Patients’ choice and hospital quality competition: Unintended impacts of the signals

Tuesday 10 July 2018, 2.00PM to 3.15pm

Speaker: Professor Mireia Jofre-Bonet, City, University of London

Abstract: Patients’ choice is central to the recent reforms of the NHS and it relies on quality indicators being publicly available. We write a model in which patients can choose hospitals and hospitals choose their treatment quality. As is standard, consumers’ willingness to pay for quality - and to acquire information on quality - is increasing in wealth. Consumers aim to maximize the quality of the treatment received. Hospital quality indicators are available to patients with a certain precision. We find that the precision with which quality is released may increase the disparity of treatments across the wealth distribution. We test some of the implications of this model using the Hospital Episodes Statistics for England and we find that wealthier individuals in lower income areas exercise choice to a greater degree than their less wealthy neighbours and individuals tend to use GP defined choice sets. These findings are consistent with our choice model and empirical models of rationally inattentive choice.

Location: ARRC Auditorium A/RC/014

Who to contact

For more information on these seminars, contact:

Maria Jose Aragon
Jessica Ochalek

CHE Seminar Programme

  • Thursday 7 June
    Eleonora Fichera, University of Bath
  • Tuesday 10 July
    Mireia Jofre-Bonet, City, University of London
  • Thursday 13 September
    Rachel Elliott, University of Manchester
  • Thursday 4 October
    Josh Carlson, University of Washington 
  • Thursday 8 November 
    Carol Propper, Imperial College London
  • Thursday 6 December
    Joanna Coast, University of Bristol