THE NON-EVIDENTIAL MEANING OF THE TENA KICHWA ‘DIRECT EVIDENTIAL’

Abstract

Quechuan languages are known to have a three-way evidential distinction between direct, indirect and reported source of information (cf. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004). The Quechuan enclitic =mi has previously been analysed e.g. as marking direct evidence and certainty (Weber 1986; Floyd 1997), or the ‘best possible ground’ for making an assertion (Faller 2002). However, neither of the to-date analyses is adequate for describing the meaning of the enclitic =mi in Tena Kichwa, a Quechuan variety spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In this article, I discuss the properties of the Tena Kichwa =mi, and show that in this variety, the marker is best analysed not as an evidential, but as a marker of epistemic primacy.

1. Introduction

Tena Kichwa (QII1, Quechuan, Ecuador, henceforth TK) is an agglutinative, exclusively suffixing language, spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon by 20 (Lewis 2015) to 40 (Moseley 2010) thousand people. TK has two main grammatical categories: verbs and nominals, each associated with a distinct set of derivational and inflectional markers. The word order tends towards SOV, but can vary due to discourse-related factors – a feature typical for Quechuan varieties (cf. e.g. Muysken 1995) Also alike other Quechuan languages, TK has a set of word-final ‘free enclitics’, which can attach to hosts from all grammatical categories.

Most Quechuan varieties exhibit an evidential distinction between direct, indirect and reported source of information (cf. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004), marked by a subset of ‘free enclitics’ mentioned above. This article focuses on the semantic and pragmatic properties of the TK ‘free enclitic’ =mi. In other Quechuan languages, =mi has been analysed as a ‘direct evidential’ (e.g. Weber 1986; Floyd 1997; Hintz & Hintz 2014) or ‘best possible ground’ marker (Faller 2002) and was also claimed to encode speaker certainty (e.g. Weber 1986; Nuckolls 1993; Floyd 1997). None of these analyses, however, can account for the TK =mi. In this article, I propose that, rather than as a direct evidential, the TK =mi should be analysed as a marker of epistemic primacy (Stivers et al. 2011), encoding the speaker’s subjective perception of their ‘relative right to know’ (Stivers et al. 2011: 13).

The structure of this article is as follows: first, I introduce the notions relevant to the subject matter, discussing the distinctions within the evidential domain and the notion of epistemic primacy. Secondly, I describe the evidential system typical of Quechuan languages and show how the TK system differs from the Quechuan paradigm. Thirdly, I focus on the enclitic =mi.

1 According to the classification put forward by Torero (1964), Quechuan languages can be divided into two subgroups. Quechua I encompasses the varieties spoken in the Peruvian highlands, considered to be ‘the homeland of Proto-Quechua’ (Adelaar with Muysken 2004: 180-1). Quechua II (Torero 1964) includes all the remaining varieties.
I discuss its previous analyses and compare them with the TK data\(^2\), in order to show that it can be adequately analysed as an epistemic primacy marker. I conclude by discussing the implications of such analysis.

2. Evidentiality and epistemic primacy

In this section, I provide some background on the notions which I use in the analysis of TK =\(mi\). Firstly, I discuss the issues pertinent to defining evidentiality. Secondly, I focus on epistemic primacy.

2.1. Evidentiality

This section provides some background on evidentiality as a cross-linguistic grammatical and semantic category. I mention some of the terminological issues that arose in the course of the development of scholarly interest in evidentiality and describe the different semantic distinctions made within taxonomy of evidence types.

2.1.1. ‘Narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of evidentiality

The concept of evidentiality – the linguistic marking of the source of information – as a semantic and grammatical category in its own right originates in the early 20\(^{th}\) century from Franz Boas’ descriptive work on North American indigenous languages (cf. Boas 1911). However, it was over the last three decades that the body of descriptive and typological work on evidentiality has grown significantly (see e.g. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998; Aikhenvald 2004; de Haan 2013 for typological overviews).

Early analyses defined evidential marking as encoding ‘attitudes toward knowledge’ (Chafe & Nichols 1986: vii) or a ‘range of epistemological considerations’ (Chafe 1986). Such understanding is tantamount to the ‘broad’ approach to evidentiality as encoding both the attitude towards, and the source of knowledge (cf. Chafe 1986), which implies intrinsic links between evidentiality and epistemic modality. In the literature on modality contemporary to early work on evidential systems, marking of the source of evidence was considered a subtype of epistemic modality (Palmer 1986; Willett 1988). The assumption that speakers are most committed to the truth of propositions for which they have direct evidence is intuitive, and true for most everyday situations. However, there are cases, such as those of religious beliefs or knowledge acquired from authority, where speaker’s commitment and direct evidence do not go hand in hand (cf. De Haan 1998; Faller 2002; Michael 2008).

The mismatches between commitment to the truth of a proposition and access to direct evidence for it underpin a different tradition of looking at evidentiality, in which the epistemic and the evidential came to be regarded as two distinct types of propositional modality (Palmer 2001; see also Boye 2012 on the category of ‘epistemicity’). Under such view, epistemic modality is related to the speaker’s judgements about the factual status of

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\(^2\) This article is based on data collected during two fieldtrips to the Napo Province, Ecuador in 2013 and 2014. The corpus resulting from the fieldwork amounts to 13h of naturalistic TK discourse, comprising different oral genres, as well as a corpus of over 23h of elicitation data.
propositions. Evidential modality, on the other hand, indicates the evidence speakers have to support their statements (Palmer 2001: 8-9). The distinction between epistemic and evidential yields the ‘narrow’ definition of evidentiality as only marking the source of information, separate from epistemic judgement (Willett 1988: 54; Dendale & Tasmowski 2001: 342-3; Aikhenvald 2004). In this article, I subscribe to this ‘narrow’ view of evidentiality.

