to be constant over the period where there are incremental costs and health benefits associated with the technology in question.

Discussion

A social decision making perspective regards bodies such as NICE as the agents of a socially legitimate higher authority that allocates budget to the health care system. Estimates of $\Delta h_t$, $\Delta c_t$, and $k_t$ are required by the agent to ensure that decisions are made in line with the objective delegated by the higher authority. In addition, an instruction from the higher authority as to the rate at which it can borrow or invest when allocating resources, $r_\delta$, is also needed. However, the social rate of time preference for health is not a choice that the agent can or should make. Rather, just like the cost-effectiveness threshold, it is revealed through budget allocation decisions. Therefore, not only is $k_t$ a revealed (albeit partial) expression of social value, but $r_\delta \approx r_\delta - g_k$ is also a revealed but partial expression of the social rate of time preference for health generated by collectively funded health care. The relationship between $r_\delta$ derived in this way and $r_c$ depends on whether there are no distortions in capital and product markets and on whether the cost-effectiveness threshold is constant. If both these conditions hold then $r_c = r_\delta$, $g_k = 0$ and the current NICE policy of discounting costs and health effects at 3.5% would be correct if the current UK Treasury estimate of the STPR is deemed appropriate. However, there are good reasons to suppose that this rate is too high. Aside from the difficulty of basing STPR on dubious estimates of each of its 3 elements, a real rate of return of 3.5% far exceeds observed marginal rates of return - even before any adjustments are made for distortions (e.g. environmental externalities or intergenerational effects), which would be required to estimate a social opportunity cost of capital. Importantly, from a social decision making perspective, a real rate of 3.5% is far in excess of current real yields on UK government bonds - as of 30 September

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5 Since $r \delta = \frac{1 + r_c}{1 + g_k} - 1$, substituting this into the formula for $d_c$ from Claxton et al. (in submission):

$$d_c = r_\delta + g_k + r_\delta g_k = \left[ \frac{1 + r_c}{1 + g_k} - 1 \right] + g_k + \left[ \frac{1 + r_c}{1 + g_k} - 1 \right] g_k = \left[ \frac{1 + r_c}{1 + g_k} - 1 \right] (1 + g_k) + g_k$$

$$= \left[ \frac{1 + r_c - g_k}{1 + g_k} \right] (1 + g_k) + g_k = 1 + r_c - 1 - g_k + g_k = r_c.$$
2009, real rates of 1.24%, 1.31% and 0.19% are expected at 5, 10 and 20 years respectively (Bank of England, 2009). A lower common rate of discount might therefore be a more appropriate policy for NICE to adopt if the threshold is not expected to grow over relevant time horizons.

If the threshold is expected to grow at the same rate as some consumption value of health based on individual preference or derived from an external social welfare function \( g_k = g_v \) then, whether a welfarist prescription or social decision making perspective is adopted, the same discounting policy should be used as long as \( r_\ell = r_v \). If it is assumed that the higher authority always allocates budget to maximise the welfare function that any chosen definition of \( v_\ell \) presupposes then budgets would necessarily be ‘optimal’ with respect to this definition of social welfare, and \( v_\ell = k_\ell \) and \( g_v = g_k \). However, this assumes that an explicit and complete welfare function can be specified which both describes social choice and how it is mediated through the social democratic process, i.e. precisely what the social decision making approach assumes is not possible. Alternatively, it is possible to simply define \( g_v = g_k \) by assuming that the only expression of the value of health is the cost-effectiveness threshold – but now \( v_\ell \) and \( g_v \) are redundant because it is \( k_\ell \) and \( g_\ell \) that express social value. In these circumstances it is not possible to appeal to evidence of \( g_v > 0 \) based on individual preferences or the analysis of particular welfare functions to justify \( g_k > 0 \). There appear to be only two coherent positions to take: either assume budgets will match a chosen welfare function, in which case evidence of \( v_\ell \) and \( g_v \) from the chosen welfare function would be relevant; or assume that budgets are an expression of some unknown, latent welfare function, in which case it is evidence of \( k_\ell \) and \( g_k \) that is relevant.

Whether or not the threshold has been growing or is expected to grow over relevant time horizons is, in principle at least, an empirical question (Martin et al., 2008). Simply observing real growth in the budget for health care, however, is not sufficient evidence for \( g_k > 0 \). It will also depend on improvements in the productivity of health care and whether any increased expenditure is discretionary and ‘displaceable’ by NICE guidance. Over recent years much of the real budget growth in the UK NHS has been devoted to national initiatives that are not easily displaced, e.g. new contracts for General Practitioners and consultants, national waiting time targets, information technology initiatives, etc. It also includes the guidance issued by NICE itself, which is mandatory. Therefore, any real growth in what remains will have been much more modest and more likely to be offset by growth in the productivity of displaceable activities, e.g. drugs, devices, procedures and other services. Similarly, although there has been a general rise in input prices for the UK NHS, much of this inflation has been driven by staff as well as capital and overhead costs, a great deal of which cannot easily be displaced. What are more relevant are the prices of inputs which could be displaced, an important element of which is drug prices. Although branded drug prices have tended to rise, at the same time there has been generic entry on patent expiry with dramatic reductions in prices (Office of Fair Trading, 2007). As such, it is not self evident that the threshold has grown over recent years, despite real increases in the budget for health care; in any case, growth in the threshold seems much less likely in the future with the prospect of reduced budget growth, increased pressures to improve productivity and downward pressure on input prices.

Under a social decision making perspective, the allocation of budget illustrated in Figure 3 is not, and cannot, be assumed to be ‘optimal’. To make claims about the optimality or otherwise of budgets poses the question: ‘optimal’ with respect to what? The ‘what’ can only be some complete (or at least separable) description of social welfare. However, the premise of a social decision making perspective is that a complete, explicit and legitimate expression of social welfare is not possible. If that premise is acceptable (it quite reasonably may not be) then all else seems to follow. All that can be said is that the budgets are allocated by a legitimate social process which is tasked with balancing ever-changing competing and contradictory claims on resources and conflicting social objectives. Therefore, the budgets allocated by this process, including allocations between sectors other than health, will not generally appear ‘optimal’ when compared with any specific social welfare function that might be specified. The implications within the health sector (the thresholds and the implied social rate of time preference for health) are revealed and legitimate, but can only be regarded as a partial
expression of social value. In summary, it appears that both the welfarist and social decision making perspectives are internally consistent. What distinguishes them is the assumption - on which discounting and other policy questions turn - of whether a complete, explicit and legitimate expression of social welfare is possible.
References


