Research
Overview
Research interests
Moral Philosophy, Theories of Practical Reason, Normative Theory, History of Moral Philosophy, Decision Theory, Social Choice, Epistemology.
Current projects
- ‘Counting Reasons and Saving Lives’ (a paper on number scepticism and, more generally, on the foundations of consequentialism)
- ‘The Normativity of Rationality’ (a paper on the relation between reasons and rationality, which continues work done in my paper 'Ewing's Problem)
- ‘The Bootstrapping Objection’ (a paper arguing that there is no general bootstrapping problem for mind-based accounts of practical reasons)
- ‘The Normative Force of Decision Theory’ (to counter Broome's criticism of decision theory as normatively vacuous)
- ‘The Philosophy of Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (a project on the philosophical commitments of CBA)
- ‘Is Sosa’s epistemology apt?’ (to investigate whether aptness, accuracy because of adroitness, can play the important role Sosa assigns to it in his analysis of knowledge)
- ‘Virtue Theory versus Deontology in Epistemology’ (continuing my work of ‘Valuing Knowledge’, where I argue for a deontological understanding of justification)
- ‘What is epistemic value?’ (to investigate the tension between an attributive theory of goodness and the idea that epistemic values are on a par with other kinds of ‘non-attributive’ values, like social, aesthetic, or moral values)
- Instrumental Value (to argue that there is no conception of instrumental value that could be the basis of instrumental reasoning)
- Subjectivism and Objectivism in Normative theory (to defend what I take to be Pritchard’s view which, to put it somewhat paradoxically, is to defend subjectivism by showing that is a form of objectivism)
- Final Value (to argue that the conception of final value is not on a par with analogous distinctions in value theory as it presupposes a substantial commitment regarding what it is to be valuable)
- Fairness and Goodness (an exploration of Broome’s anti-consequentialist account of fairness and its uses in a consequentialist framework)
- Liberty, Rights, and Consistency (a defence of minimal consistency against Sugden’s rights-based criticism)
- Is there a Gettier Problem in Practical Philosophy? (to discuss the reliance of virtue epistemology on parallels between beliefs and actions)