2.1.2. Taxonomy of evidence types

The semantic distinctions postulated within the narrowly defined domain of evidentiality are based on cross-linguistic surveys of evidential systems (cf. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004). The taxonomy of source of evidence resulting from these surveys is shown in Figure 1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Visual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auditory</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other sensory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>Hearsay</td>
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<td>Second-hand</td>
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<td>Third-hand</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Folklore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inferred</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Results (inference)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reasoning (conjecture)</td>
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</table>

Figure 1: Taxonomy of sources of evidence

The prediction this particular taxonomy makes about the possible evidential systems is that one marker cannot be used to code types of evidence that belong to different overarching types. For instance, we can expect a marker encompassing inference and reportative evidence, but the taxonomy does not predict a marker encoding both non-visual sensory and reportative evidence.

As mentioned previously, most Quechuan languages make a distinction between direct, inferred (covering both inference and conjecture), and reported source of information. However, the data show that the TK cognates of evidential enclitics do not encode the source of information. They are better analysed as encoding a more subjective notion of epistemic primacy, which I discuss in the next section.

2.2. Epistemic primacy

As shown in the discussion above, the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality has been acknowledged and extensively discussed in the literature. More recent research suggests that both evidentiality and epistemic modality are related to a number of other categories which express meanings related to how both the speaker and the addressee relate to the information expressed by the utterance. These categories include egophoricity (cf. Hargreaves 2005; Dickinson 2016), mirativity (e.g. Dickinson 2000), engagement (e.g.
Evans 2016), construction of mutual knowledge (cf. Hintz & Hintz 2014) and a range of other categories related to the ‘epistemic perspective’ of the speaker and/or the addressee (Bergqvist 2015). The detailed discussion of the categories mentioned above is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that epistemic meanings which are neither evidential nor epistemic modal can be grammatically encoded. In my view, a satisfactory semantic description of the TK ‘evidential’ enclitics requires analysing them as markers of yet another epistemic category, namely, epistemic primacy.

Epistemic primacy has been described as one of the dimensions of knowledge in interaction (cf. Stivers et al. 2011: 13), presented in Figure 2:

(1) **Epistemic access** (knowing vs. not knowing/ types of evidence/ degree of certainty)

(2) **Epistemic primacy** (relative right to know/ claim, authority of knowledge)

(3) **Epistemic responsibility** (obligations/ rights to have information)

Figure 2 Dimensions of knowledge in conversation

The three dimensions listed in Figure 2 correspond to the different ‘levels’ on which knowledge can be grounded in conversation. Evidentiality falls within the dimension of ‘epistemic access’, since it relates to the types of evidence for the proposition conveyed. Epistemic modality also falls within that domain, as related to the degree of certainty.

The domain of epistemic primacy is more subjective than epistemic access. While epistemic access is concerned with the relationship between the proposition and the speaker, epistemic primacy has to do with the distribution of knowledge between participants of the speech event. Epistemic primacy is the asymmetry ‘in the depth, specificity or completeness’ of the speech act participants’ knowledge (Stivers et al. 2011: 13). Consequently, marking of epistemic primacy is grounded in the speaker’s subjective assessment of their knowledge state, rather than in how the speaker obtained the information. While epistemic primacy often arises as a result of having direct/best possible evidence for the information in question or being certain that the proposition is true, it needs not be grounded in those parameters.

The third domain – epistemic responsibility – is related to the information that the speaker has an obligation or a right to know. For instance, it is expected of everyone to know their own name. On the other hand, there is information about other people, their internal states and experiences or private affairs, about which their interlocutors do not have a responsibility, or even right, to have information. This last domain is akin to Kamio’s (1997) ‘Territory of Information’ (henceforth ToI). The types of information which fall within one’s default ToI are (i) internal direct experience, (ii) information within one’s professional expertise, (iii) information obtained through external direct experience including verbal reports, and considered reliable, (iv) information about persons, object, events and facts in one’s close environment, (v) information about oneself (Kamio 1997: 18). One has right to all the information listed above, but also a responsibility to be familiar with them. Other types of information can also become part of one’s ToI when they (Kamio 1997: 11-2), that is, integrated into one’s system of knowledge and beliefs. The pace at which this happens might
depend on the type of information – more personal information tends to be absorbed sooner. Faller (2002) describes a similar process as relevant to the integration of information into the Best Possible Ground in Cuzco Quechua. I discuss this concept in more detail in Section 3.1. Although this has not been discussed by the authors (cf. Stivers et al.), the domains of epistemic primacy and epistemic responsibility correlate with one another. It should be expected that if the speaker has epistemic primacy over some information, she also has an obligation, or right, to know.

It is also important to notice that different types of clauses index different speech participants as sources of information (Bruil 2014: 44) - and therefore also as default candidates for holding epistemic primacy. In declarative clauses, the source of information corresponds to the speaker, and in interrogatives – to the hearer. Given that evidentiality and related categories can anchor to different speech participants in different types of clauses, rather using the term ‘speaker’, descriptions of epistemic systems should be referring to ‘origo’: “the person from whose perspective a given evidential is evaluated” (Garrett 2001: 15). In order to apply the term to other epistemic marking systems, this definition is broadened to designate “the person from whose perspective a given expression is evaluated” (cf. Bühler 1990; Mushin 2001). The process whereby the origo anchors to different participants in different clause types is referred to in the literature as ‘origo shift’ (cf. Garrett 2001; Peterson 2010).

