Christian Piller
Senior Lecturer

Profile

Career

2011-2012 Research Fellow Institute of Advanced Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 
2010 (summer term) Visiting Professor  University of Vienna
2007 - Senior Lecturer University of York
1996 - 2007 Lecturer University of York
1997 PhD Princeton University, USA
1994 MA Princeton University, USA
1991 - 1995 Teaching Assistant Princeton University, USA
1989 - 1991 University Assistant University of Innsbruck, Austria
1987 - 1989 Research Fellow University of Graz, Austria
1987 Mag.Phil University of Graz, Austria

Departmental roles

  • Chair of the PEP Board of Studies

Research

Overview

Research interests

Moral Philosophy, Theories of Practical Reason, Normative Theory, History of Moral Philosophy, Decision Theory, Social Choice, Epistemology.

Current projects

  • ‘Counting Reasons and Saving Lives’ (a paper on number scepticism and, more generally, on the foundations of consequentialism)
  •  ‘The Normativity of Rationality’ (a paper on the relation between reasons and rationality, which continues work done in my paper 'Ewing's Problem)
  • ‘The Bootstrapping Objection’ (a paper arguing that there is no general bootstrapping problem for mind-based accounts of practical reasons) 
  •  ‘The Normative Force of Decision Theory’ (to counter Broome's criticism of decision theory as normatively vacuous)
  •  ‘The Philosophy of Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (a project on the philosophical commitments of CBA) 
  •  ‘Is Sosa’s epistemology apt?’ (to investigate whether aptness, accuracy because of adroitness, can play the important role Sosa assigns to it in his analysis of knowledge)
  •  ‘Virtue Theory versus Deontology in Epistemology’ (continuing my work of ‘Valuing Knowledge’, where I argue for a deontological understanding of justification)
  •  ‘What is epistemic value?’ (to investigate the tension between an attributive theory of goodness and the idea that epistemic values are on a par with other kinds of ‘non-attributive’ values, like social, aesthetic, or moral values)
  •  Instrumental Value (to argue that there is no conception of instrumental value that could be the basis of instrumental reasoning)
  •  Subjectivism and Objectivism in Normative theory (to defend what I take to be Pritchard’s view which, to put it somewhat paradoxically, is to defend subjectivism by showing that is a form of objectivism) 
  •  Final Value (to argue that the conception of final value is not on a par with analogous distinctions in value theory as it presupposes a substantial commitment regarding what it is to be valuable)
  •  Fairness and Goodness (an exploration of Broome’s anti-consequentialist account of fairness and its uses in a consequentialist framework)
  •  Liberty, Rights, and Consistency (a defence of minimal consistency against Sugden’s rights-based criticism) 
  •  Is there a Gettier Problem in Practical Philosophy? (to discuss the reliance of virtue epistemology on parallels between beliefs and actions)

Publications

Selected publications


Teaching

Undergraduate

  • Ethics
  • Free Will and Moral Responsibility
  • Moral Relativism
  • Meta-ethics
  • The Structure of the Good
  • Practical Reason and Ethics
  • Normative Ethics
  • Rationality, Morality and Economics

Postgraduate

  • Ethical Thinking
  • Ethics
  • Philosophy, Politics and Economics of Social Choice


 
Christian Piller (c) Ian Martindale (www.ianmartindale.co.uk)

Contact details

Dr Christian Piller
Senior Lecturer
Department of Philosophy
University of York
Heslington
York
YO10 5DD

Tel: 01904 323261


http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~cjp7/