Also importantly from the point of view of this article, declaratives and interrogatives differ from the imperatives in the type of ‘conversational update’ they provide. In Gricean pragmatics, the mismatch between declaratives and interrogatives on the one hand, and imperatives on the other is analysed in terms of differing ‘direction of fit’ between the words and the world (Searle 1976). In case of declarative and interrogatives, the direction of fit is from the words to the world – declarative and interrogative utterances need to match an independently existing state of affairs. In case of imperatives, the direction of fit is the opposite – from words to world – since the utterance of an imperative sentence is an attempt to influence a state of affair existing in the text-external world.

These opposing directions of fit are associated with different types of origo authority over the information. In case of declaratives and interrogative clauses, the authority of the origo is epistemic – related to ‘knowing how the world is’, and indexed to the speaker and the addressee, respectively. In imperatives, the origo is the speaker and the type of authority she holds is deontic – associated with determining ‘how the world ought to be’ (Stevanovic & Peräkylä 2012: 298). Consequently, the notion of epistemic primacy/authority is only compatible with declarative and interrogative clauses.

3. Evidentiality in Quechuan languages

In this section, I provide a brief overview of evidential systems in Quechuan languages, and discusses the previous analyses of the enclitic =mi. I also introduce the Tena Kichwa set of ‘evidential’ enclitics, with a view to providing a background for the ensuing discussion of the TK enclitic =mi.
3.1. The Quechuan evidential paradigm

Most of the described Quechuan varieties make a three-way evidential distinction between direct, inferential/conjectural and reported information source. These distinctions are marked by means of ‘independent enclitics’ which can attach to hosts from different grammatical categories. The three-member evidential paradigm is illustrated below with examples from Cuzco Quechua, adapted from Faller (2002: 122):

(1) Direct/best possible ground =mi
Para-sha-n=mi.
rain-PROG-3=mi
It is raining. [speaker sees that it is raining]

(2) Conjectural =chá
Para-sha-n=chá.
rain-prog-3=chá
It is raining. [speaker conjectures that it is raining]

(3) Reportative =si
Para-sha-n=si.
rain-PROG-3 =si
It is raining. [speaker was told that it is raining]

The enclitic =mi was analysed by Faller (2002) as the marker of ‘best possible ground’ for making an assertion. The ‘best possible ground’ corresponds to direct evidence if the information in question belongs to the speaker’s own life experience. However, in case of encyclopaedic knowledge, which tends to be learnt from authority rather than through direct experience, the ‘best possible ground’ can correspond to reportative evidence.

In most Quechuan varieties, the cognates of =chá are analysed as marking both inference and conjecture. However, in CQ the evidential meaning of =chá indicates that the speaker ‘bases his or her statement on a mental process’ (Faller 2002: 176). If the statement is based on partial direct evidence, the dubitative marker -chus hina is preferred (Faller 2006):

(4) Context: Marya looks very pale.
   a. ?Unqu-sqa-chá ka-sha-n-man
      sick-PRT-CONJ be-PROG-3-COND
      She may be sick.
   b. Unqu-sqa-chus hina ka-sha-n-man
      sick-PRT-RES be-PROG-3-COND
      She appears to be sick.

Faller 2007: 4
The marker -chus hina/chu shina means roughly ‘I guess’, ‘I think’, ‘apparently’ (Faller 2006: 3). Its distribution and translation suggest that it might function in similar contexts as the the =mi yachin (=mi seem-3SG) construction in TK, which I discuss in Section 4.3.2.

Although most Quechuan varieties described to date have three evidential enclitics, there are also exceptions to this rule. In TK, as well as Imbabura Quechua (QII, Cole 1982), the reportative marker is not attested. On the other end of the spectrum, South Conchucos Quechua (QI) is reported to have five evidential markers (Hintz 2012; Hintz & Hintz 2014), while Sihuas Quechua (QI, Hintz & Hintz 2014) and Huamalíes Quechua (QI, Howard 2012) have six.

Prior to the evidential analysis, the markers in question were interpreted e.g. as ‘comment of clause’ (Parker 1969) or ‘validational’: indicating the speaker’s epistemic judgement about the conveyed information (Adelaar 1977; Cole 1982; Lefebvre & Muysken 1988). Since Weber’s (1986) study of the enclitics’ function in Huánuco Quechua (QI), they have predominantly been analysed as evidentials (e.g. Weber 1986; Floyd 1997; Faller 2002; Hintz 2012; Howard 2012). Nonetheless, in many Quechuan varieties, the ‘evidential’ markers do not fit in with the ‘narrow’ definition of evidentiality as only marking the source of information. The enclitics in question have been interpreted as indicating the speaker’s source of information as well as: epistemic judgement (e.g. Weber 1986; Nuckolls 1993; Floyd 1997; Adelaar 1997), illocutionary force (Faller 2002; Nuckolls 2012), speaker subjectivity (Howard 2012; Nuckolls 2012), or distinction between individual and shared knowledge (Hintz 2012; Howard 2012; Hintz & Hintz 2014). I come back to this issue in Section 5, where I discuss the proposed analysis of the TK =mi against the background of meanings encoded by evidential enclitics in other Quechuan varieties.

### 3.2. The ‘evidential’ enclitics in Tena Kichwa

As mentioned above, the TK ‘evidential’ markers comprise the ‘direct’ =mi and ‘indirect’ =cha, while the reportative enclitic is not attested. Hearsay/reportative information is introduced by a periphrastic construction combining =mi with the verb of speech (ni-):

```plaintext
(5) rima -wa -n Saida ungu -shka =mi siri -k ni -sha
say -1OBJ -3 NAME fall.ill -ANT =mi stay-AG.NMLZ say -SS
[They] tell me Saida is ill.
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In (5), the =mi-marked complement clause is embedded under the main verb rima- (‘talk’). The speech complement is introduced by the complementiser nisha (‘say-SS’). This reportative construction is akin to that attested in Imbabura Quechua (Cole 1982), spoken in the Ecuadorian Highlands. The detailed discussion of the occurrences of =mi in embedded speech complements is beyond the scope of this article. However, the data suggests that such constructions can be analysed as containing an assertion made by the subject of the matrix clause, and presented, rather than asserted by the speaker in the utterances context (cf. Hooper & Thompson 1973; Krifka 2014; Faller 2014).
The distribution of the ‘evidential’ markers =mi and =cha in the TK data shows no correlation between their presence and a particular source of evidence for the proposition they mark. The marker =mi can occur in utterances based on different types of evidence:

(6) Direct evidence
tamya -w =mi
rain -PROG =mi
*It is raining* [speaker sees that it’s raining].

(7) Inference
tuta tamya -shka =mi (yachi -n )
night rain -ANT =mi (seem -3SG)
*It seems it rained tonight.* [speaker woke up in the morning to see the ground is wet]

(8) Conjecture
ñuka yaya shamu -w =mi (yachi -n )
1SG father come -PROG=mi (seem -3SG)
*It seems my father is coming.* [speaker hears footsteps outside, and was expecting his father to come home]

Example (6) is in line with the use of =mi in other Quechuan varieties, where the marker indicates that the speaker has direct, visual evidence. The use of =mi in the reportative construction in (5) could also be accounted for in evidential terms (cf. Faller 2002; 2014). The examples that put the best possible ground/direct evidential analysis of =mi into question are (7) and (8), where =mi marks statements based on inferential and conjectural evidence.

If the distribution of =mi and =cha in TK was similar to that in other varieties, we would expect that at least a conjectural statement could be marked with =cha. However, such an utterance is not felicitous in TK:

(9)

a. #tamia-w-n=dza
   rain-PROG-3SG=cha
   Intended meaning: *It is raining, it must be raining.*
   [speaker hears noise on the roof, it sounds like rain]

b. tamia-w-n=dza?
   rain -PROG-3SG=cha
   *Is it raining?*
My consultants pointed out that while (9a) is grammatical, it is not felicitous as an assertive utterance. They observed, however, that a =cha-marked utterance is felicitous in the same discourse context as a question or request for information, given in (9b). Compare (9) with the inferential statement in (7) above, and with analogous examples from Cuzco Quechua, cited in (10):

(10)  
   a. Para-sha-n- chá.  
      rain-PROG-3-CONJ  
      It is raining.  
      [It’s been raining the last few days, so speaker conjectures that it is/might be raining now.]  
      Faller 2007: 5  

   b. Para-sha-n- chus hina.  
      rain-PROG-3-DUB  
      I think/guess it is raining.  
      [Speaker hear something that sounds like rainfall on the roof, but is not entirely sure that it is rain.]  
      Faller 2006: 3  

Utterance in (10a) is based on conjecture, and (10b) on inference/partial evidence. In TK, the utterance of (7) would be appropriate in both contexts. The =cha-marked utterance, as shown in (9), is only felicitous in this context as a request for information/confirmation. The meaning of the TK =cha will not be discussed further here, but the data presented above already suggest that it does not lend itself to the conjectural/inferential evidential analysis proposed for its cognates in other Quechuan varieties.

Let us now come back to the inferential and conjectural clauses in (7) and (8) above. As far as I am aware, the use of =mi in statements based on reasoning, or embedding =mi-marked clauses under an epistemic modal such as yachin (‘seem-3SG’) has not been attested in other Quechuan varieties. These examples also contradict the interpretation of =mi as a direct evidence marker or best possible ground (BPG) marker (cf. Faller 2002). The direct evidential analysis does not apply, since it was shown in the examples above that =mi can occur in utterances covering direct, indirect and reportative evidence. The marker also cannot be analysed as indicating BPG, since such an analysis would require that the speaker believes to have the BPG for making a statement, which is clearly not the case if she chooses to use =mi with the modal yachin (‘seem-3SG’) as in (7) and (8) above. However, if =mi is analysed as marker of epistemic primacy – ‘the relative right to know or claim’ (Stivers et al. 2011: 13) – it can be reconciled with embedding under yachin.

In the discussion above, I have shown that the TK marker =mi can occur on statements covering different sources of evidence, which suggests it is not best analysed as an evidential marker. In Section 4, I develop an account of the meaning of =mi in TK and show that the distributions of the marker can be accounted for if it is analysed as encoding the origo’s epistemic primacy.
4. The TK enclitic =mi

In the preceding section, I have shown that the ‘direct evidential’ analysis cannot be sustained for the TK =mi. Nonetheless, despite semantic differences, in discourse, the TK =mi in patterns similarly to its cognates from other varieties. The marker is not grammatically obligatory in any context in which it occurs, but it is required for the felicity of certain speech acts. In this section, I first discuss the analyses of =mi in other varieties. Secondly, I analyse the type of contribution the TK =mi makes to the utterance, and develop and account of the enclitic as a marker of epistemic primacy.

4.1. Previous analyses of =mi

The objective of this section is to provide context for the discussion of the TK =mi, and to show how its distribution and semantics differs from that of its cognates. For reasons of space, the discussion is limited to the most widely accepted analyses of the enclitic.

Weber (1986) analyses the Huánuco Quechua (QI) =mi in as encoding the evidential meaning of ‘learnt by direct experience’. He claims that =mi can give rise to the implicature of certainty due to the Quechua cultural axiom whereby ‘(only) one’s own experience is reliable’ (Weber 1986: 138). For Wanka Quechua (QI), Floyd (1997) sees the direct evidential meaning of =mi as but one of the instantiations of its wider, validational meaning. Under his prototype-theoretical analysis, the meaning of =mi as marking direct experience is a prototype within a primarily validational schema. That is, certainty is the most abstract, schematic meaning of =mi, which plays a role in all its uses, including the most common, prototypical one: marking of direct evidence. Floyd, alike Weber (1986) sees the prototypical meaning of =mi as derived from the fact that certainty is most often based on direct evidence.

Faller (2002: chap. 4) points out that although such an axiom is intuitively correct, there are situations, such as mistaken perceptions, which call it into question. She also points out that =mi is often used to mark propositions which could not have been directly experienced by the speakers, such as future events, or internal states of others. Consequently, she develops the account of =mi as encoding the ‘best possible ground’ (henceforth BPG), for making an assertion, briefly discussed above. The BPG corresponds to different types of evidence depending on whether the information comes from the origo’s personal experience or forms part of general world knowledge. According to Faller, =mi is an illocutionary modifier affecting the sincerity conditions of the utterance. As such, it cannot be used if the speaker does not believe to have the BPG for his statement (cf. Faller 2002). In the sections that follow, I show that the analyses discussed above are only partially applicable to the enclitic =mi in TK.

4.2. =mi and the proposition expressed

According to previous studies, the meaning of the Quechua =mi is of the non-truth-conditional type. Although only Faller (2002) states this explicitly, analysing =mi as an illocutionary operator modifying the truth conditions of an utterance, other analyses of =mi mentioned in the previous section (cf. Weber 1986; Floyd 1997) also assume its non-truth-conditional meaning, although without explicit discussion.

In the literature a test are standardly used to determine the type of meaning the marker/lexical item makes to an utterance is the challengeability/assent-dissent test (Faller 2002: sec. 3.5.3;
It is based on the assumption that only the meaning of a truth-conditional element can be ‘questioned, doubted, rejected or (dis)agreed with’ (Faller 2002: 110). In order to check whether the TK =mi is challengeable, I use examples analogous to those proposed by Faller for Cuzco Quechua (2002: 157-8). Consider:

(11)

ñuka  yaya  shamu-w=mi
1SG  father  come-PROG=mi

*My father is coming.*

If, as I hypothesised above, =mi is the marker of epistemic primacy, (11) could be challenged by a statement along the lines of (12):

(12)

Mana!  #Kan  mana  yacha-ngui=chu  chi-ta=ga  !
NEG  2SG  NEG  know-2=Q/NEG  D.DEM-ACC=TOP

*No! you don’t know that!*

Speakers find (12) infelicitous as a response to (11), which supports the claim that the semantic contribution of =mi to the clause cannot be challenged. A felicitous response is exemplified below:

(13)

Mana!  Shuj=mi  a-n.
NEG  one=mi  COP-3

*No, it’s someone else!*

Utterance (13) relates to the event of the father coming, rather than to the speaker’s epistemic authority. The fact that (13), but not (12), is considered felicitous in this discourse context, supports the non-truth conditional analysis of the TK =mi. While further tests should be conducted to corroborate this conclusion, the results of the challengeability test indicate that the TK =mi can be analysed as a non-truth conditional.

Faller (2002) has initially analysed the Cuzco Quechua =mi as an illocutionary modifier of sincerity conditions, basing this analysis on the fact that the enclitic was not embeddable, and scoped over propositional operators. More recent research has shown that illocutionary elements can also be embedded (e.g. Krifka 2014; Woods 2016), and in her more recent work Faller has also reconciled the fact that the CQ evidentials can embed in finite complement clauses with their analysis as illocutionary markers (Faller 2014).

The examples in the previous sections have already shown that the TK =mi can embed under verbs of speech, as in example (5), and under the epistemic modal *yachin* (‘seem-3SG’), as in (7) and (8). As in case of CQ, the fact that the enclitic is embeddable does not necessarily contradict its illocutionary analysis.

Another scope property which the TK =mi shares with its cognates is that it can occur in declarative and interrogative clauses, but is ungrammatical in imperative clauses. Consider:
(14)
a. miku-y!
eat-2IMP
Eat!

b. *miku-y=mi!
eat-2IMP=mi

The ungrammaticality of (14b) is to be expected if =mi is analysed as a modifier of epistemic authority. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the authority held by the origo in imperative clauses is deontic, rather than epistemic. Hence, it is not surprising that imperative marking should be incompatible with epistemic authority modifiers. The fact that =mi is ungrammatical in imperative clauses also does not contradict its illocutionary analysis, since it is possible for illocutionary discourse markers to only be compatible with certain clause types (cf. Coniglio & Zegrean 2012). Therefore, the examples above show that alike its cognates from other Quechuan varieties, the TK =mi is non-truth conditional, and that it could be analysed as an illocutionary modifier. In the following section, I discuss the occurrence of =mi in declarative and interrogative clauses.

4.3. The semantics of =mi: claiming epistemic primacy

In this section, I focus on the semantics of the TK =mi, showing that it can be analysed as a marker of the origo’s epistemic primacy. I discuss the distribution and meaning of =mi in main clause and in certain embedded contexts.

4.3.1. =mi in main clauses

It was shown in the discussion above that having direct evidence/best possible ground is not a necessary condition for the use of =mi in TK, which suggests that the enclitic does not encode an evidential meaning. Below, I support that observation with more examples:

(15)
Chi rumira paynami churasha
chi rumi -ta payguna =mi chura -sha
D.DEM stone -ACC 3PL =mi put -SS
chapanushka chibi...
chapa -nu -shka chi -pi
wait -3PL.SUBJ -ANT D.DEM -LOC

They have put this stone...they've waited having put it there...

Example (15) comes from a conversation about the Pear Story (Chafe 1980). The speaker comments on the stone on the road, claiming that the three boys who appeared in the video
put it there. This is a conjecture, since no such thing was shown in the film. Consequently, in other varieties of Quechua, (15) would not have been marked with =mi. However, the speaker believes that he has just realised something about the story that might not be apparent to his interlocutor, and he uses =mi to index epistemic primacy.

Similar examples come from a staged conversation about the results of Three Shell Games. As part of an elicitation session, two consultants watched video recordings of six games. First, they saw each game without the finale, and were asked to guess where the seed was. Then, they watched the same trick until the end, when the final location of the seed was revealed. Statements based on guesswork and conjecture are marked by indirect evidentials in other varieties and therefore I was expecting the speakers to use =cha. However, =cha did not occur at all in the 10-minute recording (113 turns). Instead, the speakers’ guesses were mostly marked with =mi:

(16)
lluki  puramami  rin,  llukipurama
lluki  pura -ma =mi  ri -n  lluki  -pura -ma
left  side -DAT=mi  go -3SG  left  -side -DAT
[the steed] goes to the left, to the left...

(17)
muyuwa  ajga  chi  puramami  sakirin
muyu-wa  a -k =ga  chi  pura -ma =mi  saki-ri  -n
seed -INS  be-AG.NMLZ =TOP  D.DEM  side -DAT=mi  let -ANTIC-3SG
the seed, the [one] that has the seed stays on this side

In both examples given above, the speakers have good grounds to think they perception could be mistaken; they have already watched several tricks and never guessed correctly. Their use of =mi goes against the analysis of the enclitic as marking best possible ground, since the speaker needs to believe having the BPG to use =mi (Faller 2002: ch.4). However, if =mi is analysed as a marker of epistemic authority, by using it each speaker makes a claims as to the ‘depth, specificity or completeness of their knowledge’, which does not have to be based on direct evidence. By using the enclitic, the speaker is trying to convince the interlocutor that his insight is privileged and grants him the ‘primary right’ to assess the situation in the video (cf. Stivers et al. 2011: 13)

The uses of =mi prototypical for other varieties, where the origo does have the BPG for making an assertion, are also accounted for if =mi is analysed as a marker of epistemic authority. Both BPG and epistemic authority can be claimed with respect to information integrated in one’s system of beliefs, coming from direct experience, or learnt from authority (Faller 2002: chap. 4). In TK, =mi also occurs in these cases:

(18)
Chi-raygu  kuna-gama  wayusa  upi-shka  tuku-shka
D.DEM-CAUSAL  now-LAT  guayusa  drink-ANT  become-ANT
Because of this until now the drinking of the guayusa has been known (practiced) by all, guayusa is very good.

In (18), a community elder talks about the custom of drinking guayusa. In the =mi-marked statement, the speaker invokes cultural knowledge about guayusa, alongside his personal experience.

In declarative clauses, origo corresponds to the speaker. Therefore, evidential/epistemic markers are ‘anchored’ to the speaker and represent her point of view (cf. e.g. Bruil 2014; Bergqvist 2015). Consequently, it is to be expected that the marking of epistemic authority is redundant in first person singular subject clauses, where the speaker is entitled to ‘epistemic privilege’ (cf. Dickinson 2016) by virtue of being the primary actor of the situation she narrates. Therefore, marking of origo’s epistemic authority in 1SUBJ clauses should either be ungrammatical or associated with pragmatically marked reading. The second case obtains in TK. Consider:

(19)

pagrachu-ni=mi pay shamu-shka-manda
thank -1SG=mi 3SG come-ANT-ABL
I thank him [the parish’s president] for having come

Example (19) is an excerpt from a political speech – a member of the village government emphatically thanks his superior for attending an event. The enclitic =mi is used to convey greater intentionality than would be expressed by an unmarked assertion, which would also be grammatical in this context. The occurrence of =mi in 1SUBJ clauses is often found in political speeches, presumably to increase the argumentative force of utterances.

Pragmatic effects arise also when =mi is used in 2SUBJ clauses. In TK, 2SUBJ declaratives are generally considered rude. This is possibly due to the mismatch between the origo/speaker and the primary agent, which in 2SUBJ declaratives corresponds to the addressee. In elicitation, my consultants rejected 2SUBJ declaratives and suggested interrogative equivalents instead. While TK speakers reject unmarked ‘out-of-the-blue’ 2SUBJ declaratives, 2SUBJ declaratives with =mi are considered felicitous:

(20)
a. #Juan, pantalon-da liki-ngui / liki-nga ra-w-ngui.
NAME trousers -ACC break-2SG / break-FUT AUX-PROG-2SG
Intended meaning: Juan, you’ll break your trousers.

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3 A traditional Napo Runa infusion made with leaves of Ilex guayusa.
b. Juan pantalon-da liki-shka. 
NAME trousers-ACC break-ANT
Juan has broken his trousers [I just found out]

c. Juan, pantalon-da liki-ngui=mi
P.NAME trousers-ACC break-2SG=mi
Juan, you’ll break your trousers!

Example (20a) was not considered felicitous, and the consultant suggested a 3SUBJ clause in (20b) instead. Example (20c) was judged felicitous, but only in a context of scolding/warning a child. A similar effect, although associated with a different illocutionary force – of encouragement, is shown in (21):

(21)  
A: Mana usha-ni 
NEG can-1SG
I cannot (do this)

B: [kan] ushan-gui=mi
[2SG] can-2SG =mi
[Yes, you] can!

Example (21) comes from a conversation in which I uttered (21A), claiming I would not be able to prepare chicha, to which my friend replied with (21B), encouraging me to try. When I asked another consultant whether (21B) would be felicitous without =mi, it was judged odd and lacking argumentative force.

Pragmatic effects resulting from the co-occurrence of =mi with 2SUBJ are in line with similar phenomena attested in epistemic marking systems in other languages. In Wutun (Sinitic, China), the egophoric marking co-occurring with 2SUBJ results in performatives (Sandman 2016). In Tsafiki (Barbacoan, Ecuador, Dickinson 2016) the egophoric marker -yo co-occurs with 2SUBJ in scolding contexts, similar to (20c) above. As mentioned previously in examples (20) and (21) there is a mismatch between the second person agent, who by default has the primary right to know about their own actions, and the epistemic primacy encoded by =mi, which in declaratives is anchored to the speaker. It is plausible that an increase of illocutionary force of the utterances cited above is due to this discrepancy in epistemic primacy.

The effect of using =mi is different in interrogatives, where, as a result of origo shift, =mi is anchored to the addressee. Consider:

(22)  
A: Kan kulki-ra mana chari-ngui=mi ? 
2SG money-ACC NEG have-2SG=mi

Example (20a) was not considered felicitous, and the consultant suggested a 3SUBJ clause in (20b) instead. Example (20c) was judged felicitous, but only in a context of scolding/warning a child. A similar effect, although associated with a different illocutionary force – of encouragement, is shown in (21):

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The effect of using =mi is different in interrogatives, where, as a result of origo shift, =mi is anchored to the addressee. Consider:

(22)  
A: Kan kulki-ra mana chari-ngui=mi ? 
2SG money-ACC NEG have-2SG=mi
B: Ari, mana chari-ni =chu
yes NEG have-1SG=Q/NEG

A: You don’t have money[. do you]

B: No, I don’t

The exchange in (22) is plausible in a situation where B has previously told A that he didn’t have money. Therefore, A’s utterance could be seen as a confirmation question, following up on what B had said before. In (22A), =mi is anchored to the addressee, who has the epistemic primacy with respect to the information A enquires about. In this respect, the interrogative utterance of (22B), differs from the declarative (21B), where =mi is anchored to the speaker.

The enclitic =mi occurs in interrogatives much less frequently than in declaratives. In his description of Quian (Tibeto-Burman), LaPolla states that evidentials are non-obligatory in interrogatives, unless the speaker makes an assumption about the addressee’s source of information regarding the answer (2003: 73, cited in Bergqvist 2015: 4). Faller (2002) made a similar observation for =mi in Cuzco Quechua. This interpretation could also be paraphrased to apply to TK, where it appears that =mi is only used in interrogatives if the speaker wishes to make an explicit reference to the addressee’s authority to answer the question. In the absence of such reference, the ‘default’ polar interrogative marker =chu is used:

(23)
Kan kullki-ra chari-ngui=chu?
2SG money-ACC have-2SG=Q/NEG
Do you have money?

The difference between (22B) and (23) is that in the former, the speaker is asking for confirmation, while the latter is a request for information. However, =mi can also occur in requests for information. Consider the content question in (24):

(24)
Ima shutimi?
what name=mi
What is her name? [asked to someone who knows the person in question]

Example (24) was uttered by a person who did not know me, when one of my consultants brought me to her house. The use of =mi-marked utterance in this context can be interpreted as the speaker recognising the addressee’s epistemic primacy with respect to information about the newcomer. Nonetheless, the discourse contexts in which speakers decide to use =mi in interrogatives require further investigation.

4.3.2. =mi in embedded clauses

In Section 3.2, I have shown examples of =mi embedding under the verb of speech, and under the non-factive verb yachin (‘seem-3SG’). In this section, for the reasons of space, I
limit the discussion of =mi in embedding contexts to its occurrences in the scope of the epistemic modal. Consider:

(25) [ñuka yaya shamu-w =mi ]CP yachi -n
1SG father come -PROG=mi seem -3

It seems my father is coming.

[speaker hears footsteps outside, and was expecting his father to come home]

(26) Wa.... [urmashkanimi ]CP yachin....
wa urma -shka -ni=mi yachi -n
oh fall -ANT -1=mi seem -3

Oh, I seems I have fallen [while drunk]

The consultants most often translate yachin into Spanish with constructions involving non-factive verbs: ‘it seems’ or ‘I believe’. In other dialects of Quechua, the above utterances would not occur with =mi. In (25) the speaker bases his claim on incomplete evidence, and therefore the indirect evidential or – in Cuzco Quechua – the marker -chus hina would be appropriate in this context. Example (26) is uttered in a context where the speaker is not fully aware of his actions. Aikhenvald reports that in such cases, evidential languages often recur to the use of indirect/non-visual evidentiality (2004: chap. 7). This is also the case for several Quechan varieties (cf. Weber 1986: 139; Faller 2002: 190), where reportative marker is used to mark the speaker’s unawareness of her own actions. In TK, either =mi + yachin or just yachin occurs in those contexts.4

The above shows that the embedding of =mi under yachin is not compatible with analysing the enclitic as marker of certainty, direct evidence, or BPG. As mentioned previously, the speaker needs to believe in having the BPG to use the enclitic encoding it and such belief is not compatible with embedding under a weak epistemic modal. However, if =mi is analysed as marker of epistemic authority – ‘the relative right to know or claim’ – it can be reconciled with embedding under yachin.

As mentioned in the previous discussion, epistemic primacy and epistemic certainty belong to different dimensions of knowledge. Therefore, cases where the speaker has epistemic primacy over the information, but is not willing to assert it with certainty, though marginal, are logically possible. In (25) and (26) above the main point of both utterances is the embedded proposition (cf. Papafragou 2006; Krifka 2014), with respect to which the speaker claims epistemic authority. Embedding the proposition under a subjective epistemic modal (Papafragou 2006) indicates the speaker’s reduced commitment (Krifka 2014:14). However, it does not affect the speaker’s epistemic primacy.

Utterance (26) was made in context where the speaker is not fully aware of his actions, although, by virtue of being the actor, he does have epistemic authority over them. Example

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4 In the 11-hour corpus of naturalistic discourse, 40 tokens of yachin, 25% (n=10) with =mi-marked complements.
can also be explained in this manner – the speaker does have the epistemic authority to talk about his father and his comings and goings, since the father’s habits fall within the
speakers ‘territory of information’. However, the speaker is not certain whether it is indeed his father coming. Therefore, the embedding of =mi-marked claims under yachin could be
seen as a strategy of ‘epistemic downgrading’ (Kärkkäinen 2003; Heritage & Raymond 2005;
Stivers et al. 2011).

5. Summary and conclusions

In this article, I have argued that in TK, the enclitic =mi should be analysed as a marker of the
origo’s epistemic primacy, rather than as a direct evidential. I have shown that the enclitic is a
non-truth conditional marker which can occur in constructions grounded in different sources of evidence, and that it cannot be analysed as encoding the origo’s direct evidence/best possible ground for making a speech act. However, if =mi is analysed as a marker encoding the origo’s epistemic primacy, its distribution can be accounted for. I have also shown that the marker is non-truth conditional, and suggested that it can be interpreted as a modifier of illocutionary force.

Tena Kichwa is not the only Quechuan variety in which the speaker’s choice of an ‘evidential’ enclitic is grounded not only in mode of access to the information. As mentioned in the discussion of evidential systems in other Quechuan languages, several of them have systems of five or six markers. All these systems have the ‘standard’ direct, indirect and reportative markers. Apart from that, they have markers which encode whether the information is shared between the speaker and the addressee. South Concuchos Quechua has markers asserting mutual knowledge (=cha:) and indicating a conjecture shared by speech act participants (=cher) (Hintz & Hintz 2014). Sihuas Quechua shows the same distinction, and also distinguishes between reported information (=shi), and generalised knowledge based on reported information (=sha) (Hintz & Hintz 2014). This shows that in certain Quechuan varieties, the ‘evidential’ systems are susceptible to the distinction between information which is only known to the origo, and the one that is known to both interlocutors. The TK ‘evidential’ system seems to be susceptible to similar intersubjective factors – the ‘epistemic primacy’ meanings of =mi encodes the fact that the origo has more/better quality information than her interlocutor.

Since TK is recognised as one of the least ‘conservative’ Quechuan varieties, it is plausible that the meaning of =mi in TK has undergone semantic change from an evidential to an epistemic primacy marker. Change from marking the source of information towards marking epistemic primacy is in line with the observation made by Traugott and Dasher (2002) who recognise ‘intersubjectification’ as a process of grammaticalisation that consists of a gradual development from a subjective perspective, representing the inner states of the speaker, to an intersubjective one, incorporating the perspectives of other speech act participants. It has been mentioned above that in certain Quechuan dialects the evidential paradigms have markers which encode the perspectives of both the speaker and the addressee (Howard 2012; Hintz & Hintz 2014). While these systems are labelled as ‘evidential’ by the authors of their descriptions, they are clearly intersubjective in nature, and concerned not only with the source of evidence, but also with the distribution of knowledge/information between the participants of the speech situations. In the light of these descriptions, the analysis of the TK enclitic =mi as encoding the origo’s epistemic primacy rather than the direct evidence/best possible ground evidence seems to fit with patterns of semantic change attested both cross-linguistically and in other Quechuan varieties.
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